第 344 期·中文精讀

諾姆·布朗:撲克中 AI 與人類的對抗及策略性談判博弈

Noam Brown: AI vs Humans in Poker and Games of Strategic Negotiation

OpenAI 研究者諾姆·布朗講撲克 AI 的訓練思路、博弈論基礎與機器在談判類任務中的推理。

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中文精讀由 AI 基於原始訪談改寫,非官方翻譯,可能存在偏差或錯誤;表述以原音訊與官方文稿為準。說明

2017 年 1 月,匹茲堡。一臺叫 Libratus 的機器,在 20 天裡跟四位世界頂級單挑無限注德州撲克(No Limit Texas Hold'em)選手打了 12 萬手牌,贏走了接近 200 萬美元的籌碼。

同一批人,2015 年也打過一場。那次機器輸得很難看,差距不小。

兩年時間,對手沒換,規則沒換,賭注沒換。變的是演算法裡一個很具體的選擇,而這個選擇後來被證明,比多算幾百萬手牌重要得多。

Libratus 是拉丁語,意思是"平衡"。名字是諾姆·布朗(Noam Brown)起的。他當時在卡內基梅隆讀博,現在是 Meta AI(原 FAIR)的研究科學家。他參與打造的三個系統,構成了這條研究線的三級臺階:Libratus 打贏雙人無限注德州撲克,Pluribus 打贏六人局,Cicero 在《外交》(Diplomacy)這個靠自然語言談判推動的桌遊裡達到人類水平。

表面上這是三個遊戲。往深了看,這是同一個問題的三種難度:資訊不完全、對手會思考、對手還會說話。

無限注的真正區別,藏在人的心理閾值裡

無限注德州撲克是全世界最流行的撲克變體。電影裡那些場景,《007:大戰皇家賭場》《賭王之王》,桌上玩的都是它。

跟限注版本比,規則差異只有一句話:你可以在任何時候把面前所有的籌碼推進底池。限注局裡底池有 2 美元,你最多隻能下 2 美元。無限注局裡,面前擺著 1 萬美元,你就隨時可以推 1 萬美元進去。

開局底池可能只有一兩美元,一手牌打完,桌上可能已經有 1000 美元。籌碼量能以極快的速度放大,這個選項永遠擺在桌上。

布朗提到一個詞,jumpy,大致可以譯成"跳腳"。很多人在無限注裡輸錢,輸在這個地方:坐下的時候想的是玩個一百美元,打了兩圈,底池突然變成一千美元,手就開始抖,判斷就開始變形。

他自己給了一個很生活化的解釋。打撲克你要選的,是期望值最大的那個動作。這跟投資是一個邏輯:如果桌上這筆錢的輸贏會實質影響你的生活,你就會不自覺地轉向風險厭惡。對手推一個大注過來,你腦子裡冒出來的第一句話往往是"這太多了,我承受不起"。這一瞬間,你已經不在算牌了。

反過來,主動推大注的人也吃同一碗飯。撲克的核心策略之一,就是把對手放進一個不舒服的位置。底池裡躺著 50 美元,你甩進去 1000 美元,如果時機選對,對手就被迫在一個他從來沒準備好面對的量級上做決定。

這件事當然雙向。推錯了,你也會輸掉一大筆。布朗說得很直白,不懂行的人在無限注裡虧錢非常容易,但反過來,上升空間也大。

所以"無限注獎勵瘋子"這個說法只對了一半。它獎勵的是那種能精確控制自己瘋狂頻率的人。真正被懲罰的,是承受不了那個數字的人。

納什均衡:石頭剪刀布裡藏著的那個真理

任何有限的、雙人的、零和博弈,都存在一個最優策略。你按它打,不管對手做什麼,期望上你不會輸。

這個結論對很多人來說是反常識的,但它在象棋裡成立,在撲克裡成立,在所有滿足條件的雙人零和博弈裡都成立。

布朗用石頭剪刀布給直覺。你按相同機率出石頭、剪刀、布,對手怎麼出都無所謂,長期下來你不會虧。

撲克同理。存在一套非常複雜的策略,按它打,長期你不會輸錢,實際對局裡大機率還會贏。

"期望"這個詞要拆開看。撲克方差極大,你會贏一些牌,也會輸一些牌,就算打的是完美策略,也沒法保證每一手都贏。打得足夠久,至少不虧,通常還會賺。這個"期望"講的是籌碼量長期的變化,它不含一個現實約束:你會不會中途破產。理論上你不會,現實裡你可能已經沒錢上桌了。

"有限"這個條件其實很寬鬆。大多數遊戲本來就是有限的,很多無限遊戲裡也存在這套完美策略,只要滿足緊緻性一類的技術條件。真有反例,比如那個著名的小遊戲:誰報的數字大誰贏。這個遊戲沒有納什均衡。訪談裡兩人還當場玩了一把,萊克斯喊 17,布朗喊 18,贏了。

"零和"這個條件更關鍵。我贏 50 美元,就意味著你輸 50 美元,總量守恆。

一旦走出雙人零和,納什均衡依然存在,但它的意義大打折扣。布朗舉了《風險》(Risk)這個遊戲:如果桌上其他所有人商量好了聯手先把你滅了,你沒有任何一套策略能保證自己贏。你做什麼都沒用。

六人撲克也在這條線上。它依然是籌碼守恆的,但三個以上玩家同場,納什均衡給不了你"不會輸"的保證。雙人博弈裡,策略是你的護城河;多人博弈裡,別人的聯合才是你的天花板。

這也解釋了一件很多人沒意識到的事:為什麼撲克 AI 的進展順序是先雙人、後六人。Pluribus 打贏六人局發生在 Libratus 之後,間隔一年多。技術上六人局的複雜度高得多,但更大的障礙在於,理論保證在多人局裡消失了,你沒法再聲稱自己"不可被擊敗",只能聲稱自己在實戰裡贏了。

反事實遺憾最小化:把"如果我當時"算到底

怎麼找到那個均衡?布朗團隊用的是自我對弈(self play)。

演算法一開始完全隨機地打牌,打到一手牌結束,贏了 50 美元,然後回頭覆盤:如果我當時選另一個動作會怎樣?如果我在這一步加註而不是跟注,對手會怎麼反應?因為對面坐的是自己的副本,這個反事實推理做得出來。它會算出"如果我這麼走,對手那麼走,我再這麼走,最後能贏 150 美元而不是 50"。

然後它更新那個動作的後悔值(regret)。後悔值大致等於:過去沒打這個動作,我有多後悔。下次遇到同樣的局面,後悔值高的動作被選中的機率就更高。

這個過程反覆跑,後悔值不斷累積。按正確的方式把高後悔值動作的機率提上去,數學上可以證明它會收斂到納什均衡。哪怕是不完全資訊博弈,結論照樣成立。

這個方法叫反事實遺憾最小化(counterfactual regret minimization,CFR)。它不必然繫結自我對弈,只是自我對弈是它最自然的實現方式,也是一種有理論保證的強化學習。

布朗特意點了一句:這套東西跟人類學牌的方式非常像。你跟朋友打完一手牌,會問一句"如果我在轉牌加註,你會跟嗎"。這就是在做反事實推理,跟演算法乾的事一模一樣。規模放大到千萬手,你就能逼近一套最優策略。

這裡有個細節值得技術人留意。CFR 的強項不只是"會學習",而是"有證明"。在完全資訊博弈裡,你甚至不需要這麼嚴密的演算法,隨便來點蒙特卡洛樹搜尋加上自我對弈就能收斂。一旦進入不完全資訊,理論的嚴密性就變成了必需品,隨手的工程手段會直接失效。

10 的 161 次方:為什麼需要神經網路

問題在於,無限注德州撲克的決策點數量大概是 10 的 161 次方。宇宙裡的原子數大約是 10 的 80 次方,平方一下是 10 的 160 次方。這個遊戲的規模比"宇宙原子數的平方"還大一截。

你不可能遍歷所有局面。你也不可能指望再次遇到完全相同的局面,機率低到可以忽略。神經網路解決的是"相似":遇到一個沒見過的局面,它可以從見過的、結構類似的局面裡泛化,把那些局面上積累的後悔值遷移過來。

布朗補了一句,這個數字還取決於籌碼量怎麼設定,不同版本會有出入。但量級擺在這裡,多一兩個數量級不改變結論。

訓練用的版本里,機器自己的下注尺度是有約束的,它只在一個有限的候選集裡選。但對面的真人選手不受這個限制,想推多少推多少。這構成了一個不對稱:對手可以出招到你的搜尋空間之外,你不能。所以搜尋模組必須能處理"預期之外的輸入",這跟很多工程系統面臨的處境是一樣的。

撲克和象棋,哪個更難

這是個會吵起來的問題。布朗的回答很乾脆:撲克。他還開了個玩笑,說這個答案大概會讓 DeepMind 的大衛·席爾瓦(David Silver)不太高興。

不完全資訊是第一個理由。德州撲克裡,你拿到兩張牌,只有你能看見;對手也拿到兩張,只有他能看見。你打牌的時候得同時算四件事:他以為我有什麼,我有什麼,他有什麼,他以為我以為他有什麼。

詐唬能成立,全靠這個不對稱。你手裡的牌很爛,但你下注,對手不知道,你就有可能贏下這一手。

第二個理由更微妙,也更值得琢磨:在不完全資訊博弈裡,策略不只是"打哪個動作",還包括"以多大機率打這個動作",而機率本身決定了這個動作的價值。

回到石頭剪刀布。你每次都出石頭,對手很快發現規律,你的石頭就不值錢了。你幾乎從不出石頭,只出 1% 的時候出,對手大機率在出剪刀,這時候你石頭的價值高得離譜。

平移到撲克:你從來不詐唬,名聲在外,某一天突然詐唬一次,成功率極高,賺得很多。反過來,你被人看出是個詐唬慣犯,你一詐唬就被人跟到底,你會輸得很慘。找到那個詐唬頻率,就是撲克的核心難題。

象棋裡沒有這回事。你十次開局走王后棄兵,還是一百次走王后棄兵,這個動作的期望值不變。

所以撲克的演算法要解決的是兩件事:每個動作值不值得打,以及每個動作該用多高的頻率去打。後一件才是真正難的地方,也是前面那些 CFR、搜尋、神經網路存在的理由。Libratus 這個名字取"平衡",就是因為它被設計成去找那個頻率上的平衡點。

頻率不只管詐唬。下注多少、用哪些牌下注、大注還是小注,全都是頻率問題。所謂"範圍"(range)這個概念就來自這裡:你在某個位置詐唬的時候,不希望對手能抓到規律,所以你得同時想"如果我手裡是好牌,我會不會也這麼打"。你的動作要能被對手對映到很多種手牌,這個動作才夠好。

這套"我知道你知道我知道"的推理,在成功的撲克 AI 裡是被顯式建模的。共同知識的信念狀態,被直接寫進了演算法。它沒有從對局裡自己湧現出來。

12 萬手牌,200 萬美元,和 2015 年那場慘敗

布朗讀博期間,每年有個"計算機撲克競賽",全世界做撲克 AI 的實驗室帶著自己的機器人來對打。他們的機器人贏了 2014 年和 2016 年的比賽。

他們決定把這個東西推到真人頂級選手面前。四位專精單挑無限注德州撲克的世界級選手,20 天,12 萬手牌,20 萬美元獎金池,按四個人互相之間的相對戰績分配,目的是讓他們有動機認真打。

這不是他們第一次幹這件事。2015 年,團隊帶著當時的版本跟職業選手打過一場,輸得很明顯。

從 2015 到 2017,改進的核心在演算法層面。

2015 年的思路是"先把整個遊戲解出來"。賽前把能算的算完,做成一張巨大的查詢表,實戰時遇到什麼局面就查表。

2017 年的思路轉向實時搜尋。賽前那張表只作為起點,每次真正做決策的時候,現場再算一遍:針對當前這個具體局面,重新求一個更好的策略。

聽起來像工程最佳化,實際上是正規化差異。查表意味著你把計算預算花在賽前,把所有可能性都鋪平;實時搜尋意味著你把預算花在當下這個點上,只算眼前這一步。前者在遇到表外局面時會直接崩掉,後者天然有應對空間。

搜尋空間長什麼樣?象棋裡的搜尋是你在這個局面下能走哪些棋,走完之後局面變成什麼樣。撲克裡搜的東西更繞:你搜的是自己可以採取的動作、採取這些動作的機率,以及你如果拿的是別的牌,你會怎麼做。

最後這一項是最難理解的。你手裡一把爛牌,想詐唬。這個詐唬好不好,取決於你會不會在同樣的位置用好牌也下注。如果你只在爛牌時下注,那就是明牌詐唬,對手一眼看穿。所以演算法必須同時評估"我拿好牌的時候怎麼打",兩邊的頻率要配平,對手才會陷入兩難:這注到底該跟還是該棄。

這正是布朗說的目標:永遠讓對手留著一絲懷疑。

最終的結果是,12 萬手牌,接近 200 萬美元。這一次機器人沒有試圖適應對手,沒有試圖讀人,沒有搞任何心理戰,它只是在逼近納什均衡。

然後它把四位頂級選手打崩了。

GTO 與剝削:一場持續多年的爭論,被一場比賽終結

撲克圈和學術界為這件事吵了很久。一邊叫 GTO(game theory optimal,博弈論最優),一邊叫剝削性打法(exploitative play)。

2017 年之前,佔上風的其實是後者。很多人說,博弈論那套東西純屬紙上談兵,真想賺錢,你得盯著對手的眼睛,讀出他的靈魂,猜出他手裡是什麼牌。

後來情況慢慢變了。一批選手開始老老實實打接近 GTO 的策略,賺到了錢,而且不太去調整自己適應對手。Libratus 那場比賽把這件事釘死了。

但布朗對菲爾·赫爾穆特(Phil Hellmuth)的評價很有意思。他承認這位撲克傳奇有時候打得並不"最優",可他就是贏。布朗的解釋是,赫爾穆特的強項不在於讓自己變得不可預測,而在於他能引導對手犯錯:讓對手以為自己有某個弱點,然後預判對手會怎麼調整打法,再反手針對這個調整。

這是個兩層結構。第一層,你偏離均衡去剝削對手。第二層,對手發現你在剝削他,他也偏離均衡來反制你。誰在第二層站得更高,誰就贏。

頂尖人類選手通常的做法是:先把自己的策略打到接近均衡,讓自己不可被剝削;同時在實戰中觀察對手哪裡露出了破綻,再針對性地偏出去一點。偏離是有限度的,因為每一次偏離都在給對方留下可利用的空間。

這裡有個常被混淆的點需要說清。納什均衡不等於"可預測"。恰恰相反,均衡策略的全部意義就在於讓你變得難猜。赫爾穆特的混亂風格之所以有效,是因為它讓對手無法建立穩定的模型,這跟均衡策略要達到的效果在方向上是一致的,只是路徑不同。

訪談裡萊克斯問了一個布朗沒往深處答、但其實挺重要的問題:能不能把"表演性"也建模進去?職業牌手的收入大頭來自贊助和曝光,不來自牌桌。一個能說垃圾話、能製造節目效果、偶爾故意打得離譜的 AI,在商業上是更值錢的。

這已經不是博弈論問題了。

會贏的 AI 和好玩的 AI,是兩種東西

布朗把這個區分講得很清楚:贏下一個遊戲的 AI,和讓人願意跟它玩的 AI,是兩碼事。再加上一個維度,讓人願意看它玩的 AI,又是第三碼事。

他聽過做遊戲 AI 的人講過這個。《文明》(Civilization)系列裡的 AI 從來不打最優解,它們在做另一件事:製造人格,製造性格,讓局面好看。真按勝率最佳化,遊戲會變得很難玩。

萊克斯剛跟託德·霍華德(Todd Howard)聊過,就是《輻射》《上古卷軸》《星空》背後的那個人。話題自然滑到 NPC 上:大語言模型會把開放世界 RPG 裡的 NPC 變成什麼樣。

布朗的判斷是,這可能是大語言模型最早進入大眾消費場景的應用之一。《上古卷軸 6》大概快做完了,趕不上;《上古卷軸 7》用上語言模型,他一點都不意外。萊克斯在旁邊補了一句"這是我猜的,不是他說的",兩人笑了一下。

更有意思的是布朗講的一段往事。他讀書時聽一位遊戲公司高管的分享,臺下有人問:為什麼這些遊戲全都圍繞著打打殺殺?那位高管的回答是,做一個能跟你對話、能跟你合作的 AI,比做一個能跟你對打的 AI,難太多了。

這個解釋放在今天看,依然成立,但正在鬆動。當對話不再需要逐句寫死指令碼,非戰鬥類的互動就有了空間。大量以合作為核心、以關係為核心的遊戲形態會被解鎖。

萊克斯提了個更野的方向:未必是正向的,可能只是戲劇性。你進《使命召喚》,不開槍,蹲在角落裡跟一個 AI 拌嘴,被它陰陽怪氣了一頓,晚上睡不著,第二天專門回去把這場架吵完。

布朗覺得這個方向挺帶勁。遊戲世界有個天然優勢:玩家心裡清楚這不是真實世界,所以 AI 犯點錯、出點亂子,代價可控。就像《外交》這個遊戲,它不是真實的地緣政治,不是真實的戰爭,它是個遊戲,可以在裡面放一點混亂,放一點樂趣。

從沒有語言的博弈,到有語言的博弈

撲克和《外交》,中間隔著一道坎。

撲克是純策略博弈,全程沒有一句話。所有資訊都編碼在動作裡:下注、加註、跟注、棄牌。詐唬是用籌碼說的謊。對手能讀的只有你的下注模式,你能藏的只有自己的牌。

《外交》不一樣。七個玩家,一戰前的歐洲,談判、結盟、背叛、承諾、威脅,全部透過自然語言完成。你要說服法國跟你一起打德國,你要在最後一刻撕毀約定去搶補給中心,你還得在下一輪重新找到盟友。

這裡的不完全資訊,不只是"你手裡有什麼牌"。更麻煩的是"你說的話算不算數"、"你現在的盟友明天會不會反水"、"你剛才那句承諾是真心還是緩兵之計"。牌是固定的,意圖是流動的。

Cicero 在 2022 年登上 webDiplomacy 平臺的匿名對局,40 局下來,平均得分是人類玩家的兩倍以上,進入了前 10%。它由兩部分組成:一個負責戰略推理的規劃模組,一個負責生成對話的語言模型。規劃模組算出該跟誰結盟、該往哪調兵,語言模型負責把這些意圖翻譯成讓對面信服的人話。

這套組合的難度在於,兩半必須對齊。戰略上你需要法國按兵不動,語言上你就得找出一個法國願意相信的理由,而且這個理由在後續幾十輪裡還得自洽,不能自己打自己的臉。

撲克 AI 裡那個"共同知識信念狀態"的顯式建模,在《外交》裡變成了另一種形態:你要建模的不只是對手認為你手裡有什麼牌,還要建模對手相信你這個人有多可信。前者是機率,後者是聲譽。

從 Libratus 到 Cicero,布朗走的是一條很清晰的線:先解決只有動作的博弈,再解決有語言、需要建立信任的博弈。前者考的是機率和平衡,後者考的是意圖和信譽。而人類世界裡絕大多數難題,都是後者。

這也是為什麼撲克那套東西值得技術人認真看一遍。你做產品定價,對手是競品;你做招聘談判,對手是候選人;你做商務合作,對手是合作方。這些場景的共同結構是:資訊不對稱、對手在思考、你的動作會被解讀成訊號、你的聲譽會影響下一輪的價值。

這四條,恰好就是撲克。

  • 先判斷你面對的是"完全資訊"場景還是"不完全資訊"場景。象棋式的場景裡,把每一步算到最優就夠了;撲克式的場景裡,只算最優會被人讀穿。
  • 在不完全資訊場景裡,主動保留隨機性。固定套路一旦被識別,價值就會歸零。同一個決策,故意用不同方式處理,哪怕單次看不是最優。
  • 做覆盤時,問那句撲克選手會問的話:如果我當時換一種打法,對手會怎麼反應。只覆盤自己做了什麼遠遠不夠,要覆盤對手的應對函式。
  • 評估一個策略的好壞,看它在對手最優應對下的表現,不要只看它在對手犯錯時的表現。後者只能證明對手菜。
  • 多人博弈裡放棄"必勝策略"的幻想。你能控制的是自己不被聯合針對,控制不了別人是否結盟。把精力放在降低自己被圍剿的機率上。
  • 做決策前先問一句:這個動作能不能被對方翻譯成唯一含義。如果你的每一個動作都指向一種意圖,你在談判桌上就沒有任何槓桿。
  • 如果你想做出讓人願意用的 AI 產品,別隻盯著勝率或準確率。好玩、可信、有性格,是另一條獨立的最佳化目標,需要單獨設計。
文稿由本站用語音識別模型(基於官方釋出音訊)機器轉寫,可能有識別錯誤,人名與數字請以音訊為準。
Lex Fridman Podcast #344 – Noam Brown: AI vs Humans in Poker and Games of Strategic Negotiation Machine transcription by Qwen3-ASR 0.6B (MLX, local, Apache-2.0). May contain recognition errors. The following is a conversation with No Brown, research scientist at Fair Facebook AI Research Group at Meta AI. He co-created the first AI system that achieved superhuman level performance in No Limit Texas Hold'em both heads up and multiplayer. And now recently he co-created an AI system that can strategically out negotiate humans using natural language in a popular board game called Diplomacy, which is a war game that emphasizes negotiation. And now a quick few second mention of each sponsor. Check them out in the description. It's the best way to support this podcast. We got True Classic T's for shirts, Audible for audiobooks, Inside Tracker for bio monitoring and ExpressVPN for ISP privacy. Choose wisely, my friends. And now onto the full ad reads as always no ads in the middle. 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So we got Libras that solved or at least achieved human level performance on No Limit Texas Hold'em poker with two players heads up. You got Pluribus that solved No Limit Texas Hold'em poker with six players. And just now you have Cicero. These are all names of systems that solved or achieved human level performance on the game of Diplomacy, which for people who don't know is a popular strategy board game. It was loved by JFK, John F Kennedy and Henry Kissinger and many other big famous people in the decade since. So let's talk about poker and diplomacy today. First poker, what is the game of No Limit Texas Hold'em and how is it different from chess? Well, No Limit Texas Hold'em poker is the most popular variant of poker in the world. So you know you go to a casino, you play, sit down at the poker table. The game that you are playing is No Limit Texas Hold'em. If you watch movies about poker like Casino Royale or Rounders, the game that they're playing is No Limit Texas Hold'em poker. Now it's very different from Limit Hold'em in that you can bet any amount of chips that you want and so the stakes escalate really quickly. You start out with like one or two dollars in the pot and then by the end of the hand you've got like a thousand dollars in there maybe. So the option to increase the number very aggressively very quickly is always there. Right, the no limit aspect is there is no limit to how much you can bet. You know you in Limit Hold'em, there is like two dollars in the pot you you can only bet like two dollars but if you got ten thousand dollars in front of you you are always welcome to put ten thousand dollars into the pot. So I got a chance to hang out with Phil Hellmuth who plays all these different variants of poker. And correct me if I am wrong, but it seems like No Limit rewards crazy versus the other ones rewards more kind of calculated strategy or or no because you are sort of looking from an from an analytic perspective is is strategy also rewarded in No Limit Texas Hold'em. I think both variants reward strategy, but I think what's different about No Limit Hold'em is it's it's much easier to get jumpy. You know you go in there thinking you are going to lose. You know you are going to play for like a hundred dollars or something and suddenly there is like you know a thousand dollars in the pot. A lot of people can't handle that. Can you define jumpy? When you are playing poker, you always want to choose the action that's going to maximize your expected value. It's kind of like kind of like with investing right like if you are ever in a situation where you are the amount of money that's at stake is is going to have a material impact on your life, then you are going to play in a more risk averse style. You know if somebody makes a huge bet, you are going to if you are playing No Limit Hold'em and somebody makes a huge bet, there might come a point where you are like this is too much money for me to handle like I can't risk this amount and that's what throws a lot of people off. So that's the big difference I think between No Limit and Limit. What about on the action side when you are actually making that big bet? That's what I mean by crazy. I was I was trying to refer to the the technical the the technical term of crazy meaning use the big jump in the bet to completely throw off the other person in terms of their ability to reason optimally. I think that's right. I think one of the key strategies in poker is to put the other person into an uncomfortable position and if you are doing that then you are you are playing poker well and there is a lot of opportunities to do that in No Limit Hold'em you know you can have like fifty dollars in there you throw in a thousand dollar bet and you know that sometimes if you do it right it puts the other person in a really tough spot now it's also possible that you make huge mistakes that way and so it's really easy to lose a lot of money in No Limit Hold'em if you don't know what you are doing but there is a lot of upside potential too. So when you build systems AI systems that play these games, we'll talk about poker, we'll talk about diplomacy. Are you are you drawn in in part by the beauty of the game itself? AI aside, or is it to you primarily a fascinating problem set for the AI to solve? I am drawn in by the beauty of the game. When I I started playing poker when I was in high school and the idea to me that there is a correct an objectively correct way of playing poker and if you could figure out what that is then you are you know you are making unlimited money basically. That's like a really fascinating concept to me. And so I was fascinated by the strategy of poker, even when I was like 16 years old. It wasn't until like much later that I actually worked on poker AI's. So there was a sense that you can solve poker like in the way you can solve chess for example or checkers. I believe checkers got solved right. Yeah checkers checkers is completely solved optimal strategy. It's impossible to beat the AI. Yeah and so in that same way you could technically solve chess. You could solve chess. You could solve poker. You could solve poker. So this is this gets into the concept of Nash equilibrium. So what is Nash equilibrium? Okay, so in any finite two player zero sum game, there is an optimal strategy that if you play it you are guaranteed to not lose an expectation no matter what your opponent does. And this is kind of a radical concept to a lot of people, but it's true in chess, it's true in poker, it's true in any finite two player zero sum game. And to give some intuition for this, you can think of rock paper scissors. In rock paper scissors, if you randomly choose between throwing rock paper and scissors with equal probability, then no matter what your opponent does, you are not going to lose an expectation. You are not going to lose an expectation in the long run. Now the same is true for poker. There exists some strategy, some really complicated strategy that if you play that you are guaranteed to not lose money in the long run and I should say this is for two player poker, six player poker is a different story. Yeah it's a beautiful giant mess. When you say in expectation, you are guaranteed not to lose in expectation. What does in expectation mean? Poker is a very high variance game, so you are going to have hands where you win, you are going to have hands where you lose, even if you are playing the perfect strategy, you can't guarantee that you are going to win every single hand, but if you play for long enough, then you are guaranteed to at least break even and and in practice probably win. So that's in expectation the size of your stack generally speaking. Now that doesn't include anything about the fact that you can go broke. It doesn't include any of those kinds of normal real world limitations. You are talking in a in a theoretical world. What about the the zero sum aspect? How big of a constraint is that? How big of a constraint is finite? So finite's not a huge constraint. So I mean most games that you play are finite in size. It's also true actually that there exists this like perfect strategy in many infinite games as well. Technically the game has to be compact. There are like some edge cases where you don't have an Nash equilibrium in a two player zero sum game. So you can think of a game where like you know if we're playing a game where whoever names the bigger number is the winner, there is no Nash equilibrium to that game. 17. Yeah, 18. You beat. You win again. You are good at this. Played a lot of games. Okay, so that's and then the zero sum aspect the zero zero sum aspect. So there exists a Nash equilibrium in non two player zero sum games as well. And by the way, just to clarify what I mean by two player zero sum, I mean there is two players and whatever one player wins the other player loses. So if we're playing poker and I win fifty dollars, that means that you are losing fifty dollars. Now outside of two player zero sum games, there still exists Nash equilibrium, but they're not as meaningful because you know you can think of a game like risk. If everybody else at the and on the board decides a team up against you and take you out, there is no perfect strategy you can play that's going to guarantee that you win there. There is just nothing you can do. So outside of two player zero sum games, there is no guarantee that you are going to win by playing a Nash equilibrium. Have you ever tried to model in the other aspects of the game, which is like the pleasure you draw from playing the game and then if you are a professional poker player, if you are exciting even if you lose. The you know the money you would get from the attention you get to the sponsors and all that kind of stuff is that that would be a fun thing to model to model in. I wish that would make it sort of super complex to include the human factor and this in its full complexity. I think you bring up a couple good points there. So I think a lot of professional poker players, I mean they get a huge amount of money not from actually playing poker but from the sponsorships and having a personality that people want to tune in and watch that that's a big that's a big way to to make a name for yourself in poker. I just wonder from an AI perspective if you create and we'll talk about this more maybe an AI system that also talks trash and all that kind of stuff that that becomes part of the function to maximize so it's not just optimal poker play maybe sometimes you want to be chaotic maybe sometimes you want to be suboptimal and you lose the the chaos and maybe sometimes you want to be overly aggressive because the audience loves that. Yeah, fascinating. I think I think what you are getting at here is that there is a difference between making an AI that wins a game and an AI that's fun to play with. Yeah, yeah, and or fun to watch. So those are all different things, fun to play with and fun to watch. Yeah, and I think you know I've I've heard talks from like game designers and and they say like you know people that work on AI for actual recreational games that people play and they say yeah there is a big difference between trying to make an AI that actually wins and you know you look at a game like Civilization the way that the AI's play is not optimal for trying to win they're they're playing a different game they're trying to have personalities they're trying to be fun and engaging and that makes for a better game. Yeah and we also talk about NPCs. I just talked to Todd Howard who is the the creator of Fallout and the Elder Scrolls series and Starfield a new game coming out and the creator what I think is the greatest game of all time which is Skyrim and the NPCs there the AI that governs that whole game is very interesting but the NPCs also are super interesting and considering what language models might do to NPCs in an open world RPG role playing game. It's super exciting. Yeah, honestly, I am. I think this is like one of the first applications where we're going to see like real consumer interaction with large language models. I guess let Skyrim Elder Scrolls six is in development now. They're probably like pretty close to finishing it, but I would not be surprised at all if Elder Scrolls seven was using large language models for their NPCs. No, they're not. They're I mean I am not saying anything. Not saying anything. Okay, this is me speculating, not you. No, but but there is they're just releasing the Starfield game. They do one game at a time. Yeah, and so whatever it is, whenever the date is, I don't know what the date is. Calm down, but it would be I don't know like 2024, 25, 26. So it's actually very possible that would include language models. I was listening to this this talk by a gaming executive when I was in grad school, and one of the questions that a person in the audience asked is why are all these games so focused on fighting and killing? And the person responded that it's just so much harder to make an AI that can talk with you and cooperate with you than it is to make an AI that can fight you. And I think once this technology develops further and you can have you can reach a point where like not every single line of dialogue has to be scripted, it unlocks a lot of potential for new kinds of games like much more like positive interactions that are not so focused on fighting and I am really looking forward to that. It might not be positive, it might be just drama. So you you'll be in like a Call of Duty game instead of doing the shooting, you'll just be hanging out and like arguing with an AI about like like passive aggressive and then you won't be able to sleep that night. You have to return and continue the argument that you were emotionally hurt. I mean, yeah, I think that's actually an exciting world. Whatever, whatever is the drama, the chaos that we love the push and pull of human connection. I think it's possible to do that in the video game world, and I think you could be messier and make more mistakes in the video game world, which is why it would be a nice place and and also it doesn't have a deep of a as deep of a real psychological impact because inside video games it's kind of understood that you are in a not a real world so whatever crazy stuff AI does we have some flexibility to play just like with a game of diplomacy it's a game this is not real geopolitics not real war it's a it's a game so you could you can have a little bit of fun a little bit of chaos okay back to Nash equilibrium how do we find the Nash equilibrium? All right, so there is different ways to find a Nash equilibrium. So the way that we do it is with this process called self play. Basically, we have this algorithm that starts by playing totally randomly and it learns how to play the game by playing against itself. So it will start playing the game totally randomly and then it you know if it's playing poker it'll eventually like get to the end of the end of the game and make fifty dollars, and then it will like review all the decisions that it made along the way and say what would have happened if I had chosen this other action instead. You know if I had raised here instead of called, what would the other player have done? And because it's playing against a copy of itself, it's able to do that counterfactual reasoning. So it can say, okay, well if I took this action and the other person takes this action and then I take this action and eventually I make one hundred fifty dollars instead of fifty. And so it updates the regret value for that action. Regret is basically like how much does it regret having not played that action in the past, and when it encounters that same situation again, it's going to pick actions that have higher regret with higher probability. Now it'll just keep simulating the games this way. It'll keep you know accumulating regrets for different situations, and in the long run, if you pick actions that have high regret with higher probability in the correct way, it's proven to converge to a Nash equilibrium. Even for super complex games, even for imperfect information games. It's true for all games. It's true for it's true for chess. It's true for poker. It's particularly useful for poker. So this is the the method of counterfactual regret minimization. This is counterfactual regret minimization. That doesn't have to do with self play. Has to do with just any if you follow this kind of process self play or not. You will be able to arrive at an optimal set of actions. So this counterfactual regret minimization is a kind of self play. It's a principled kind of self play that's proven to converge to Nash equilibrium even in imperfect information games. Now you can have other forms of self play and people use other forms of self play for perfect information games. Um, where you have more flexibility the algorithm doesn't have to be as theoretically sound. Um, in order to converge to to that class of games because there's it's a simpler setting. Sure. So I kind of in in my brain the word self play has mapped to neural networks but we're speaking something bigger than just neural networks it could be anything. The self play mechanism is just the mechanism of a system playing itself. Exactly. Yeah, self play is not tied specifically to neural nets. It's it's a kind of reinforcement learning basically. Okay. And I would also say this process of like trying to reason oh what would the value have been if I had taken this other action instead. This is very similar to how humans learn to play a game like poker right like you probably played poker before and with your friends you probably ask like oh would you have called me if I raised there. You know and that's that's a person trying to do the same kind of like learning from a counterfactual that the AI is doing. Okay and if you do that at scale you are going to be able to learn an optimal policy. Yeah. Now where the neural nets come in I said like okay if it's in that situation again then it will choose the action that has has high regret now the problem is that poker is such a huge game you know I think no limit Texas Hold'em the version that we were playing has 10 of the 161 different decision points which is more than the number of atoms in the universe squared. That's heads up. That's heads up. Yeah. 10 of the 161 you said. Yeah I mean it depends on the number of chips that you have the stacks and everything but like the version that we were playing was 10 of the 161. Which I assume would be a somewhat simplified version anyway because the. But there's some like step function you had for like bets. Oh no no that's that's I'm saying like we played the the full game you can bet whatever amount you want and the bot maybe was constrained in like what it considered for bet sizes but the the person on the other side could bet whatever they wanted. Yeah I mean 161 plus or minus 10 doesn't matter. Um and so the the way neural nets help out here is you know you don't have to run into the same exact situation because that's never going to happen again the odds of you running into the same exact situation are pretty slim but if you run into a similar situation then you can generalize from other states that you've been in that kind of look like that one and you can say like well these other situations I had high regret for this action and so maybe I should play that action here as well. Which is the more complex game chess or poker or go or poker do you know. That is a controversial question. Okay I'm gonna. Was like somebody screaming on Reddit right now it depends on which subreddit you're on is it chess or is it poker. I'm sure like David Silver is going to get really angry at me. Yeah I'll I'll say I'm going to say poker actually and I think for a couple reasons. They're not here to defend themselves. So first of all you have the imperfect information aspect and so it's um it. We we can go into that but like once you introduce imperfect information, uh things get much more complicated. So we should say maybe you can describe what is seen to the players what is not seen, uh in the game of Texas Hold'em. Yeah so Texas Hold'em you get two cards face down that only you see um and so that's the hidden information of the game the other players also all get two cards face down that only they see. Um and so you have to kind of as you're playing reason about like okay what do they think I have what do they have what do they think I think they have that kind of stuff and um that's that's kind of where bluffing comes into play right because the fact that you can bluff the fact that you can bet with a bad hand and still win is because they don't know what your cards are. And that's the that's the key difference between a perfect information game like poker sorry like chess and go um and imperfect information games like poker. This is what trash talk looks like. The implied statement is the game I solved is much tougher. But yeah so when you're playing I'm just going to do random questions here so when you're playing your opponent under imperfect information. Is there some degree to which you're trying to estimate the range of hands that they have, or is that not part of the algorithm? So what are the different approaches to the imperfect information game. So the key thing to understand about why imperfect information makes things difficult is that you have to worry not just about which actions to play but the probability that you're going to play those actions. So you think about um rock paper scissors for example rock paper scissors is an imperfect information game. Um because you don't know what I'm about to throw. I do but yeah usually not yeah. And so you can't just say like oh I'm just going to throw rock every single time because the other person is going to figure that out and notice a pattern and then suddenly you're going to start losing. And so you don't just have to figure out like which action to play you have to figure out the probability that you play it. And really importantly the value of an action depends on the probability that you're going to play it. So if you're playing rock every single time that value is really low but if you're. Never playing rock you play rock like one percent of the time and suddenly the the other person is probably going to be throwing scissors and when you throw rock the value of that action is going to be really high. Now you take that to poker what that means is the value of bluffing for example if you're the kind of person that never bluffs and you have this reputation as somebody that that never bluffs and suddenly you bluff there's a really good chance that that bluff is going to work and you're going to make a lot of money. On the other hand if you got a reputation like if they see you play for a long time and they see oh you're the kind of person that's bluffing all the time when you bluff they're not going to buy it and they're going to call you down you're going to lose a lot of money. And that finding that balance of how often you should be bluffing is the key challenge of a game of poker. And um you contrast that with a game like chess. It doesn't matter if you're opening with the queen's gambit 10 of the time or 100 of the time the value the expected value is the same. So um so that's that's why we need these algorithms. That understand not just we have to figure out what actions are good but the probabilities we need to get the exact probabilities correct and that's actually when we created the bot Lebratus Lebratus means balanced because the algorithm that we designed. Was designed to find that right balance of how often it should play each action. The balance of how often in the key sort of branching is the bluff or not the bluff. Is that is that a good crude simplification of the major decision in poker. It's a good simplification I think that's like the main tension but it's it's not just how often to bluff or not to bluff it's like how often should you bet in general how often should you what what kind of bet should you make. Um should you bet big or should you bet small and with which with with which hands and so this is where the idea of of a range comes from because when you are bluffing with a particular hand in a particular spot. You don't want there to be a pattern for the other person to pick up on you don't want them to figure out oh whenever this person is in this spot they're always bluffing and so you have to reason about okay would I also bet with a good hand in this spot. You want to be unpredictable so you have to think about what would I do if I had this different set of cards. Is there explicit estimation of like a theory of mind that the other person has about you or is that just a emergent thing that happens. The way that the bots handle it that are really successful they have an explicit theory of mind so they are explicitly reasoning about what are. What's the common knowledge belief what does what do you think I have what do I think you have what do you think I think you have um it's explicitly reasoning about that is there multiple use there. So maybe that's jumping ahead to six players but is there a stickiness to the person so it's an iterative game you're playing the same person. There is there's a stickiness to that right you're gathering information as you play it's not every every every hand is in your hand is there um a continuation in terms of estimating what kind of player I'm facing here. That's a good question so you could approach the game that way the way that the bots do it they don't and the way that humans approach it also expert human players the way they approach it is to basically assume that you know my strategy so. I'm going to try to pick a strategy where even if I were to play it for 10 000 hands and you could figure out exactly what it was you still wouldn't be able to beat it basically what that means is I'm trying to approximate the Nash equilibrium I'm trying to be perfectly balanced because if if I'm playing the Nash equilibrium even if you know what my strategy is like I said I'm still unbeatable in expectation. So so that's what that's what the bot aims for and that's actually what a lot of expert poker players aim for as well to start by playing the Nash equilibrium and then maybe if they spot weaknesses in the way you're playing then they can deviate a little bit to take advantage of that. They aim to be unbeatable in expectation okay so who's the greatest poker player of all time and why is it Phil Hellmuth so this is for Phil. So he's known um at least in part for maybe playing suboptimally and he still wins a lot it's a bit chaotic so maybe. Can you speak from an AI perspective about the genius of his madness or the madness of his genius. So playing suboptimally playing chaotically um as a way to make you hard to pin down about what your strategy is. So okay the thing that I should explain first of all with like Nash equilibrium it doesn't mean that it's predictable the whole point of it is that you're trying to be unpredictable. Now I think when somebody like Phil Hellmuth might be really successful is not in being unpredictable but in being able to um. Take advantage of the other player and figure out where they're being predictable or guiding the other player into thinking that you have certain weaknesses and then and then understanding how they're going to change their behavior they're going to deviate from a Nash equilibrium style of play to try to take advantage of those perceived weaknesses and then counter exploit them so you kind of get into the mind games there. So you think about at least heads up poker as as a dance between two agents I guess are you playing the cards are you playing the the player. So this this gets down to a big argument in the poker community and the academic community for a long time there was this debate of like what what's called GTO game theory optimal poker or exploitative play. And um up until about like 2017 when we did the Lebratus match I think actually exploitative play had the advantage a lot of people were saying like oh this whole idea of game theory it's just nonsense and if you really want to make money you got to like look into the other person's eyes and read their soul and figure out what cards they have. But what happened was people started adopting the game theory optimal strategy um and they were making good money and they weren't trying to adapt so much the other player they were just trying to play the Nash equilibrium and then what really solidified it I think was the Lebratus the Lebratus match. Where we played our bot against four top heads up no limit Hold'em poker players and the bot wasn't trying to adapt to them it wasn't trying to exploit them it wasn't trying to do these mind games it was just trying to approximate the Nash equilibrium and it crushed them. I think you know we were playing for 50 100 blinds and over the course of about 120 000 hands it made close to two million dollars 120 000 hands 120 000 hands against humans. Yeah and this was this was fake money to be clear so there was real money at stake there was 200 000 first of all all money is fake but um that's that's that's a different conversation. We give it meaning it's an it's a it's it's a phenomenon that gets meaning from our complex psychology as a human civilization. It's emergent from the collective intelligence of the human species but that's not what you mean you mean like there's literally you can't you can't buy stuff with it okay can you actually step back and take me through that competition. Yeah okay so when I was in grad school there was this thing called the annual computer poker competition where every year all the different research labs that were working on AI for poker would get together they would make a bot they would play them against each other. And we made a bot that actually won the 2014 competition the 2016 competition and so we decided we're going to take this bot build on it and play against real top professional heads up no limit Texas Hold'em poker players. So we invited four of the world's best um players in this specialty and we challenged them to 120 000 hands of poker over the course of 20 days. Um and we had 200 000 200 000 dollars in prize money at stake where it would basically be divided among them depending on how well they did relative to each other. So we wanted to have some incentive for them to play their best. Did you have a confidence 2014 16 that this is even possible how much doubt was there. So and we did a competition actually in 2015 where we also played against professional poker players and the bot lost by by a pretty sizable margin actually now there were some big improvements from 2015 to 2017 and so. Can you speak to the improvements is it computational nature is it the algorithm the the methods it was it was really an algorithmic approach that that was the difference so. 2015 it was much more focused on trying to come up with a strategy upfront like trying to solve the entire game of poker like and then just have a lookup table where you're saying like oh I'm in this situation what's the strategy. Um the approach that we took in 2017 was much more search based it was trying to say okay well let me in real time try to compute a much better strategy than what I had precomputed by playing against myself during self play. What is the search space for poker? What are you searching over? What's that look like? There's different actions like raising calling yeah what are the actions. Um is it just a search over actions. So in a game like chess the the search is like okay I'm in this chess position and I can like you know move these different pieces and see where things end up in poker what you're searching over is the actions you can take for your hand the probabilities that you take those actions and then also the probabilities that you take other actions with other hands that you might have. Um and and that's kind of like a hard to wrap your head around like why are you searching over these like other hands that you might have and like trying to figure out what you would do with those hands. Um and the idea is is again you you want to you want to always be balanced and unpredictable and so if your search algorithm is saying like oh I want to raise with this hand well in order to know whether that's a good action like let's say it's a bluff you know let's say you have a bad hand and you're saying like oh I I think I should be betting here with this really bad hand and bluffing. Well that that's only a good action if you're also. Betting with a strong hand otherwise it's an obvious bluff so if your action in some sense maximizes your unpredictability so that action could be mapped by your opponent to a lot of different hands then that's a good action. Basically what you want to do is put your opponent into a tough spot so you want them to always have some doubt like should I call here should I fold here and if you are raising in the appropriate balance between bluffs and good hands then you're putting them into that tough spot and so that's what we're trying to do we're always trying to search for a strategy that would put the opponent into a difficult position. Can you give a metric that you're trying to maximize or minimize does this have to do with the regret thing what we're talking about in terms of putting your opponent in a maximally tough spot. Yeah ultimately what you're trying to maximize is your expected winning so like your expected value the amount of money that you're going to walk away from assuming that your opponent was playing optimally in response so you're going to assume that your opponent is is also playing like as as well as possible a Nash equilibrium approach because if they're not then you're just going to make more money right like anything that deviates like by definition the Nash equilibrium is the strategy that does the best in expectation. And so if you're deviating from that then you're just they're going to lose money and since it's a two

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