第 345 期·中文精讀

Coffeezilla:SBF、FTX、欺詐、騙局、假大師、金錢、名聲與權力

Coffeezilla: SBF, FTX, Fraud, Scams, Fake Gurus, Money, Fame, and Power

Coffeezilla 覆盤 FTX 崩塌與 SBF 案,拆解加密騙局、假導師與網紅經濟中的灰色地帶。

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中文精讀由 AI 基於原始訪談改寫,非官方翻譯,可能存在偏差或錯誤;表述以原音訊與官方文稿為準。說明

一個管理著數百億美元客戶資產的人,事後告訴全世界,他對自家賬目的誤差範圍大概是100億美元。這話沒人逼他說,是他在一次 Twitter Space 上順口講的。

說這話的人叫 Sam Bankman-Fried,圈內簡稱 SBF。把這句隨口的話揪住不放的人,叫 Coffeezilla。

Lex Fridman 播客第345期,2022年12月8日釋出,嘉賓就是這位在 YouTube 上專門拆穿騙局的調查記者。節目開場 Lex 問他喜歡怎麼喝咖啡,他答得乾脆。

黑得像靈魂被碾碎。(Coffeezilla)

網上關於這個問題的討論熱度,大概僅次於另一個問題:他到底怎麼做到一個人挖出這麼多騙局。兩個問題其實是同一個問題的兩面。

從泡菜溢價起家的“街區最聰明的孩子”

先把時間線捋清楚。

SBF 的父母都是律師,家境優渥。他念的是頂尖私立高中,然後進 MIT,畢業去了 Jane Street。這是華爾街有名的高頻交易公司,訓練出來的人對風險、相關性、頭寸這些東西有近乎本能的理解。

2017年,他和幾個朋友創立了 Alameda Research,一家加密對沖基金。團隊裡有 Jane Street 出來的,也有谷歌出來的。當時圈內的說法是,這是“街區最聰明的孩子”。

他們的第一桶金來自一個叫“泡菜溢價”的東西。

當時韓國交易所的比特幣價格明顯高於全球其他市場。你可以低價買入,搬到韓國賣掉,賺中間的差價。這種機會存在的原因很土:韓國資本管制嚴格,資金進出不便,套利的人進不去,價差就一直掛著。

吃到這口肉靠的是執行力和腿腳快,不是什麼金融鍊金術。但 Alameda 把這筆錢滾成了做市業務。

做市就是給交易所提供流動性,同時掛買單和賣單,賺中間的價差和手續費。這在術語裡叫 delta 中性,意思是理論上你不賭漲也不賭跌,漲跌都能賺錢。

問題就出在“理論上”這三個字。

低風險敘事,和一家沒有牌照的銀行

做市確實是相對溫和的策略,但溫和不等於沒有風險。對手方違約、清算延遲、流動性突然枯竭,這些都可能讓一個看似中性的頭寸變成單邊虧損。

真正的隱患在融資端。

因為策略聽起來是低風險的,Alameda 就能對外講一個很有說服力的故事:我們是低風險策略,所以給你一個誘人的固定回報,你借錢給我們是安全的。這本質上是一家沒有牌照的銀行,用“我們比市場聰明”當信用背書。

而這群人的確是市場裡最聰明的那批,所以沒人追問。

2019年,SBF 又開了 FTX,一家加密衍生品交易所,主打槓桿和更復雜的金融產品。幣安早期投了1億美元進去,兩家一度是隊友。三年後 FTX 用20億美元把幣安手裡的股份買了回來,對幣安來說這是一筆極漂亮的投資,也是一顆埋在後面的雷。

FTT:把整座大廈押在自己的代幣上

FTX 自己發行了一個代幣,叫 FTT。

這個幣的性質很模糊。它跟平臺收入掛鉤,FTX 承諾用一部分手續費收入回購並銷燬 FTT,供應減少,價格自然有支撐。所以它的價值某種意義上是對 FTX 未來業績的對映。

聽起來像股票,但它在法律上不是股票,沒有任何股東權利,也不受證券法約束。Coffeezilla 的說法是,FTT 的精確價值從一開始就是被推測出來的,它和 FTX 的經營狀況高度繫結。

真正致命的是結構:Alameda 和 FTX 手裡握著大量自己發的 FTT,並且用它作為自己資產負債表的抵押品。

你仔細想想這個迴圈。它等於在說,我的資產價值取決於我的公司估值,而我的公司估值取決於我的資產價值。

Coffeezilla 在節目裡講相關性講得很清楚。

一個受過專業訓練的交易員,思考風險的方式是看相關性。如果你投了某個人,又投了這個人的產品,你以為自己在分散,實際上你是在加倍下注同一個人。真要構建一個穩定的體系,就不能把所有雞蛋放在同一個籃子裡,除非你百分百確信那個人會一直好下去。

這些人是被訓練成這麼思考的。一家估值數百億美元的公司把整個體系押在自己的代幣上,這不需要外部人挑刺,內部人一眼就該看出不對。

如果我知道這些人受過這樣的訓練,那麼一個交易所把整個體系的大部分價值押在自己的代幣上,這是瘋狂的。(Coffeezilla)

後來發生的事情更糟。

客戶存進來的比特幣和以太坊是真實資產,風險跟 FTX 本身不相關。他們把這些真東西挪走,拿去賭博,然後在資產負債表上填上 FTT 當作“價值”。一進一出,風險被成倍放大。

賭贏了,所有人歌頌他們。賭輸了,劇本沒人寫過。

一根火柴點著了整棟樓

2022年上半年,加密市場開始連環爆。

Luna 崩了。那是一個承諾高額回報的演算法穩定幣專案,最後進入了所謂的死亡螺旋:幣價下跌導致抵押品貶值,抵押品貶值引發更多拋售,迴圈到底。緊接著三箭資本也倒了。那幾個月,行業裡幾乎所有人都在懷疑自己的對手方。

FTX 看起來是唯一沒事的那一方。

不僅如此,SBF 還在夏天到處救助別的公司。媒體把他比作摩根大通的 Jamie Dimon,那個“到我這裡為止”的角色。他是行業裡那個穩定的成年人。

到了10月、11月,監管討論熱了起來。SBF 在華盛頓積極奔走,推動立法。幣安的趙長鵬(CZ)聽說這些方案可能會傷到自己的生意,兩人在推特上開始互相嗆聲。

然後 CoinDesk 發出一篇報道,指出 FTX 的資產負債表看起來不太妙:手裡有很多幣,按市價算有值,但你一賣它就崩。

Coffeezilla 的朋友,推特上的 Dirty Bubble Media,接著發了一份報告,直說這家公司已經資不抵債。

CZ 轉發了。他還加了一句:我手裡那些 FTT,我全賣了。

這一下性質就變了。

在那之前,所有人都以為 FTX 是安全的,Tom Brady 的錢都放那兒。CZ 的表態給市場的訊號是:連最瞭解這家公司的人都不願意持有它的代幣了。擠兌從那一刻開始。

SBF 出來發了幾條推,說資產沒問題,足夠覆蓋所有提現。一天之後他改口,說流動性不足,暫停提現。再過幾天,FTX 宣佈破產。

這裡需要理清三個實體:Alameda Research、FTX International、FTX US。三家一起進了破產程式。它們之間是否在混同資金、混同到什麼程度還在調查,但資金確實在互相挪用。

挪用這件事本身就是欺詐的核心。因為 FTX 從第一天起就明確告訴客戶:你的存款我們不會動,不會拿去交易,就放在單獨的賬戶裡等你來取。

單向玻璃:為什麼“我不知道”站不住腳

SBF 的公開辯護是這樣的:我不清楚 Alameda 在幹什麼,我不知道他們有這麼大的保證金頭寸,我不知道有個會計處理上的特殊之處,而且這個特殊之處滾到了80億美元。我當時說公司有錢,是因為我真以為有錢。

Coffeezilla 的回應很有意思。他沒有一上來就罵,而是先接了一個極端對比。

Lex 在節目裡提到了希特勒和最終解決方案,說檔案上找不到他本人的簽字,理論上存在“不知情”的空間。Coffeezilla 接過這個話題,說大多數人看到這種情況還是會說,不可能不知情,尤其當所有內部人都出來指證的時候。

然後他把這個邏輯搬到了 FTX 上。

內部人提供的情況裡,最要命的一點是:Alameda 和 FTX 之間有一道單向玻璃。

在金融業,交易部門和商業銀行部門之間必須設資訊隔離牆。原因很簡單,這兩邊一旦通氣,利益衝突就是必然的。這是一條結構性的職業規範,跟道德修養沒關係。

FTX 的情況恰恰相反:Alameda 的人能看見 FTX 內部幾乎所有的東西,而 FTX 的普通員工對 Alameda 在做什麼幾乎一無所知。這道牆只朝一個方向開。

疏忽會造出沒有牆,不會造出一堵單向的牆。單向的牆只能是被設計出來的。

Coffeezilla 補了第二個論據,是公司結構。

如果你真的不懂企業架構,真的只是幾個在巴哈馬瞎搞的年輕人,那結果應該是簡單到不能再簡單的結構。可 FTX 和 Alameda 名下掛著五十來家公司和子公司,一張複雜到外人根本理不清的網。沒有人一覺醒來就搭出五十家公司的架構,意外長不出這種結構。

如果你真的不知道自己在幹什麼,你最後會得到一個非常簡單的結構。(Coffeezilla)

第三個論據更直接:Alameda 提前知道 FTX 要上什麼幣。

交易所上線某個幣種,價格通常會在訊息公佈前後明顯拉昇,這是行業裡公認的現象。多個內部人告訴 Coffeezilla,Alameda 的人在 FTX 上幣前買進,等上線後賣出,賺了幾百萬美元。

這個操作有個更通俗的名字:內幕交易。

個人幹這個是犯罪,公司系統性地幹這個同樣是犯罪。而且這種資訊只可能從最高層流出來,從僱員的層級洩露不會形成穩定的操作習慣。

Coffeezilla 的總結很刻薄:SBF 在“聰明變得有罪”的那一刻,突然就變得又蠢又天真了。

80億美元的“存根賬戶”

關於那個80億,故事值得單獨講一遍。

FTX 剛起步的時候拿不到銀行賬戶。

加密交易所在銀行眼裡天生可疑,資金來源說不清楚,合規部門不願意碰。Alameda 作為一家交易公司,開銀行賬戶容易得多。

於是早期客戶入金的流程變成了這樣:你想給 FTX 打錢,匯款指引指向的卻是 Alameda 的賬戶。錢到了 Alameda,FTX 在平臺內給你記賬。

這套做法本身就繞開了大量銀行監管規則。SBF 的解釋是,這裡存在一個會計處理上的問題:客戶匯給 Alameda 的錢進入了一個叫存根賬戶(stub account)的地方,標籤不清楚,像個佔位符。他說自己並不知道這些錢實際上被當成了 Alameda 的資產,也不知道公司拿這些錢去幹了別的。錢本該被隔離存放,結果沒有。

Coffeezilla 在現場直接懟了回去。他提到福布斯在一個月前拿到過 Alameda 的詳細賬目。SBF 的回應是,那不算詳細賬目,我只是大概知道,誤差在100億美元以內。

你的誤差範圍是100億美元。一個大概從來沒值超過500億的公司,誤差範圍是100億。這已經超出健康公司和虧損公司之間的差別,這是你還上不上得了法庭的差別。(Coffeezilla)

一個人同時擁有兩種特質:能把一張複雜的公司網路搭起來,能讓整個行業把他當成救世主,能在華盛頓和立法者談笑風生;同時又聲稱自己連公司賬上少了幾十億美元都毫無察覺。這兩件事放在同一個人身上,邏輯上無法相容。

Lex 在節目裡給了他一個三分法:無能、瘋狂、邪惡,讓他下注。Coffeezilla 的回答很剋制:不是無能,剩下兩個都有,具體比例只有 SBF 自己知道。

瘋狂在這裡不包括精神層面的失控,指的是他可能既在對所有人撒謊,也在對自己撒謊。這兩件事可以同時為真,而且互相支撐。

開卡羅拉的人,住在千萬頂層公寓

要理解這個人,得看他怎麼經營形象。

他很清楚形象的價值,而且是有意識地經營。

2020年美國大選,他捐了4000萬美元,主要給了民主黨。他在 Tiffany Fong 公佈的一段通話裡說,自己給共和黨的錢其實一樣多,只不過走的是暗錢渠道。理由也說得直白:絕大多數記者是自由派,公開捐給共和黨會被記恨。他要的是所有方向都對自己有利。

他還在刻意塑造一種形象:穿T恤短褲,開豐田卡羅拉,住著幾百萬美元的頂層公寓,同時宣稱要把財富全部捐出去。

這套敘事被包裝成了有效利他主義(effective altruism)的樣板:先拼命賺錢,賺到極致,然後全部捐掉,最大化善的總量。

紅杉資本給他寫過一篇極為溢美的投資備忘錄,標題的意思大概是“世界首位萬億富翁”。媒體鋪天蓋地地寫“最慷慨的億萬富翁”。他確實捐了一部分,也確實拿到了大量正面報道,而這一切,按 Coffeezilla 的判斷,都是設計好的。

他整個人的歷史,就是在正確的時間持有正確的觀點,以達到正確的效果。你憑什麼認為他會突然改掉這個習慣?(Coffeezilla)

這套東西真的管用。直到資產負債表開始晃之前,公眾對他的認知就是“金融界的向善力量”。

這也是破產之後那場道歉巡演值得警惕的地方。

他接受了幾乎所有媒體的採訪,大臺小臺都給,唯獨沒給一直在追問他的 Coffeezilla。Coffeezilla 是自己蹲在別人的 Twitter Space 裡,私信主持人混進去,才逮到提問機會的。他問了幾句尖銳的,SBF 有時候就直接退出房間。

一個人願意面對所有鏡頭,獨獨躲開某一個提問者,這本身就是在挑選聽眾。

還有一層更少人提到的細節。他講自己不瞭解 Alameda 的賬目,但他同時又能在鏡頭前精確地討論 FTX 的資金流向、監管策略、和投資人的關係。這種選擇性無知的位置安排得非常精確:凡是能證明自己無辜的領域,他記得比誰都清楚;凡是能證明自己有罪的領域,他一概記不清。

出事後才發現,盡調一直是空著的

這次事件暴露的不只是一個人的問題。

在崩塌之前,主流財經媒體幾乎沒有一篇報道提出過實質性的質疑。紅杉的備忘錄、鋪天蓋地的“最慷慨億萬富翁”特稿、各種年度人物榜單,全都在給這家公司做信用背書。

真正做了盡職調查的,是一家加密行業媒體的記者,和一個推特上的匿名博主。

盡調的成本從來不高,高的是不做盡調的代價。那些把品牌借給 SBF 的機構,事後都在解釋自己當時看到了什麼、沒看到什麼。答案通常是:看到了創始人的魅力,沒看到資產負債表。

而資產負債表本來就是唯一值得看的東西。

CZ 不是兇手,只是最後一根稻草

很多人把 FTX 的崩塌算在 CZ 頭上,覺得是他的那條推特點了火。

Coffeezilla 的判斷不一樣:

我不認為他該為這場崩塌負責。地基本來就不穩,下一次推力來的時候它就會倒。他只是碰巧成了壓垮駱駝的那根稻草。(Coffeezilla)

這個區分很重要。點火的人和建樓的人承擔的不是同一種責任。擠兌只是把已經存在的窟窿暴露出來。如果 FTX 真的把客戶資產隔離存放,CZ 賣光手裡所有的 FTT,最多讓幣價跌一跌,客戶提現照常。

不過 Coffeezilla 也提了一個他覺得幣安該做的事:把那20億美元裡賺到的部分吐出來。那筆錢有一部分是現金,有一部分是 FTT。既然 FTX 從很早期就是個騙局,那從這筆交易裡獲得的收益,某種意義上是屬於客戶的。

他用鯊魚來形容 CZ。Lex 追問是好的鯊魚還是壞的鯊魚,他的回答是:鯊魚就是吃東西的。

這個比喻繞開了道德評判,只說行為模式。CZ 是個冷酷、精於算計、極其自律的商人。他會不會把錢吐出來,取決於他覺得這是不是對自己最有利的選擇。

被摧毀的從來是小賬戶

每次爆雷,新聞頭條都是那幾個大數字:幾百億市值蒸發,幾十億缺口。然後列一張前五十大債權人名單。

Coffeezilla 說他做這類調查久了,會發現一個穩定的規律:那些損失一千萬美元的人當然也很慘,但真正被毀掉的是賬上只有五萬、三萬、兩萬美元的人。這些人沒有閒錢,沒有分散配置,那筆錢就是他們的全部。

加密社群的使用者結構讓這件事更殘酷。參與者裡有大量年輕人,十八九歲,二十出頭,工作幾年攢下一筆錢,全倉押在某一個幣上。

十八九歲,打了幾份工,攢下這筆錢,這就是他的全部。然後它沒了。這基本等於毀掉一個人的生活。(Coffeezilla)

這些人也最沒有話語權。他們沒有公關團隊,上不了電視,在推特上喊也喊不出聲量。新聞週期過去之後,他們的困境不會有人再提。

而頂端的人呢。SBF 至今沒被戴上手銬,還在接受採訪,還在巡迴道歉。這個畫面對普通人的衝擊,比賬面上的虧損數字更大。

加密的初心,和它自己的反面

要理解這場崩塌為什麼讓人難受,得回到加密的起點。

2008年之後,普通人對銀行系統的信任被徹底打碎了。大家看到的是:銀行搞出了全球性的金融危機,最後由納稅人買單,責任人一個個安然無恙。那種“規則對上面的人不適用”的感受,是加密誕生的土壤。

中本聰的白皮書某種意義上是一份政治宣言:我們不再需要信任任何中心機構,賬本公開,規則寫在程式碼裡,誰也不能偷偷改。

所以加密貨幣的核心賣點從來不是暴富,是透明。你不用等 SEC 披露檔案,你可以直接在鏈上看到一筆錢從哪來、到哪去。這在理論上是對“缺少透明導致金融危機”這個問題的直接回應。

諷刺的地方就在這兒。

這個以透明為信仰的行業,在最關鍵的地方全是不透明的:交易所的資產負債表在鏈下,客戶的資金去向在鏈下,Alameda 的賬目在鏈下。技術在鏈上,人在鏈下。

你可以在區塊瀏覽器上看到每一筆轉賬,卻看不到交易所是不是把你的幣借給了自己的關聯公司去賭博。

更麻煩的是,這個行業為了顯得高階,發明出越來越複雜的產品:演算法穩定幣、迴圈抵押、槓桿疊加。每一個複雜產品都在增加風險的不透明度。Luna 的死亡螺旋就是最好的例子,它的機制設計得足夠複雜,複雜到沒人能一眼看出它在什麼條件下會崩,等看出來的時候已經來不及了。

結果呢。2008年那套結構原封不動地復刻了一遍:頂端的人幾乎不承擔後果,底端的人被清空,執法永遠慢一步。

這件事真的傷到了信任

Lex 在節目裡問,這會不會傷到人們對加密的信任。Coffeezilla 的回答是肯定的,會,而且很嚴重。

傷害發生的路徑很直白。

一個新人進入這個行業,最先學到的一課是“不要相信中心化機構,自己保管私鑰”。FTX 是那個行業裡形象最好的交易所,有最豪華的投資人名單,有最賣力的監管遊說,創始人本人是有效利他主義的代言人。連它都能在一週內歸零,那還有什麼可信的?

順帶說一句,這個行業裡其實一直有一小撮人在喊:把幣放在自己錢包裡,別放在交易所。這些人常年被當成偏執狂。FTX 之後,他們的說法變成了常識。

但真正的長期影響可能在更外面。

普通人對整個金融體系的信任本來就在緩慢流失。2008年掉了一塊,2022年又掉了一塊。每一塊掉下來,都會有人得出同一個結論:規矩是給別人定的。這個結論一旦形成,就很難再逆轉。

而下一次有人想用技術手段重建信任的時候,他會發現,願意相信的人變少了。

Coffeezilla 是怎麼做這些調查的

節目裡 Lex 問過他的工作方式。他的答案沒有太多神秘感:大量準備工作,然後靠當天的腎上腺素。

我真的很在意挖到問題的根源,因為位置越高的人越容易被放過。我很在意把他們的腳按在火上。(Coffeezilla)

有意思的細節是他喝咖啡的習慣。採訪前他會灌很多咖啡因,但真正採訪當天反而儘量少喝,因為腎上腺素已經夠了,再疊加咖啡因會過度興奮。

他也承認自己怕社交。Lex 說他進門時的能量像要踹門,他回了一句:因為我怕社交。

這種反差挺說明問題。把恐懼轉成攻擊性,是很多調查記者的共同特徵。面對一個管理過數百億美元的人,緊張是常態,差別在於有人把緊張變成退縮,有人把它變成準備得更充分的那幾十分鐘。

值得說清楚的是他在這件事裡的角色。

引爆 FTX 的第一手資訊不是他發的,是 CoinDesk 的報道,和 Dirty Bubble Media 的那份報告。他的作用是持續追問,把矛盾點揪出來擺在公眾面前,讓 SBF 無法只在友好的鏡頭前講同一個故事。

這類工作沒有捷徑。它依賴的是不放過細節的耐心,和對“這個人說的兩句話互相矛盾”這種事情的敏感。SBF 那個100億美元的誤差範圍,就是在這種追問裡漏出來的。他自己大概都沒意識到,那句話有多致命。

騙局最難藏的地方從來不是數字,是數字和數字之間的邏輯。數字可以造假,邏輯不能。

  • 看到任何“高回報低風險”的承諾,先把這句話當成警報而不是機會。真正低風險的策略,回報率一定平庸;回報率不平庸,風險一定被藏起來了。
  • 存幣之前查一件事:這家交易所的資產負債表是不是公開可審計的。看不到,就當成不透明處理。別拿創始人的形象和投資人名單當替代品。
  • 大額資產放在自己掌握私鑰的錢包裡,交易所只放需要交易的那部分。這條建議在這件事之前是老生常談,在這件事之後是常識。
  • 判斷一個專案,先看關聯方結構。如果發行方、做市方、投資方是同一批人,或者互相持股、互相提供流動性,那它的市值只是一個自我迴圈的數字。
  • 讀新聞時留意報道的時間點。一家公司在出事前半年收穫的所有溢美報道,事後都值得重讀一遍,看看記者當時有沒有提過任何風險。
  • 如果你在某個行業裡工作,把內部人告訴你的東西記下來。Coffeezilla 的很多判斷都建立在“沒有動機說謊的內部人”的證詞上,這類資訊比任何公開財報都可靠。
  • 最後一條也最難:當一個人同時表現得極度聰明和極度無辜,先別急著相信任何一邊。等結構性證據出來,公司架構、資金流向、資訊流向,這幾樣東西不會說謊。
文稿由本站用語音識別模型(基於官方釋出音訊)機器轉寫,可能有識別錯誤,人名與數字請以音訊為準。
Lex Fridman Podcast #345 – Coffeezilla: SBF, FTX, Fraud, Scams, Fake Gurus, Money, Fame, and Power Machine transcription by Qwen3-ASR 0.6B (MLX, local, Apache-2.0). May contain recognition errors. The following is a conversation with Coffee Zilla, an investigator and journalist exposing frauds, scams and fake gurus. He's one of the most important journalistic voices we have working today, both in terms of his integrity and fearlessness in the pursuit of truth. Please follow, watch and support his work at YouTube dot com slash Coffee Zilla. And now a quick few second mention of each sponsor. Check them out in the description. It's the best way to support this podcast. We got Rocket Money for savings and subscriptions, Eight Sleep for naps, BetterHelp for mental health and MasterClass for online learning. Choose wisely, my friends. And now onto the full ad reads. As always, no ads in the middle. I try to make this interesting. I swear I do. But if you skip them, please still check out the sponsors. I enjoy their stuff. Maybe you will too. This show is brought to you by Rocket Money, a app that helps you identify and stop paying for subscriptions you don't need, want or simply forgot about. On average, people save up to seven hundred dollars a year with Rocket Money. You know there is garbage out in space, and space is really big. But it starts getting cluttered up. Same with there is garbage out in the ocean. And it's funny how this garbage just starts accumulating in different places, and that's that's why I think of like subscriptions. And these little things that sneak in you are not paying attention to, that you signed up for with the best intentions but don't use anymore. You forgot you subscribed to it. It's just really nice to get rid of that because it really does add up. It's a great great way to save money and also to have an easy heart that you can feel safe signing up for stuff if you are legitimately curious, knowing that it'll be caught and eventually removed. With Rocket Money, so anyway, start canceling subscriptions today at Rocket Money dot com slash Lex. You could save hundreds a year at Rocket Money dot com slash Lex. This episode is also brought to you by Eight Sleep and its new Pod Three mattress. It's a place of happiness for me—a great nap on a cold bed with a warm blanket. Away from the world, I am thinking focused on reading and drifting slowly into sleep, as you probably are to the sound of my voice. Oh man, maybe I should collaborate with Eight Sleep, where they have a little audio device in the mattress and I speak sweet nothing's into your ears as you fall asleep. I think nobody will want that, but you know I am just brain brainstorming ideas here. Anyway, yeah, this is I am a big big big big believer of power naps. It's a really powerful way for me to refresh my mind and it's just honestly really something I look forward to is the doing that on an eight sleep bed versus like on the floor or on a hotel mattress. I just that's one of the things I look forward to actually to to get back home to. Anyway, check it out and get special savings when you go to eight sleep dot com slash Lex. This episode is sponsored by BetterHelp spelled H E L P Help. They figure out what you need and match you with a licensed professional therapist in under forty eight hours. I've been speaking with a bunch of folks recently about the value of therapy. It's kind of surprising to me how many people from all kinds of walks of life at some point in their life, if not continuously throughout their life, got a lot of value from therapy. I didn't realize this. I think earlier in my life. Yeah, there is a huge amount of value to it, and I think the nice thing about BetterHelp is it's just really accessible and easy to get started. So if it's something you haven't tried before, it's definitely worth trying. You should you should try as many things as possible. So this has helped a lot of people. So why why don't you give it a try? Check them out at BetterHelp dot com slash Lex and save on your first month. This show is also brought to you by MasterClass one hundred and eighty dollars a year gets you an all access pass to watch courses from the best people in the world in their respective disciplines. We got Chris Hatfield, we got Will Wright, Carlos Santana, Gary Caspar, Daniel Ground, Neil Game, and Martin Scorsese. What would I not give to talk to Martin Scorsese? But until then, you can listen to the MasterClass. Actually, I mean there is a really fundamental difference between MasterClass and podcasts. I think long form podcasts are good at sort of having the fun relaxed exploration of ideas and MasterClass is no pun intended masterful at. Doing structured communication of those ideas from the best people in the world. It it really it's just a really crisp lecture on what those folks know best and are best at. So it's it's it's just infinite value honestly, especially if there is people on there that you really want to learn from and I bet there is if you look at the list. Yeah, definitely worth trying. Go to MasterClass dot com slash Lex to give the gift of an annual membership when you buy one of your own. That's MasterClass dot com slash Lex. Terms apply. This is the Lex Friedman podcast to support it. Please check out our sponsors in the description. And now dear friends, here is Coffee Zilla. How do you like your coffee? Dark and soul crushing. That was the number one question on the internet. Do you like your coffee to reverberate deeply through the worst of human nature? Is that how you drink your coffee? I've gone through a lot of phases on coffee. I used to in college I would go super deep into you know grinding fresh beans all of that kind of stuff water temperature exactly right. And then I hit a phase where I was just it was the maintenance dose. Then I went to like espresso because I could get a lot more in. And now I go through phases of like sometimes I like it with a little oat milk sometimes a little half and half and sugar if. Oh, you've gotten soft in your old age. I've gone a little. I have, but hey, if I am doing a SBF interview, it's black that day nothing less. Yeah, it's black no. The lights go down. What do you actually do in that in those situations like leading up to a show? Do you get hyped up like how do you put yourself in the right mind space to explore some of these really difficult topics? I think a lot of it's preparation and then once it happens, it's mostly fueled by sort of adrenaline I would say. I really deeply care about getting to like the root cause of some of these issues because I think so often people in positions of power let off the hook. So I really care about holding their feet to the fire and it translates into like. A lot of energy the day of so I never find myself like funny enough. I usually drink a lot of caffeine leading up to the interview and then I try to drink like minimum the day of because I have so much adrenaline I don't want to be like hyper stimulated. I have to say, of all the recent guests I've had, the energy you you had when you walked into the door. Was pretty excited. People not excited here. I don't know. I think they're a big deal, Lex. I think they're scared. I don't know if you know. I feel like you were going to knock down the door or something. You were very excited like that just energy. It was terrifying because I am terrified of social interaction. Anyway, speaking of terrifying, you chose a good living of interviewing people for. Face your fears, my friend. So let's talk about SBF and FTX. Who is Sam Bankman Freed? Can you tell a story from the beginning as you understand it? Yeah, so Sam Bankman Freed is a kid who grew up sort of from a position of huge privilege. Both his parents are lawyers. I believe both of them were from Harvard. He went to MIT, went to like or sorry backing up a bit more. He went to like this top prep high school, then to MIT, then he went to Jane Street. And after that, he started a trading firm in I think twenty seventeen called Alameda Research with a few friends. Some of them were from Jane Street, some of them worked at Google, and they were sort of the smartest kids on the block or that's what everyone thought. They made a lot of their money on something called the kimchi premium or at least the story goes which just to explain that. The price of Bitcoin in Korea was substantially higher than in the rest of the world and so you could arbitrage that by buying Bitcoin elsewhere and selling it on a Korean exchange. So. They made their money early, doing kind of smart trades like that. They flipped that into market making, which they were pretty early on that. Just providing liquidity to an exchange and it's what it's a strategy that is considered delta neutral which means basically if you take kind of both sides of the trade and you are making a spread. Like a fee on that, you make money whether it goes up or down. So in theory, there shouldn't be that much risk associated with it. So Alameda kind of blew up because they would offer these people you know people who are giving out loans they say hey we'll give you this really attractive rate of return and we're doing strategies that seemingly are low risk so we're a low risk bet. Where these smart kids from Jane Street and you can kind of trust us to be the. Smarter than everyone else, kind of thing. Around twenty nineteen, Sam started FTX, which is an exchange. Specifically, it specialized in derivatives, so like margins kind of more sophisticated crypto products. And it got in with Binance early on. So Binance actually has a prior relationship to FTX, which we'll explore in a second because they're going to play a role in FTX's collapse actually. Binance is the number one crypto exchange and they're led by he's called C Z on Twitter. I don't want to butcher his full name but really smart guy. Has played his hand really well and built up a quite large exchange and Binance was funding a bunch of different like startups so they funded they helped invest into FTX early on they invested one hundred million so these guys were kind of like teammates early on SBF and C Z. And FTX quickly grew. They got like especially in twenty twenty twenty one they got a lot of endorsements. They got a lot of credibility in the space. And eventually FTX actually bought out Binance. They gave them two billion dollars, so pretty good investment for for C Z in a couple years. Um and now lead that up to twenty twenty two what happens? Luna collapse, three arrows capital collapse. Which if you don't know, there is just these kind of cataclysmic events in crypto, led by some pretty risky behavior. Whether Luna was a token that promised really attractive returns that were unsustainable ultimately and it just kind of spiraled. It did what's called a stablecoin death spiral which we can talk about if we need to. The stablecoin death spiral. I can't wait till that like actually enters the lexicon like a Wikipedia page on it like economic students are learning it in school. Yes, that's like a chapter in a book anyway. I mean this is the reality of our world. This is a really big part of our of the economic system is cryptocurrency and stablecoin is part of that. Yeah, it's weird because on the one hand cryptocurrency is supposed to somewhat simplify or add transparency to the financial markets. The idea is for the first time you don't have to wait for an SEC filing from some corporate business. You can look at what they're doing on chain right. So that's good because a lot of big financial problems are caused by lack of transparency and lack of understanding risk. But ironically, you get some people creating these arbitrarily complicated financial products like algorithmic stablecoins which then introduce more risk and blow everything up. So anyways, three arrows capital blew up. And all of a sudden, this crypto industry which everyone thought was going to the moon, Bitcoin to one hundred thousand is in some trouble. And FTX seems like the only people who besides like Binance who's also really big and stable and Coinbase they seemed like they were doing fine. In fact, they were bailing out companies in the summer. I don't know if you remember that. SBF was likened to like Jamie Diamond who's the you know CEO of Chase who like kind of was like the buck stops here you know. I am like the backstop, right? So SBF was supporting the industry. He was like the stable guy. So come to like around October and November, there is all this talk about regulation. Everything's been blowing up. SBF's leading the charge on regulation. And C Z, the CEO of Binance, gets word that maybe SBF is kind of like cutting him out or making regulation that would maybe impact his business. And he doesn't like that too much. They start kind of feuding a little bit on Twitter. So when it comes out, a CoinDesk report came out that FTX's balance sheet wasn't looking that good. Like it looked pretty weak, they had a lot of coins that in theory had value if you looked at their market price. But for a variety of reasons, if you tried to sell them, they'd collapse in value. So it's sort of like this thing a house built on sand. And a friend of mine on Twitter he goes by Dirty Bubble Media he released a report and he basically said I think these these guys are insolvent. Well, C Z saw that and he retweeted it and started adding fuel to the fire of like the speculation because up to this point everyone thought FTX is super safe super secure. There is no reason to not keep your money there. Tom Brady keeps his money there whatever. And C Z kind of fuel adds fuel to the fire by saying not only am I retweeting this adding kind of like validity to this speculation but also I am going to take the FTT that I got which part of their balance sheet was this FTT token which is FTX's like proprietary token. And Alameda and FTX controlled a lot of it. They were using this token to basically be a large amount of collateral for their whole balance sheet so it accounted for this huge amount of their value. And the CEO of Binance had a huge chunk of it as well and he said I am going to sell all of it. And the the fuel that that introduced to the market is if he sells all this FTT and this FTT is underwriting a lot of the value of FTX. Does FTT almost approximate like similar things if you were to buy a stock in a public company? Is that kind of like a stock in FTX? It sort of was this proxy because what FTX was committed to doing was sort of like buying back FTT tokens. They would do this thing called the buy and burn. I think there was some amount of sharing in the revenue fees of FTX. It was kind of this convoluted thing. In my opinion, the exact value of FTT was speculated from the beginning and it was clear that it was very tied to the performance of FTX, which is important because we'll get to later. FTX sort of built their whole scaffold. On FTT, which meant that this scaffold was very wobbly because if FTX loses a little bit of confidence, then your value goes down. When your value goes down, you lose more confidence and this goes down. So it was kind of like this thing that this flywheel that when it was going well you got huge amounts of growth when it's going bad. You get a exchange death spiral sort so to speak. Actually, this structure it's a pretty non standard structure. Did the architects of its initial design anticipate the wobblyness of the whole system? So putting fraud and all those things that happened later aside, do you think it was difficult to anticipate this kind of FTT FTX Alameda Research weird dynamic? No, because I think sophisticated traders always think in terms of diversification and correlation. So if you are trying to the way to think about risk in investing is like if I invest in you Lex Friedman and then I also invest in some product you produce those the performance of those two things will be pretty correlated. So whether I invest in you or I invest in this product that you like are completely behind. I am not derisking. I am basically counting all on you doing well, right? And if you do bad, my investments do very bad. So if I am trying to build a stable thing, I shouldn't put all my eggs in the Lex Friedman basket unless I am positive that you are going to do well, right? And these people. As your financial advisor, I would definitely recommend you do not put all your eggs in this basket. Right, and so you can think about it like if I know that these people were trained to think like this and so the idea that you could start this exchange you are worth billions of dollars and you underwrite your whole system by betting. Putting most of it on your own token is is insane and what and what's crazy is we'll later find out that they were basically taking customer assets which were real things like Bitcoin and Ethereum with. With risks that were not so correlated to FTX and they were swapping them out they were using to go basically gamble those and putting FTT in its place as quote value so they were increasing the risk of the system in order to bet big. With the idea that if they bet big in one, we'd all be singing their praises. If we bet big in law, if they bet big in lost, I don't know if they had a plan, but I think they were I think they were being extremely risky and there is no way to avoid their knowledge of that. So when you say customer assets, is I come to this crypto exchange I have Bitcoin or some other cryptocurrency and this is a a thing that has. Pretty stable value over time. I mean, as crypto relative so and I am going to store it on this crypto exchange and that that's the whole point. This is a. So this thing to the degree that crypto holds value, it's supposed to continue holding value. There is not there is not supposed to be an extra risk inserted into the thing. Right, and FTX was pretty clear from the beginning that they wouldn't invest your assets in anything else. They wouldn't do anything else with it. They wouldn't trade it. That's what made FTX so such like a horror story for investor confidence is basically they made every signal that they would not do anything nefarious with your tokens. They would just put them into the side, put them in a separate account that they don't have access to and they just kind of wait there until the day that you are ready to withdraw them. That's explicitly what they told their customers. So going back to the story a little bit, C Z then says, "Hey, I am selling this token that underwrites the value of FTX." There is a total panic. SBF during this time makes set says several lies such as FTX assets are fine, we have enough money to cover all withdrawals. And a day later he basically admits that that wasn't the case. They don't have the money. They're shutting down. And then a few days later after that they declared bankruptcy. There is I should be clear there is Alameda Research. FTX International and FTX US, which is the US side of things, these are three different entities. All of them are in bankruptcy, and it's not clear to the extent that they were comingling funds, but it's clear that they were comingling funds to some extent. So they kind of were taking from each other, and that is where the fraud happens, right? Because if going back to our earlier analogy, if you are supposed to set funds aside, and I find out you were using it to go make all these arbitrage trades or do market making or all these activities you were known for for your like hedge fund trading firm thing, that's a huge problem because he basically lied about this, and especially when he's saying explicitly that we have these things we have these funds and these things turn out to be lies, well again the question of fraud comes in and it's just like there is no way he didn't know so the obvious question might be well why isn't he locked up why why is he running around and it's because really his story is that he didn't know any of it he found out that they had to steal man's position he would say he was totally disconnected from what Alameda was doing he had no idea that they had such a large margin position that they had an accounting quirk and that accounting quirk hit eight billion dollars from from his view and so when he was saying that they had money to cover it he was saying that truthfully to the best of his ability and he just was so distracted at the time that he made a series of increasingly embarrassing mistakes and now he owes it to the people to write those wrongs by publicly making this huge apology tour so you might have seen him on I mean he's been talking to nearly everyone about basically how he's just didn't know what he's doing he's the stupidest man alive so what what what are some interesting things you've learned from those interviews I think I've appreciated why you don't talk in that position most people wouldn't talk most people would listen to their legal counsel and not talk I do not think he's any lawyer worth their salt would tell him to talk because right now I think the danger of what he's doing is he's locking himself into a story of how things happened and I don't think that story is going to hold up in the coming months because I think it's impossible from the insider conversations I've had with Alameda research employees with FTX employees it's impossible to square what they are telling me with no like incentive to lie with what SBF is telling me with every incentive to lie which is fundamentally that he didn't know they were comingling funds he didn't know they were gambling with customer money and it was basically this huge mistake and it's Alameda's fault but he wasn't involved in Alameda a company he owned so like a compassionate but heart hitting gangster that you are recent very recently you interacted with SBF on I like I just the suspenders as you are saying this you interacted on Twitter spaces with SBF and really put his feet to the fire with some hard hitting questions what did you ask and what did you learn from that interaction sure I should say first this was not a willing interaction I mean I thought that was kind of the funny part of it because I've been asking him for an interview for a while he's been giving interviews to nearly everyone who wants one big channels small channels um he didn't give me one but I managed to get some by sneaking up on some Twitter spaces and DMing the people and like being like hey can I come up so I didn't get him to ask everything that I wanted because he like would leave sometimes you know after I ask some of the questions but really what I asked was about this eight billion and zooming in on the improbability of his lack of knowledge um it's sort of like if you if you run a company and you know the insides and outs and you are the top of your field top top in class and all of a sudden it all goes bust and you say I had no idea how any of this worked I didn't I didn't know it's like the guy who runs Waterberg saying I didn't know where we sourced our beef I didn't know where we that's a Texas example actually thank you I appreciate let's let's take it like worldwide Walmart like I didn't know we used Chinese manufacturers it's like that's impossible to become Walmart you have to know how like how your supply chain works you have to know even if you are at a high level you know how this stuff works can I do a hard turn on that and go sure as one must to Hitler Hitler's writing is not on any of the documents around as far as I know on the final solution so in in some crazy world you could theoretically say I knew I didn't know anything about death camps so there is this plausible deniability in theory so that's but that most people would look at that and say it's very unlikely you don't especially if all the insiders are coming out and saying no no no of course he knew he was directing us from the top I mean um what was clear what's interesting about the structure and like I love the nitty-gritty sorry we're back to SBF went to Hitler sorry now we're back to SBF I wanted to turn us as fast as possible away from Hitler um I yeah I so the insiders in what Alameda research Alameda research what was interesting is that there was this sort of one way window going on between Alameda and FTX where FTX employees didn't know a lot of what was going on Alameda insiders and I would say by design knew almost everything that was going on at FTX um and so I think that was really interesting from the perspective of a lot of the so called like what you could what he's trying to ascribe to as like failures or mistakes or ignorance and negligence when looked at closely are much more designed and they sort of don't arise spontaneously because like let's say so there is this thing in banking and like trading where if I run a bank and you run like a trading firm we need to have informational walls between us because there is huge conflicts of interest that can arise right so the negligent argument might be that like oh we just didn't know we're sort of these dumb kids in the Bahamas so we shared information equally but when you see a one way wall that starts to look a lot different right if I have a back end source of looking at or sorry you are the trading firm so you have a back end way to look at all my accounts and I have no idea that you are doing that that all of a sudden looks like a much more designed thing when it would be plausible let's say going to to use another another analogy too if you are saying look I comingled funds because I was so bad at corporate structures you would expect those companies to have a very simple corporate structure because you didn't know what you are doing right but what we see with FTX and Alameda is they had something like fifty companies and subsidiaries and this impossibly complicated web of corporate activity you don't get there by accident you don't wake up and go oh I designed like this watch that ticked a very specific way but it was all accidental if you really didn't know what you were doing you'd end up with a simple structure so even just like from a fundamental perspective what SBF was doing and like the activities they were engaging in were so complicated and purposely designed to obfuscate what they were doing it's impossible to subscribe to the negligence argument and I want to quickly say too like I don't think a lot of people have honed in on this there was insider trading going on from Alameda's perspective where they would know what coins FTX was going to list on their exchange there is a famous effect where let's say you are this legitimate exchange you list a coin the price spikes insiders told me it was a regular practice for Alameda insiders to know that FTX was going to list a coin and as a company buy up that coin so they could sell it after it listed and they made millions of dollars how do you do that accidentally yeah and that's that's illegal totally illegal so that's illegal from like and if an individual does it it's illegal it's fraud what if a company is systematically doing it and you can't tell me that FTX or somewhat at FTX wasn't feeding that information about to Alameda or somehow giving them keys to know that and that would happen at the highest level it would happen at FSPS level and this is why his arguments of I was dumb I was naive I was sort of ignorant are so preposterous because he's dumb and ignorant the second it becomes criminal to be smart and sophisticated right but then also coming out and talking about it which is a it's a bizarre move it's a bizarre and almost a dark move can you tell the story of the eight billion you mentioned eight billion what's the eight billion what's the missing eight billion yeah so it's really interesting because it's sort of like wire fraud you sort of he's sort of copying to like smaller crimes to avoid the big crime the big crime is you know everything and you were behind it right the smaller crimes are like a little wire fraud here little wire fraud there so what the eight billion is is that FTX didn't always have banking it's hard to get banking as a crypto exchange there is all these questions of like where is the money coming from is it coming from money launderer so for a variety of reasons it's always been hard for exchanges to get bank accounts so before when FTX was just getting started they didn't have a bank account so how do you put money on FTX well they would have you wire your money to their trading firm their wiring instructions would go to their trading firm it's easier to get banking as a trading firm so you put your money with the trading firm and then they'd credit you the money on FTX okay first of all this is a whole circumvention of all these banking guidelines and regulations that's the first like thing that I think is illegal but basically what SBF argued is that there was an accounting glitch error problem where when you'd send money to Alameda even though they'd credit you on FTX they wouldn't safeguard your deposits like your deposits would go into what he called a stub account which is just like some account that's not very well labeled um kind of like a placeholder account and he didn't realize that those were Alameda's funds or they were playing with those funds and that they basically should have safeguarded that for customers that's his explanation it's preposterous because it's eight billion dollars but anyways just poor labeling of accounts of an eight billion dollar account I mean it's a billion between a billion this is like do this all the time this is the craziest thing like he was he was talking to me and at one point in the conversation he's like yeah I didn't have precise not because he said I didn't have knowledge of Alameda's accounts and I said well Forbes a month ago was getting detailed accounting of Alameda and he goes oh that wasn't detailed accounting I just knew I was right within ten billion or so what is that error margin ten billion dollars for a company that is arguably never worth more than one hundred million probably never never even worth more than fifty billion your error margin is ten billion dollars you have to be this is a guy who is sending around statements that like there was no risk involved and you are telling me he had a error margin of ten billion dollars that is the difference between like a healthy company and a company so deep underwater you are going to jail so it you have to believe that he is impossibly stupid and square that with the sophistication that he brought to the table it's I think it's an impossible argument I don't even think it did you think he is incompetent insane or evil if you were to bet money on each of those incompetent insane or evil insane meaning he's lying to everyone but also to himself which you could which is a little bit different than incompetence he's not incompetent so the I think he's some combination of insane and evil but it's impossible to know unless we know deep inside his heart how self like deluded he is versus a calculated strategy and I think if you look at SBF he's such a I think he's a fascinating individual just I mean you know he's a horrible human being let's start there but he's also somewhat interesting from a psychology perspective because he's very open about the fact that he understands image and he understands how to cultivate image the importance of image so well that I think a lot of people even though they've talked about it aren't emphasizing that enough when interacting with him this is a man whose entire history is about cultivating the right opinions at the right time to achieve the right effect why do you think he would suddenly change that approach when he has all the more reason to cultivate an image so he is extremely good naturally or I don't know if he's good but he's like he's a hyper aware he's deliberate in cultivating a public image and controlling the public image you you know about the like Democrat donations like he he knew to donate to the right people forty million dollars he says on a call that we released with Tiffany Fong he says on a call that he donated the same amount to Republicans there is speculation on whether this is true because he's a liar whatever so caveat there but he said he donated to Republicans the same amount but he donated dark because he knew that most journalists are liberal and they would kind of hold that against him so he wanted all the all the sides to be on in his favor in his pocket while simultaneously understanding the entire media landscape and playing them like a fiddle by cultivating this image of I am this progressive woke billionaire who wants to give it all away do everything for charity I drive a Corolla while living in a million dollar penthouse multimillion but but that was sort of the angle he he understood so well how to play the media and I I think he underestimated when he did this how much people would put him under a deeper microscope and I don't think he has achieved the same level of success in cultivating this new image because I think people are so skeptical now no one's buying it but I think he he's trying it he's doing it to the best but it has worked leading up to this particular wobbly situation so before that wasn't the public perception of him being a force for good a financial force for good one hundred percent yeah somebody from Sequoia Capital you know wrote this glowing review that he was going to be the world's first trillionaire there are so many pieces done on he's the most generous billionaire in the world that um he was sort of like the steel man of you know it's possible to make tons of money this is like the effective altruism movement make as much money as you can as fast as you can and then give it all away and he was sort of like the the poster child for that and he did give some of it away and got a lot of press for it and I think that was kind of by design I want to address a real quick point a lot of people have said that like finance played a role and while they catalyzed this insolvency is a problem that will eventually manifest either way so I don't put any blame on CZ for basically causing this meltdown the the underlying foundation was unstable and it was going to fall apart at the next push I mean he just happened to be the final kind of like I don't know the straw that broke the camel's back yeah the catalyst that revealed but yeah but it's like I don't I don't think he's culpable for FTX's like malfeasance in how they handled accounts if that makes sense so what what what role did they play could they have helped alleviate some of the pain of investors of people that held funds there yeah I mean probably I don't know I would see some kind of weird obligation like with the two billion they made on FTX remember they got two billion some of it in cash some of it in some of it in FTT token so I don't know how much actual cash they have from that deal but they have billions from the success of what seems to be a fraud seems to have been a fraud from early on they had the back door as early as twenty early twenty twenty from what I can tell so the the back door between FTX and Alameda Alameda research do you think CZ saw through who SBF is what is he's doing no I think I think CZ is like he's a shark I think he's he's good at building a big business like a good shark or a bad shark I don't know I don't know I think sharks just eat I mean I don't I don't know I think my relationship with shark has like finding Nemo there is a shark in that I don't know I think like Jeff Bezos is a shark so whether people have loaded connotations of like how they feel about Jeff Bezos I mean I would say like I think CZ is a ruthless businessman I think he's cold he's calculated he's very deliberate and I think what he should do in this position is forfeit the funds that he profited from that investment because largely I think it was um it's owed to the customers there is so much hurting out there so I think I think they could do a lot of good around that um I don't know if they will because I don't know if he sees it in his best interest I think that's probably how he's thinking but yeah I I think they could have helped or they could still help there who do you think suffered the most from this so far the little account holders this is always true so one of the big temptations with fraud I've covered a lot of scams frauds is everyone looks at the big number everyone that's the headline billions of dollars the top fifty creditors or whatever one thinks at first but quickly when you dig down you realize that most people who lost ten million dollars I mean I am sure that's terrible for them I wish them to get their money back but it's usually the people with like fifty thousand or less that are most impacted usually they do not have the money to spare usually they're not diversified in a sophisticated way um so I think it's those people I think it's the small account holders that I feel the worst for and unfortunately they often get the least press time or air time that's the really difficult truth of this is that especially in the culture of cryptocurrency there is a lot of young people who are not diversified they're basically all in on a particular crypto and it just breaks my heart to think that there is somebody fifty thousand or thirty thousand or twenty thousand but the point is that money is everything they own right and now now what their life is basically destroyed like you know imagine you are eighteen nineteen twenty twenty one years old you saved up you've been working you saved up and this is this is it this is basically destroying a life what's so brutal about this is that this all comes on the back the entire crypto market comes on the back of comes from the deep to distrust of traditional finance right yeah two thousand eight Everybody lost trust in the banking systems, and they lost trust that if those banking systems acted in a corrupt way, that they would receive the justice. It turned out that the banks received favorable treatment. People didn't, so people lost faith in the the structure of our financial system in a way that is we're still feeling the reverberations of it. And so when crypto came along, it was like kind of this way to reinvent the wheel, reinvent the world for the the like sort of lowly and the like less powerful and kind of level the playing field. So it's so sad about events like this is you see that fundamentally a lot of the the power structures are the same where the people at the top face little repercussions for what they do, the people at the bottom are still getting screwed, the people at the bottom are still getting lied to, and law enforcement is way behind the ball. Do you think this really damaged people trust in cryptocurrency? For sure

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