第 252 期·中文精讀

埃隆·馬斯克:SpaceX、火星、特斯拉自動駕駛、機器人技術與 AI

Elon Musk: SpaceX, Mars, Tesla Autopilot, Self-Driving, Robotics, and AI

馬斯克談星艦與火星殖民計劃、特斯拉全自動駕駛進展,以及人形機器人與 AI 風險。

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中文精讀由 AI 基於原始訪談改寫,非官方翻譯,可能存在偏差或錯誤;表述以原音訊與官方文稿為準。說明

2021年底,馬斯克坐在 Lex Fridman 的麥克風前,說了一句聽起來像玩笑的話:未來,一輛不能自己開的車,用處大概就跟一匹馬差不多。

他並沒有說馬沒用。養馬的人還是有,只是很少,有點小眾,屬於個人愛好。車也一樣。在馬斯克眼裡,汽車行業正在同時發生兩件大事,一件是電動化,另一件是自動化。誰不參與自動化這場革命,誰的車在市場上就會變成那匹馬。

他甚至給了個具體數字:一臺能自己開的車,長期看價值是普通車的五到十倍。這個判斷聽起來激進,但它解釋了特斯拉這幾年做的所有設計選擇,從螢幕上畫什麼,到方向盤要不要裝監控攝像頭,再到怎麼收集資料、怎麼定義錯誤。這篇對話把馬斯克腦子裡那套自動駕駛的邏輯翻了個底朝天,值得慢慢拆。

把車的世界觀畫在螢幕上,是一次健康檢查

很多人第一次坐進特斯拉會盯著中控屏看:螢幕上畫著車道線、前後車輛、紅綠燈,像一個俯視的簡筆畫世界。這個設計選擇本身就有講究。

馬斯克的解釋很樸素:整塊螢幕的目的,是給車的感知系統做一次健康檢查。車從一堆感測器拿資料,主要是攝像頭,還有雷達、超聲波、GPS,把這些資訊轉成向量空間裡的物件,帶上車道線、紅綠燈、其他車輛這些屬性,再重新渲染到螢幕上。你往窗外看一眼,再往螢幕看一眼,就能確認這車到底知不知道周圍發生了什麼。

你可以透過看窗外,來確認車到底知不知道發生了什麼。我覺得這對讓人理解系統來說,是極有力量的一件事。(馬斯克)

Lex 追問:為什麼不把更多東西顯示出來?比如計算機視覺裡的道路分割、車道檢測、目標檢測,這些模型在邊緣地帶其實是有不確定性的。能不能把機率、把系統拿不準的部分也露出來,幫普通人建立對計算機視覺的直覺?

馬斯克的回答分了兩層。他自己開車時確實會看除錯檢視。除錯檢視有兩種:一種是增強視覺(augmented vision),在識別到的物體周圍畫框、打標籤;另一種叫視覺化器(visualizer),完全用向量空間表示,不顯示任何照片,只把車的世界觀畫出來。

普通人看不懂,他說。你給一個完全不懂計算機視覺的人看那堆向量和機率,他只會一臉茫然。所以現在螢幕上呈現的東西,是專門為大眾理解系統能力最佳化過的。這其實是個人機互動(HMI)的問題,跟技術展示關係不大。開發版裡那些除錯資訊,對絕大多數人來說就是天書。

這個細節值得多想一層。它說明特斯拉把自己擺在了一個很特殊的位置:車上坐的人不需要懂技術,只需要能做一件事,把螢幕上的世界和窗外的世界對一遍。對上了就放心,對不上就接管。這個互動契約,比任何一份使用者手冊都管用。

四十萬輛車在路上跑,這就是資料護城河

聊到資源分配,Lex 把問題拆成三塊:演算法、資料、硬體。錢和時間都有限,該往哪兒砸?

馬斯克的答案裡,資料那一塊最扎眼。特斯拉每輛車配八個朝外的攝像頭、雷達、通常十二個超聲波感測器,加 GPS 和 IMU。當時路上大約有四十萬輛車裝著這套完整感測器,正在逼近五十萬。

我不確定路上還有多少別的車裝了這麼完整的感測器,但如果超過五千輛,我會很驚訝。也就是說,我們手裡有全部資料的百分之九十九。(馬斯克)

這句話的分量在於,深度學習的魔法就是資料越多越好。但開車這件事,真正值錢的資料藏在邊緣案例(edge cases)裡。那些開得順順利利的常規場景,反而是廉價的,因為系統早就學會了。真正教會系統的東西,是那些讓它猶豫、出錯、被人一把搶過方向盤的瞬間。

怎麼發現邊緣案例?馬斯克給了兩個方向。

一個方向是正向樣本。比如一個複雜路口,到底什麼是最優的過彎軌跡(spline)?那些沒有人工接管的行駛記錄,就是標準答案。你把同一個路口的成千上萬次透過資料收集起來,告訴系統當看起來是這樣時,就這麼開,就能擬合出複雜路口的最優走法。這是一種很聰明的挖掘方式:不需要標註,不需要人工篩選,幾十萬輛車在同一個路口反覆透過,本身就構成了一個高質量的樣本池。

另一個方向是接管。司機在 Autopilot 狀態下突然接管,系統會收到一個訊號,然後判斷:他是為了圖方便接管(比如想下高速),還是因為 Autopilot 確實出錯了?這兩種情況必須區分開,否則你會把好的行為也當成錯誤去學習。

所有輸入都是錯誤

對話裡最有穿透力的一句話,出現在討論接管資料的時候。

你可以把這件事看成:所有輸入都是錯誤。如果使用者不得不介入,那就說明有問題。所有輸入都是錯誤。(馬斯克)

這句話的鋒利之處在於,它把使用者體驗從一個軟指標變成了硬約束。使用者為什麼動手?因為他覺得系統做得不對。哪怕他只是在導航上做了個決定,這個動作本身也在告訴工程師:這裡有個系統沒覆蓋到的缺口。

當然現實中要打折扣。想下高速、想變道,這類導航決策目前 Autopilot 本來就不負責,人接管是正常的。但這個折扣正在被快速抹平。馬斯克提到當時剛推送的自動導航駕駛(Navigate on Autopilot)無確認版本,會自動超車慢車、駛出高速、走高速立交,絕大部分原本需要人接管的導航動作都會消失。

他說了一句:我不覺得人們真正理解這是多大的一步。Lex 也同意,不開這車的人確實沒概念。

這裡其實藏著一個產品哲學上的轉變。早期輔助駕駛的失敗方式是顯而易見的,比如車道識別丟失、方向盤抖動,司機立刻就知道系統不行。而系統越做越好的時候,失敗變得更隱蔽、更罕見,也更難被察覺。接管率的下降,既是進步的證據,也意味著剩下的每一次接管都更加值得挖。這就是為什麼馬斯克要把每一次人工輸入都當成錯誤來對待:數量少了,每一條的資訊價值就更高了。

硬體已經就位,剩下的全是軟體問題

聊到全自動駕駛最大的技術路障,馬斯克的回答出人意料地輕描淡寫:硬體這關已經過了。

特斯拉自研的 FSD 計算機(Full Self-Driving computer)當時已經量產。它花了他三年時間,處理能力大約是車上原來那套英偉達系統的一個數量級。換裝過程簡單到離譜:拔掉英偉達的電腦,插上特斯拉的,完事。攝像頭可以跑滿幀率、滿解析度,影象都不用裁,系統還有餘量。

更關鍵的是冗餘設計。所謂 FSD 計算機其實是兩套完全獨立的系統級晶片(SoC),互為備份。

你可以拿一顆螺栓打穿這個系統的幾乎任何部位,它還是能工作。(馬斯克)

他的類比是雙引擎客機:兩個引擎都在時效能最好,但壞掉一個也能安全飛。這兩套系統只做冗餘,不搞兩個大腦投票做決策那種架構。因為現在連單套系統的效能邊界都沒摸到,根本沒必要把功能分攤到兩個晶片上,直接跑兩份完整副本就行了。

這一切指向一個結論。現在下線的每一輛車,硬體上都已經具備全自動駕駛能力。剩下的是軟體、是神經網路、是控制邏輯,而這些全部可以透過 OTA 空中升級推送。

如果你今天買一輛特斯拉,我相信你買的是一項會增值的資產,而不是貶值的資產。(馬斯克)

這句話在汽車行業裡幾乎是大逆不道的。車一向是落地就貶值,而馬斯克的說法是:硬體夠硬,軟體能一直長,車越用越值錢。在買車的人眼裡,這是個很重的購買理由;在工程團隊眼裡,這是個很重的承諾。承諾一旦說出口,後續每一次軟體推送都得對得起這句話。

至於軟體還剩多遠,他給了一串場景:高速上的體驗已經是生活質量級別的改變,接下來要把這套能力延伸到城市街道,加上紅綠燈識別、複雜路口通行,再往後是複雜的停車場。車能自己從車位開出來找你,哪怕停車場像個迷宮;也能把你放下,自己去找車位停好。

Lex 補了一句很實在的話:停車場手動操作是真的煩,這塊自動化的收益特別大。

人類到底該不該被盯著看

這是整場對話裡兩人分歧最大的地方,也是最有價值的部分。

Lex 的團隊在 MIT 做了一項研究,從 Autopilot 公開上線起收集了三年多的駕駛員面部和身體影片。他們標註了大約一萬八千九百次接管(disengagement),看司機能不能及時接管。結論是:在這些資料裡,司機保持了功能性警覺(functional vigilance),該看路的時候在看路,該接管的時候接得上。這和大量關於自動化導致警覺性下降的文獻預測相反。

但 Lex 很謹慎,他們的樣本只是一小部分人。他問馬斯克:這個結論能推廣到整個人群嗎?會不會有一小部分司機,用 Autopilot 越久越鬆懈?

馬斯克的回答直接繞過了這個問題。

這些很快都會變成無關緊要的問題。系統進步太快了。如果一個東西比人安全好幾倍,那麼再加一個人進來,對安全的影響是有限的,甚至可能是負的。(馬斯克)

甚至可能是負的,這是關鍵。他把司機監控這件事放在一個動態的天平上:如果系統可靠性還不如人,那監控司機是對的;如果系統遠遠超過人,那監控司機不但沒多大用,還可能添亂。

他給了一個電梯的類比。早年電梯是要配操作員的,你不許自己進去扳那個操縱桿在樓層之間移動。現在沒人想要電梯操作員,自動電梯停靠樓層比人操作安全得多。反過來說,讓一個隨便什麼人拿著操縱桿在樓層之間亂開電梯,那才叫危險。

你不會想讓人在電梯裡拿著一根大操縱桿吧?我寧願要按鈕。(馬斯克)

他甚至給了個時間表:也許到 2021 年底,最晚 2022 年,人類介入反而會降低安全性,他會非常震驚如果這事沒發生。

Lex 這邊沒有輕易讓步。他承認從演算法角度,基於攝像頭的駕駛員監控是個迷人的問題:檢測司機在看哪兒、認知負荷多大、身體姿態如何。而且業界很多人都相信,基於攝像頭的司機監控是必須的。他問馬斯克:難道監控一點好處都沒有嗎?

馬斯克的回答還是那個天平邏輯。系統的可靠性如果達到或低於人類水平,駕駛員監控就有意義;如果系統明顯比人強,那監控幫不上什麼忙。

這裡其實藏著兩種世界觀的碰撞。Lex 研究的是以人為中心的人工智慧,他相信如果攝像頭監控設計得當、整合得好,短期和長期都有益。馬斯克和特斯拉的焦點則在另一邊:把 Autopilot 做到統計意義上的安全收益,大到可以壓過任何關於人類行為和心理學的不確定性。

換句話說,Lex 想在人的這一端做最佳化,馬斯克想在系統這一端做到讓人變得不必要。兩個人都有道理,只是押注的方向不同。前者假設過渡期會很長,長到值得為人的弱點設計一整套補丁;後者假設過渡期短得來不及做這件事,等補丁做完,系統已經不需要它了。

這場爭論沒辦法在嘴上分勝負,只能交給時間和資料。而時間站在哪一邊,取決於軟體迭代的速度,這正是雙方都承認、卻給出完全不同結論的那個變數。

事故率的心理學:四起事故和四萬條命

聊到監管,馬斯克丟擲一組對比。

美國每年大約有四萬起汽車死亡事故。但只要特斯拉出四起,它得到的媒體報道量可能是別人的上千倍。他說這是客觀事實:監管機構會不成比例地關注能上新聞的事件,而特斯拉天生自帶流量。

這裡面的心理學其實特別有意思,他說,可惜我們沒時間聊。

這也解釋了為什麼他要反覆強調要多安全才夠。監管上真正要回答的問題只有一個:比人安全多少才算數。能不能自己開,從來就不是問題。他的估算是要比人安全到兩三百個百分點,而且不能只看死亡率。死亡樣本太少,統計上不顯著;要看撞車率、受傷率、永久傷害率、死亡率,一層層往上看,每一層都要比人類好至少兩倍左右。

這是個很實際的工程約束。你想證明自己安全,得先有足夠的壞事件樣本來計算機率。事故太少,反而證明不了什麼,這在統計上是件尷尬的事。

操作設計域的寬與窄,是兩種哲學

Lex 團隊還在研究另一套系統:凱迪拉克的 Super Cruise。它的操作設計域(ODD,Operational Design Domain)非常窄,只在特定型別的、地圖精細的高速公路上能用,測試充分但範圍小。特斯拉的 ODD 則寬得多。

各有優劣。寬 ODD 的好處是,司機能更早、更多地去探索系統的邊界,配合儀表盤上那個世界觀的顯示,慢慢建立起對系統的直覺。壞處也很明顯:你等於讓司機在任何能識別出車道線的地方都用它。

馬斯克沒回避這個矛盾,反而把話說得更狠:

坦白說,讓人手動去開一臺兩噸重的死亡機器,這事本身就挺瘋狂的。未來的人回頭看,會不敢相信以前居然允許任何人隨便開著一臺兩噸重的死亡機器到處跑。(馬斯克)

他又把電梯搬了出來。以前的人拿著操縱桿想讓電梯停哪兒停哪兒,甚至停在兩層樓中間都行。在未來看來,人類自己開車這件事,會像今天看電梯操作員一樣古怪。

這段話聽著像狂言,但它其實回答了 ODD 那個問題。在馬斯克的價值排序裡,人類手動駕駛的風險是基線,是那個需要被消除的東西。所以把 ODD 做窄,等於承認手動駕駛還要持續很久,等於在一個高風險基線上做區域性最佳化。他想要的是把基線本身換掉。

對抗樣本:教系統認識什麼絕對不是車

有駭客用對抗樣本(adversarial examples)騙過 Autopilot,讓它做出奇怪的反應。神經網路對輸入的微小擾動極其敏感,這是整個行業的軟肋。Lex 問:這種事防得住嗎?

馬斯克說防得住,理由是神經網路本質就是一堆矩陣運算。要攻擊它,得是非常懂行的人,基本上要逆向工程出矩陣是怎麼搭的,再造一個精巧的擾動讓矩陣算歪。

但擋住它很容易,基本上就是做一個反向識別。如果系統看到的東西像是矩陣攻擊,就把它排除掉。這太簡單了。(馬斯克)

他的思路是讓模型同時學兩類樣本:這是車,和這絕對不是車。這是兩個不同的概念,都得訓練。看到疑似被篡改的輸入,就歸到絕對不是那一類裡剔掉。

他還順帶調侃了一句公眾對神經網路的陌生:很多人聽到神經網路,腦子裡想的是漁網。

烤麵包機、愛與模擬宇宙

話題從工程拐到了哲學。

Lex 問:現在的深度學習方法離通用人工智慧還有多遠?馬斯克說還差幾個關鍵想法,但通用人工智慧會來得非常快。到那時候我們就得想清楚該拿它怎麼辦,如果我們還有選擇權的話。

他覺得好笑的是,人們總是分不清窄 AI 和通用智慧。讓車認出車道線、在街上導航,和真正的通用智慧,完全是兩碼事。

你的烤麵包機和你的電腦都是機器,但一個比另一個複雜得多。(馬斯克)

Lex 順著這個梗問:你有多大信心特斯拉能造出世界上最好的烤麵包機?馬斯克笑了:世界上最好的烤麵包機,是的。世界上最好的自動駕駛,是的。

他補了一句很有意思的話。對現在的他來說,自動駕駛這件事看起來已經是遊戲、盤、賽點(game set match)。他不想顯得自滿或過度自信,但這就是它此刻看起來的樣子。他可能會錯,但眼下看起來,特斯拉遠遠領先於所有人。

然後是最柔軟的問題。Lex 問:我們會不會造出一個我們能愛、它也深情地愛回來的 AI?就像電影《她》裡那樣。

馬斯克的回答帶著物理學家的冷峻。AI 會很擅長說服你愛上它。但這和它是不是真的愛你,是兩回事,這就滑進了形而上學:情感和思想是不是存在於物理世界之外的另一個領域?

從物理學的角度看,如果它愛你的方式,讓你根本無法分辨真假,那它就是真的。如果沒有一個測試能讓你區分,那就不存在區別。(馬斯克)

他把這套邏輯推到了模擬假說上。真實世界和模擬世界之間,可能根本不存在能區分二者的測試。既然測不出來,從物理學角度,它們就是一回事。

但他也留了個口子:也許存在檢測模擬的方法。只是你可以設想,一旦模擬裡的實體找到了檢測方法,模擬本身可以重啟、暫停,或者開一個新的,把這個錯誤修正掉。這個想法有點像程式設計師發現線上 bug 之後的處理方式:不回滾,直接發新版本蓋過去。

Lex 最後問:如果有一天你或別人造出了通用人工智慧,你能問它一個問題,你會問什麼?

馬斯克的答案只有一句:模擬之外是什麼?

回到現實:這場對話對普通人意味著什麼

整場對話最值得記住的,是馬斯克那套把複雜問題壓成一句話的能力。所有輸入都是錯誤,買特斯拉是買增值資產,未來開車會像電梯操作員一樣古怪。這些話之所以有傳播力,是因為它們各自背後都站著一整套工程邏輯。

同時也要看清分歧在哪裡。Lex 代表的是以人為中心的路線:在系統還不夠好的漫長過渡期裡,怎麼透過監控、互動設計、心理學研究,讓人和機器配合得更安全。馬斯克代表的是以系統為中心的路線:他想的是把系統做到讓人不再必要,把管理人的弱點放到了次要位置。

兩條路不矛盾,只是時間尺度不同。短期看,Lex 的擔憂是真實的,人確實會鬆懈,監控確實有用;長期看,馬斯克的判斷大機率會兌現,系統一旦遠超人類,人的介入就成了噪音。

這場對話裡,普通讀者能直接落地的部分其實很具體:

  • 如果你在關注自動駕駛,別隻盯著能不能自己開這個問題,重點看它怎麼定義和收集邊緣案例,接管資料怎麼被區分成圖方便和真出錯,這才是系統進化的燃料。
  • 判斷一家自動駕駛公司,先看它的車隊規模和感測器配置,再看它有沒有能力把海量資料轉成可訓練的樣本。演算法可以追,資料規模短期追不上。
  • 買任何帶輔助駕駛的車,先花十分鐘研究它的 ODD 邊界。寬 ODD 讓你更自由,也要求你更清楚它在哪兒會失效;窄 ODD 幫你規避風險,但功能天花板低。
  • 如果你是產品經理,記住所有輸入都是錯誤這個視角。使用者每一次手動糾正,都是一條免費的需求訊號,前提是你能把使用者覺得不對和系統真不對分開。
  • 別急著站隊,問自己押注的時間視窗有多長。短期做人的適配,長期等系統的勝利,兩種投入都需要,只是比例不同。

最後那句模擬之外是什麼,其實也可以反過來問自己:我們每天開車、寫程式碼、做產品,忙的這些事裡,有多少是真正必要的輸入,又有多少隻是系統還沒修好的錯誤。

文稿來自公開 Kaggle 資料集(rajneesh231/lex-fridman-podcast-transcript),為早期自動轉錄存檔,可能存在識別錯誤。
The following is a conversation with Elon Musk. He's the CEO of Tesla, SpaceX, Neuralink, and a cofounder of several other companies. This conversation is part of the Artificial Intelligence podcast. The series includes leading researchers in academia and industry, including CEOs and CTOs of automotive, robotics, AI, and technology companies. This conversation happened after the release of the paper from our group at MIT on Driver Functional Vigilance, during use of Tesla's Autopilot. The Tesla team reached out to me offering a podcast conversation with Mr. Musk. I accepted, with full control of questions I could ask and the choice of what is released publicly. I ended up editing out nothing of substance. I've never spoken with Elon before this conversation, publicly or privately. Neither he nor his companies have any influence on my opinion, nor on the rigor and integrity of the scientific method that I practice in my position at MIT. Tesla has never financially supported my research, and I've never owned a Tesla vehicle, and I've never owned Tesla stock. This podcast is not a scientific paper. It is a conversation. I respect Elon as I do all other leaders and engineers I've spoken with. We agree on some things and disagree on others. My goal is always with these conversations is to understand the way the guest sees the world. One particular point of disagreement in this conversation was the extent to which camera based driver monitoring will improve outcomes and for how long it will remain relevant for AI assisted driving. As someone who works on and is fascinated by human centered artificial intelligence, I believe that if implemented and integrated effectively, camera based driver monitoring is likely to be of benefit in both the short term and the long term. In contrast, Elon and Tesla's focus is on the improvement of autopilot such that it's statistical safety benefits override any concern of human behavior and psychology. Elon and I may not agree on everything, but I deeply respect the engineering and innovation behind the efforts that he leads. My goal here is to catalyze a rigorous nuanced and objective discussion in industry and academia on AI assisted driving. One that ultimately makes for a safer and better world. And now here's my conversation with Elon Musk. What was the vision, the dream of autopilot when, in the beginning, the big picture system level, when it was first conceived and started being installed in 2014, the hardware and the cars, what was the vision, the dream? I wouldn't characterize the vision or dream, simply that there are obviously two massive revolutions in, in the automobile industry. One is the transition to electrification and then the other is autonomy. And it became obvious to me that in the future, any car that does not have autonomy would be about as useful as a horse, which is not to say that there's no use, it's just rare and somewhat idiosyncratic if somebody has a horse at this point. It's just obvious that cars will drive themselves completely. It's just a question of time. And if we did not participate in the autonomy revolution, then our cars would not be useful to people relative to cars that are autonomous. I mean, an autonomous car is arguably worth five to 10 times more than a car which is not autonomous. In the long term. Turns out what you mean by long term, but let's say at least for the next five years, perhaps 10 years. So there are a lot of very interesting design choices with autopilot early on. First is showing on the instrument cluster or in the Model 3 on the center stack display, what the combined sensor suite sees, what was the thinking behind that choice? Was there a debate? What was the process? The whole point of the display is to provide a health check on the vehicle's perception of reality. So the vehicle's taking information from a bunch of sensors, primarily cameras, but also radar and ultrasonics, GPS, and so forth. And then that, that information is then rendered into vector space and that, you know, with a bunch of objects with, with properties like lane lines and traffic lights and other cars. And then in vector space that is rerendered onto a display. So you can confirm whether the car knows what's going on or not by looking out the window. Right. I think that's an extremely powerful thing for people to get an understanding. So it become one with the system and understanding what the system is capable of. Now, have you considered showing more? So if we look at the computer vision, you know, like road segmentation, lane detection, vehicle detection, object detection, underlying the system, there is at the edges, some uncertainty. Have you considered revealing the parts that the vehicle is in, the parts that the, the uncertainty in the system, the sort of probabilities associated with, with say image recognition or something like that? Yeah. So right now it shows like the vehicles in the vicinity, a very clean, crisp image. And people do confirm that there's a car in front of me and the system sees there's a car in front of me, but to help people build an intuition of what computer vision is by showing some of the uncertainty. Well, I think it's, in my car, I always look at the sort of the debug view. And there's, there's two debug views. Uh, one is augmented vision, uh, where, which I'm sure you've seen where it's basically, we draw boxes and labels around objects that are recognized. And then there's a work called the visualizer, which is basically vector space representation, summing up the input from all sensors that doesn't, that doesn't, does not show any pictures, but it shows, uh, all of the, it's basically shows the car's view of, of, of the world in vector space. Um, but I think this is very difficult for people to know, normal people to understand, they would not know what they're looking at. So it's almost an HMI challenge to the current things that are being displayed is optimized for the general public understanding of what the system is capable of. It's like, if you have no idea what, how computer vision works or anything, you can sort of look at the screen and see if the car knows what's going on. And then if you're, you know, if you're a development engineer or if you're, you know, if you're, if you have the development build like I do, then you can see, uh, you know, all the debug information, but those would just be like total diverse to most people. What's your view on how to best distribute effort. So there's three, I would say technical aspects of autopilot that are really important. So it's the underlying algorithms, like the neural network architecture, there's the data, so that the strain on, and then there's a hardware development. There may be others, but so look, algorithm, data, hardware, you don't, you only have so much money, only have so much time, what do you think is the most important thing to, to, uh, allocate resources to, or do you see it as pretty evenly distributed between those three? We automatically get a fast amounts of data because all of our cars have eight external facing cameras and radar, and usually 12 ultrasonic sensors, uh, GPS, obviously, um, and, uh, IMU. And so we basically have a fleet that has, uh, and we've got about 400,000 cars on the road that have that level of data, I think you keep quite close track of it actually. Yes. Yeah. So we're, we're approaching half a million cars on the road that have the full sensor suite. Um, so this is, I'm, I'm not sure how many other cars on the road have the sensor suite, but I would be surprised if it's more than 5,000, which means that we have 99% of all the data. So there's this huge inflow of data. Absolutely. Massive inflow of data, and then we, it's, it's taken us about three years, but now we've finally developed our full self driving computer, which can process, uh, and in order of magnitude as much as the Nvidia system that we currently have in the, in the cars, and it's really just a, to use it, you've unplugged the Nvidia computer and plug the Tesla computer in and that's it. And it's, it's, uh, in fact, we're not even, we're still exploring the boundaries of capabilities, uh, but we're able to run the cameras at full frame rate, full resolution, uh, not even crop the images and it's still got headroom even on one of the systems, the harder full self driving computer is really two computers, two systems on a chip that are fully redundant. So you could put a bolt through basically any part of that system and it still works. The redundancy, are they perfect copies of each other or also it's purely for redundancy as opposed to an argue machine kind of architecture where they're both making decisions. This is purely for redundancy. I think it would more like it's, if you have a twin engine aircraft, uh, commercial aircraft, the system will operate best if both systems are operating, but it's, it's capable of operating safely on one. So, but as it is right now, we can just run, we're, we haven't even hit the, the, the edge of performance. So there's no need to actually distribute functionality across both SOCs. We can actually just run a full duplicate on, on, on each one. Do you haven't really explored or hit the limit of this? Not yet at the limiter. So the magic of deep learning is that it gets better with data. You said there's a huge inflow of data, but the thing about driving the really valuable data to learn from is the edge cases. So how do you, I mean, I've, I've heard you talk somewhere about, uh, autopilot disengagements being an important moment of time to use. Is there other edge cases where you can, you know, you can, you can, you can drive, is there other edge cases or perhaps can you speak to those edge cases? What aspects of that might be valuable or if you have other ideas, how to discover more and more and more edge cases in driving? Well, there's a lot of things that are learned. There are certainly edge cases where I say somebody is on autopilot and they, they take over and then, okay, that, that, that, that's a trigger that goes to our system that says, okay, did they take over for convenience or do they take over because the autopilot wasn't working properly. There's also like, let's say we're, we're trying to figure out what is the optimal spline for traversing an intersection. Um, then then the ones where there are no interventions and are the right ones. So you then say, okay, when it looks like this, do the following. And then, and then you get the optimal spline for a complex, uh, navigating a complex, uh, intersection. So that's for this. So there's kind of the common case you're trying to, uh, capture a huge amount of samples of a particular intersection, how, when things went right, and then there's the edge case where, uh, as you said, not for convenience, but something didn't go exactly right. Somebody took over, somebody asserted manual control from autopilot. And really like the way to look at this as view all input is error. If the user had to do input, it does something all input is error. That's a powerful line. That's a powerful line to think of it that way, because they may very well be error, but if you want to exit the highway, or if you want to, uh, it's a navigation decision that all autopilot is not currently designed to do. Then the driver takes over. How do you know the difference? That's going to change with navigate an autopilot, which we were just released and without still confirm. So the navigation, like lane change based, like a certain control in order to change, do a lane change or exit a freeway or, or doing a highway under change, the vast majority of that will go away with, um, the release that just went out. Yeah. So that, that I don't think people quite understand how big of a step that is. Yeah, they don't. So if you drive the car, then you do. So you still have to keep your hands on the steering wheel currently when it does the automatic lane change. What are, so there's, there's these big leaps through the development of autopilot through its history and what stands out to you as the big leaps? I would say this one, navigate an autopilot without, uh, confirm without having to confirm is a huge leap. It is a huge leap. It also automatically overtakes low cars. So it's, it's both navigation, um, and seeking the fastest lane. So it'll, it'll, it'll, you know, overtake a slow cause, um, and exit the freeway and take highway interchanges. And, and then, uh, we have, uh, traffic lights, uh, recognition, which introduced initially as a, as a warning. I mean, on the development version that I'm driving, the car fully, fully stops and goes at traffic lights. So those are the steps, right? You've just mentioned something sort of inkling a step towards full autonomy. What would you say are the biggest technological roadblocks to full self driving? Actually, I don't think, I think we just, the full self driving computer that we just, uh, that the Tesla, what we call the FSD computer, uh, that that's now in production. Uh, so if you order, uh, any model SRX or any model three that has the full self driving package, you'll get the FSD computer. That, that was, that's important to have enough, uh, base computation, uh, then refining the neural net and the control software, uh, which, but all of that can just be provided as an over there update. The thing that's really profound and where I'll be emphasizing at the, uh, sort of what that investor day that we're having focused on autonomy is that the cars currently being produced with the hardware currently being produced is capable of full self driving, but capable is an interesting word because, um, like the hardware is, and as we refine the software, the capabilities will increase dramatically, um, and then the reliability will increase dramatically, and then it will receive regulatory approval. So essentially buying a car today is an investment in the future. You're essentially buying a car, you're buying the, I think the most profound thing is that if you buy a Tesla today, I believe you are buying an appreciating asset, not a depreciating asset. So that's a really important statement there because if hardware is capable enough, that's the hard thing to upgrade usually. Exactly. So then the rest is a software problem. Yes. Software has no marginal cost really. But what's your intuition on the software side? How hard are the remaining steps to, to get it to where, um, you know, uh, the, the experience, uh, not just the safety, but the full experience is something that people would, uh, enjoy. Well, I think people enjoy it very much so on, on, on the highways. It's, it's a total game changer for quality of life for using, you know, Tesla autopilot on the highways, uh, so it's really just extending that functionality to city streets, adding in the traffic light recognition, uh, navigating complex intersections and, um, and then, uh, being able to navigate complicated parking lots so the car can, uh, exit a parking space and come and find you, even if it's in a complete maze of a parking lot, um, and, and, and, and then if, and then you can just, it can just drop you off and find a parking spot by itself. Yeah. In terms of enjoyability and something that people would, uh, would actually find a lot of use from the parking lot is a, is a really, you know, it's, it's rich of annoyance when you have to do it manually. So there's a lot of benefit to be gained from automation there. So let me start injecting the human into this discussion a little bit. Uh, so let's talk about, uh, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, the, about full autonomy. If you look at the current level four vehicles being tested on road, like Waymo and so on, they're only technically autonomous. They're really level two systems with just the different design philosophy, because there's always a safety driver in almost all cases and they're monitoring the system. Right. Do you see Tesla's full self driving as still for a time to come requiring supervision of the human being. So it's capabilities are powerful enough to drive, but nevertheless requires the human to still be supervising, just like a safety driver is in a other fully autonomous vehicles. I think it will require detecting hands on wheel for at least, uh, six months or something like that from here. It really is a question of like, from a regulatory standpoint, uh, what, how much safer than a person does autopilot need to be for it to be okay to not monitor the car, you know, and, and this is a debate that one can have it. And then if you, but you need, you know, a large sample, a large amount of data. Um, so you can prove with high confidence, statistically speaking, that the car is dramatically safer than a person, um, and that adding in the person monitoring does not materially affect the safety. So it might need to be like two or 300% safer than a person. And how do you prove that incidents per mile incidents per mile crashes and fatalities, fatalities would be a factor, but there, there are just not enough fatalities to be statistically significant at scale, but there are enough. Crashes, you know, there are far more crashes than there are fatalities. So you can assess what is the probability of a crash that then there's another step which probability of injury and probability of permanent injury, the probability of death, and all of those need to be a much better than a person, uh, by at least perhaps 200%. And you think there's, uh, the ability to have a healthy discourse with the regulatory bodies on this topic? I mean, there's no question that, um, but, um, regulators pay just disproportionate amount of attention to that, which generates press. This is just an objective fact. Um, and Tesla generates a lot of press. So the, you know, in the United States, this, I think almost, you know, uh, in the United States, this, I think almost 40,000 automotive deaths per year. Uh, but if there are four in Tesla, they'll probably receive a thousand times more press than anyone else. So the, the psychology of that is actually fascinating. I don't think we'll have enough time to talk about that, but I have to talk to you about the human side of things. So myself and our team at MIT recently released the paper on functional vigilance of drivers while using autopilot. This is work we've been doing since autopilot was first released publicly over three years ago, collecting video of driver faces and driver body. So I saw that you tweeted a quote from the abstract, so I can at least, uh, guess that you've glanced at it. Yeah, I read it. Can I talk you through what we found? Sure. Okay. So it appears that in the data that we've collected, that drivers are maintaining functional vigilance such that we're looking at 18,000 disengagement from autopilot, 18,900 and annotating, were they able to take over control in a timely manner? So they were there present looking at the road, uh, to take over control. Okay. So this, uh, goes against what, what many would predict from the body of literature on vigilance with automation. Now, the question is, do you think these results hold across the broader population? So ours is just a small subset. Do you think, uh, one of the criticism is that, you know, there's a small minority of drivers that may be highly responsible where their vigilance decrement would increase with autopilot use? I think this is all really going to be swept. I mean, the system's improving so much, so fast that this is going to be a mood point very soon where vigilance is like, if something's many times safer than a person, then adding a person, uh, does the, the, the effect on safety is, is limited. Um, and in fact, uh, it could be negative. That's really interesting. So the, uh, the, so the fact that a human may, some percent of the population may, uh, exhibit a vigilance decrement will not affect overall statistics numbers of safety. No, in fact, I think it will become, uh, very, very quickly, maybe even towards the end of this year, but I'd say I'd be shocked if it's not next year. At the latest, that, um, having the person, having a human intervene will decrease safety decrease. It's like, imagine if you're an elevator and it used to be that there were elevator operators, um, and, and you couldn't go on an elevator by yourself and work the lever to move between floors. Um, and now, uh, nobody wants it an elevator operator because the automated elevator that stops the floors is much safer than the elevator operator. And in fact, it would be quite dangerous to have someone with a lever that can move the elevator between floors. So that's a, that's a really powerful statement and really interesting one. But I also have to ask from a user experience and from a safety perspective, one of the passions for me algorithmically is a camera based detection of, uh, of just sensing the human, but detecting what the driver is looking at, cognitive load, body pose on the computer vision side, that's a fascinating problem. But do you, and there's many in industry believe you have to have camera based driver monitoring. Do you think there could be benefit gained from driver monitoring? If you have a system that's, that's at, that's at or below a human level reliability, then driver monitoring makes sense. But if your system is dramatically better, more likely to be better, more liable than, than a human, then drive monitoring monitoring is not just not help much. And, uh, like I said, you, you, just like, as an, you wouldn't want someone into like, you wouldn't want someone in the elevator, if you're in an elevator, do you really want someone with a big lever, some, some random person operating the elevator between floors? I wouldn't trust that or rather have the buttons. Okay. You're optimistic about the pace of improvement of the system that from what you've seen with the full self driving car computer, the rate of improvement is exponential. So one of the other very interesting design choices early on that connects to this is the operational design domain of autopilot. So where autopilot is able to be turned on the, so contrast another vehicle system that we're studying is the Cadillac SuperCrew system. That's in terms of ODD, very constrained to particular kinds of highways, well mapped, tested, but it's much narrower than the ODD of Tesla vehicles. What's there's, there's pros and... It's like ADD. Yeah. That's good. That's a, that's a good line. Uh, what was the design decision, uh, what, in that different philosophy of thinking where there's pros and cons, what we see with, uh, a wide ODD is drive Tesla drivers are able to explore more the limitations of the system, at least early on, and they understand together with the instrument cluster display, they start to understand what are the capabilities. So that's a benefit. The con is you go, you're letting drivers use it basically anywhere. So anyway, that could detect lanes with confidence. Was there a philosophy, uh, design decisions that were challenging that were being made there or from the very beginning, was that, uh, done on purpose with intent? Well, I mean, I think it's frankly, it's pretty crazy giving it, letting people drive a two ton death machine manually. Uh, that's crazy. Like, like in the future of people who are like, I can't believe anyone was just allowed to drive for one of these two ton death machines and they just drive wherever they wanted. Just like elevators. He was like, move the elevator with that lever, wherever you want. It can stop at halfway between floors if you want. It's pretty crazy. So it's going to seem like a mad thing in the future that people were driving cars. So I have a bunch of questions about the human psychology, about behavior and so on that would become that because, uh, you have faith in the AI system, uh, not faith, but, uh, the, both on the hardware side and the deep learning approach of learning from data will make it just far safer than humans. Yeah, exactly. Recently, there are a few hackers who, uh, tricked autopilot to act in unexpected ways with adversarial examples. So we all know that neural network systems are very sensitive to minor disturbances to these adversarial examples on input. Do you think it's possible to defend against something like this for the broader, for the industry? Sure. So can you elaborate on the, on the confidence behind that answer? Um, well the, you know, neural net is just like a basic bunch of matrix math. Or you have to be like a very sophisticated, somebody who really understands neural nets and like basically reverse engineer how the matrix is being built and then create a little thing that's just exactly, um, causes the matrix math to be slightly off. But it's very easy to then block it, block that by, by having basically anti negative recognition. It's like if you, if the system sees something that looks like a matrix hack, uh, exclude it, so it's such an easy thing to do. So learn both on the, the valid data and the invalid data. So basically learn on the adversarial examples to be able to exclude them. Yeah. Like you basically want to both know what is, what is a car and what is definitely not a car. And you train for this is a car and this is definitely not a car. Those are two different things. People have no idea neural nets really. They probably think neural nets are both like, you know, fishing net only. So as you know, so taking a step beyond just Tesla and autopilot, uh, current deep learning approaches still seem in some ways to be far from general intelligence systems. Do you think the current approaches will take us to general intelligence or do totally new ideas need to be invented? I think we're missing a few key ideas for general intelligence, general artificial general intelligence, but it's going to be upon us very quickly. And then we'll need to figure out what shall we do if we even have that choice? But it's amazing how people can't differentiate between say the narrow AI that, you know, allows a car to figure out what a lane line is and, and, and, you know, and navigate streets versus general intelligence. Like these are just very different things. Like your toaster and your computer are both machines, but one's much more sophisticated than another. You're confident with Tesla. You can create the world's best toaster. The world's best toaster. Yes. The world's best toaster. Yes. The world's best self driving. I'm, I, yes. To me right now, this seems game set match. I don't, I mean, that sounds, I don't want to be complacent or overconfident, but that's what it appears. That is just literally what it, how it appears right now. I could be wrong, but it appears to be the case that Tesla is vastly ahead of everyone. Do you think we will ever create an AI system that we can love and loves us back in a deep, meaningful way? Like in the movie, her, I think AI will be capable of convincing you to fall in love with it very well. And that's different than us humans. You know, we start getting into a metaphysical question of like, do emotions and thoughts exist in a different realm than the physical? And maybe they do. Maybe they don't. I don't know. But from a physics standpoint, I tend to think of things, you know, like physics was my main sort of training and from a physics standpoint, essentially, if it loves you in a way that is, that you can't tell whether it's real or not, it is real. That's a physics view of love. Yeah. If there's no, if you cannot just, if you cannot prove that it does not, if there's no, if there's no test that you can apply that would make it, allow you to tell the difference, then there is no difference. Right. And it's similar to seeing our world as simulation. There may not be a test to tell the difference between what the real world and the simulation, and therefore from a physics perspective, it might as well be the same thing. Yes. And there may be ways to test whether it's a simulation. There might be, I'm not saying there aren't, but you could certainly imagine that a simulation could correct that once an entity in the simulation found a way to detect the simulation, it could either restart, you know, pause the simulation, start a new simulation, or do one of many other things that then corrects for that error. So when maybe you or somebody else creates an AGI system and you get to ask her one question, what would that question be? What's outside the simulation? Elon, thank you so much for talking today. It was a pleasure. All right. Thank you.

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