第 334 期·中文精讀

阿巴斯·阿馬納特:伊朗抗議、馬赫薩·阿米尼、歷史、CIA 與核武器

Abbas Amanat: Iran Protests, Mahsa Amini, History, CIA & Nuclear Weapons

伊朗史學者梳理抗議運動的來龍去脈,以及外部干預與核問題的歷史脈絡。

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2022年9月底,柏林街頭出現了十萬人規模的遊行。人群舉著庫爾德語標語,抗議伊朗國內對女性的鎮壓。伊朗國家電視臺的晚間新聞也播了這條訊息:約一萬人聚集在柏林,抗議德國上漲的汽油和天然氣價格。

耶魯大學歷史學家阿巴斯·阿馬納特(Abbas Amanat)在 Lex Fridman 播客第334期裡講了這個細節。他研究伊朗現代史四十多年,寫過一本八百頁的《伊朗現代史》。講這件事時他的語氣裡沒有多少憤怒,更多是見怪不怪的疲憊。官方媒體這套操作已經運轉了四十三年,這一次連造假都懶得認真。

粗糙謊言的代價是,95%以上的伊朗人根本不在聽國內新聞。他們看 BBC Persian,看 Iran International,看至少五六家境外波斯語頻道。

一個22歲遊客的死,如何點燃整個國家

2022年9月中旬,馬赫薩·阿米尼(Mahsa Amini)從庫爾德斯坦省的薩蓋茲到德黑蘭探親。她22歲,按照伊朗的強制著裝規定,頭巾戴得規規矩矩,全身遮蓋。道德警察,波斯語叫 Gashte Ershad,直譯是"指導巡邏隊",還是把她攔了下來。

執法隊裡有兩名全身罩袍的女性警員和兩名男性。沒有人確切知道那幾個小時裡發生了什麼,阿馬納特也只能推測:她遭到了毆打,過程中出現了某種衝突,隨後陷入昏迷。她被帶到拘留中心,名義上是"再教育",之後被送進醫院。第二天,她死了。一個22歲、沒有明顯違規行為的女孩,死於顱骨損傷。

社交媒體把訊息傳遍了全國。第二天德黑蘭街頭就有人聚集,人們哭著悼念她。她年輕,漂亮,無辜,來自庫爾德地區,這些元素疊加在一起,讓她很快成了這場運動的象徵。藝術家們根據她的照片做了大量再創作,那張頭像現在貼滿了伊朗的牆壁。

當局原本的判斷是,這事幾天就會過去。結果抗議從德黑蘭街頭蔓延到全國大學校園,再蔓延到高中。參與者的年齡結構非常特殊:主力是十幾歲到二十出頭的年輕人,男女一起上街,態度決絕,面對全副武裝的安全部隊毫不退縮。

"女性、生命、自由"這句話,來自另一個戰場

運動的主口號是"Zan, Zendegi, Azadi",翻譯過來是"女性、生命、自由"。它原本是庫爾德語的"Jin, Jiyan, Azadi",最早出現在敘利亞庫爾德斯坦。那裡的庫爾德女性武裝正在與"伊斯蘭國"作戰,因為對方在攻擊雅茲迪人、奴役雅茲迪女性。

這句口號從敘利亞戰場傳到土耳其庫爾德地區,再從庫爾德斯坦傳到伊朗本土,最後成了德黑蘭街頭的標語。阿馬納特說,歷史學者對這類口號的傳播路徑特別感興趣,它把三個原本分開的訴求壓進了一個短語裡。

第一個詞是女性。伊朗女性在法律上被當作二等公民對待,這一點後面會展開。

第二個詞是生命。用美國人的說法,就是對幸福的追求。年輕人要音樂,要跳舞,要在大街上自由走動,要談戀愛,不想被一個無處不在的"老大哥"盯著,告訴他什麼能做什麼不能做。

第三個詞是自由。這是伊朗人一百多年來的老訴求,從1906年立憲革命算起。自由在這裡的含義很具體:沒有獨立的政黨,新聞自由極其有限,廣播電視全部握在政府手裡,宣傳機器覆蓋全國。

阿馬納特特別提醒,這三個詞湊在一起是件有些意外的事。它們各自都有漫長的歷史,卻在這輪運動裡第一次被同一批人同時喊出來。女性站到最前線,在伊朗現代史上找不到先例。

波斯語裡的"八零後":一代人的自我命名

這代年輕人管自己叫"Daheh Hashdidi",意思是"八零年代人"。伊朗使用自己的太陽曆,他們出生在波斯歷1380年代,對應公曆2001年到2010年。這個自我命名本身就是身份宣示:我們和你們不一樣。

阿馬納特把革命後的伊朗分成三代。第一代是1979年革命的參與者,也就是現在年輕人的祖父母一輩。第二代是中間那代,在兩伊戰爭和重建年代長大,學會了和體制妥協,在限制中過日子。第三代就是現在街上這批人,他們從出生起就在伊斯蘭共和國裡,卻對這個共和國毫無認同。

代際關係的性質變了。過去父親甚至母親可以命令子女做什麼,現在必須協商。年輕人不太聽父母的話,父母也沒有把握要求他們聽。家庭內部的權威結構正在鬆動,這件事本身就是政治權威鬆動的一個縮影。

這批人在數字技能上遠超上一代。他們透過社交媒體瞭解全世界的明星、潮流、電影、音樂,知道外面的生活長什麼樣。阿馬納特說,一個德黑蘭的中學生,對美國社會的瞭解可能不比一個美國中學生少,有時候還更多。

伊斯蘭共和國花了四十三年做社會工程,想把伊朗人塑造成某種樣子。這一代人站在街上,說明這個工程失敗了。

頭巾只是載體,選擇權才是核心

抗議現場最廣為流傳的畫面,是年輕女性摘下強制佩戴的頭巾,扔進街心的火堆,圍著火跳舞。

有人會把這場運動讀成反對頭巾本身。阿馬納特強調,訴求其實更簡單:戴不戴該由個人決定。想戴的人可以戴,不想戴的人不該被強制。運動口號裡沒有"廢除頭巾"這一條。

最能說明問題的是遊行隊伍的成分。在德黑蘭街頭和大學校園裡,戴著頭巾的年輕女性和摘掉頭巾的女性站在一起,共同抗議。男性和女性混在一起,衝破體制強加了幾十年的性別隔離。這個畫面比任何口號都有說服力:她們要的是自己說了算,那塊布只是載體。

外觀這件事看起來瑣碎,其實不然。你怎麼想象自己,怎麼呈現自己,是人格的一部分。體制想要的是一個"貞潔的伊斯蘭女性"的形象,全身遮蓋,由家庭中的男性成員保護。年輕人拒絕被這樣定義。

法律意義上的二等公民

頭巾只是最表面的東西。阿馬納特列了一串更硬的條款。

離婚,需要男性同意。子女監護權,母親的權利有限。遺產繼承,女性的份額低於男性。出國、辦理護照、自由遷徙,都需要丈夫、父親、兄弟或者某個男性親屬簽字。極端情況下,一個成年女性的兒子都可以成為她的監護人。

這套制度把父權制寫進了法律條文,執行得非常徹底。一個受過大學教育、每天在 Instagram 上看紐約和柏林生活方式的女孩,回到家裡發現自己連買張機票出國都要父親同意。這種落差本身就是火藥。

大學裡的性別隔離延伸到食堂。很多學校的自助餐廳分成男女兩個廳,學生吃飯要分開。這一輪抗議裡,學生們乾的第一件事就是把隔斷牆砸了,男女坐在一起吃飯。動作很小,含義不小,它把抽象的"自由"變成了可以當場做到的事。

政權的解釋:外國陰謀和沙阿的子孫

抗議進入第六週,最高領袖的唯一公開回應是:這些人是沙阿時期安全機構 SAVAK 的後代。

阿馬納特講到這裡時,語氣裡帶著難以置信。SAVAK 在1979年就被解散了。四十三年後,最高領袖說街上那些十七八歲的孩子是 SAVAK 成員的子孫,所以他們不忠誠,可以被殘酷鎮壓。這個邏輯的荒謬程度,反而暴露了政權內部的焦慮。

官方敘事的另一條線是"外國勢力"。美國是"大撒旦",以色列是幕後黑手,抗議者是外國代理人和內奸。這套解釋有兩個功能:把國內矛盾外部化,為暴力鎮壓提供合法性。

這些人被說成外國勢力的代理人,他們的家人全都出賣了自己,對偉大的伊斯蘭共和國失去了忠誠,所以可以這樣殘忍地對待他們,可以這樣殘忍地鎮壓他們。(阿巴斯·阿馬納特)

阿馬納特提到政權現在的狀態:極度焦慮。如果他們真有信心,不需要用這麼強硬的方式禁止一個口號傳播。反應越粗暴,越說明底氣不足。

四百萬僑民,和一場宣傳事故

伊朗在海外有大約四百萬僑民,分佈在澳大利亞、紐西蘭、日本、西歐、土耳其、美國、加拿大。這張網路覆蓋面極廣,也是國內運動的外部放大器。

柏林那場遊行,保守估計十萬人參加,人從德國各地和西歐其他國家趕來。伊朗官方媒體的處理方式前面已經說過了:把反政府遊行改寫成反通脹遊行,觀眾從十萬縮到一萬。

這次改寫之所以失敗得如此徹底,是因為伊朗國內的媒體生態早已繞開官方渠道。衛星天線在伊朗的普及程度超出很多人的想象:小城鎮、村莊的屋頂上到處都是鍋蓋天線。政府早期試圖用粗糙的方式限制境外媒體,效果一直有限。這一輪抗議期間,境外波斯語頻道幾乎24小時滾動播出每一段流出的影片。

阿馬納特說,政府這麼幹有點愚蠢,因為差不多百分之九十五甚至百分之百的伊朗人都在看境外波斯語媒體。國內宣傳的受眾已經萎縮到近乎不存在。

斷網的代價:一天五千萬美元

政府的應對手段之一是限制網際網路。問題是,伊朗經濟已經深度依賴網路。

阿馬納特的朋友告訴他,伊朗跟瑞典有幾分相似:幾乎不用現金。原因很實際,通脹太厲害,紙幣在快速貶值,刷卡成了唯一可行的方式。去超市刷卡,點外賣線上支付,疫情之後這套系統更是滲透到了日常生活。

斷網意味著超市結不了賬,外賣送不了,生意做不成。據估算,伊朗經濟每天因此損失約五千萬美元。政府沒有能力長期關網,因為關了網政府自己也運轉不下去。控制工具和經濟命脈成了同一根線,政府剪不斷。

與此同時,WhatsApp 在伊朗的普及率極高。受過高中和大學教育的伊朗人幾乎人人會用。社會的資訊流動能力遠超政府的封鎖能力。

人口革命:從九個孩子到一個孩子

要理解今天的伊朗,人口結構是繞不開的底層變數。

二十世紀初,伊朗人口大約九百萬。1979年革命時是三千五百萬。現在是八千三百萬。四十年翻了一倍多。

真正關鍵的是生育率的斷崖式下跌。1970到1980年代,生育率是2.8到3,現在降到了1.1。這個數字意味著下一代人口只有上一代的一半左右。

阿馬納特說,伊朗是中東人口控制最成功的國家,沒有之一。政府這些年一直在鼓勵多生孩子,發補貼,做宣傳,中產階級就是不生。

原因是城市化。大量原本住在村莊的人搬進了五萬、十萬人口的小城市,過上了城市生活。城市生活要教育投入,要住房,要時間,生育的成本結構完全變了。醫療條件改善以後,嬰兒死亡率大幅下降,不需要靠多生來對沖夭折風險,生育決策從"多生幾個總會活下來幾個"變成了"精細養一兩個"。

這套邏輯在任何完成城市化的社會都成立。伊朗的特殊之處在於,它是在一個神權體制下完成的,而且速度極快。

阿馬納特還講了一個常被忽略的區別。過去農業社會生十個孩子,六個可能活不過五歲,最後剩四個。抗生素普及以後,生十個大機率活十個。生育的外部約束一鬆,家庭自己就開始算計。城市裡的房子、學費、時間成本,把"多子多福"的賬徹底算翻了。

教育擴張的反噬

1970年代,伊朗全國只有十到十二所大學。現在有56所國立大學,加上"阿扎德大學"(Azad University,字面意思是"自由大學")在全國的321個校區。

識字率86%。阿馬納特估計這個數字可能高於土耳其,在整個中東地區名列前茅。全國有一百萬中小學教師。

這些統計數字背後是一個政權沒有預料到的後果。伊斯蘭共和國擴招,本意是培養擁護體制的一代,尤其是讓傳統家庭的女孩接受教育。結果女性入學率飆升,來自亞茲德、錫斯坦這類保守小城的女孩,十八九歲獨自去幾千公里外的城市上大學。這在阿馬納特年輕的時代不可想象。

教育一旦鋪開,就不可逆。讀過大學的人會思考,會比較,會不滿。阿馬納特說得很直接:這批在傳統家庭、甚至教士家庭長大的孩子,一旦走出去,就再也回不去了。

人口流動也在重新塑造這個國家。你今天去伊朗,會在各個省份聽到各地口音:西北的亞塞拜然突厥語口音出現在南方省份,南方的口音出現在北方。庫爾德語、俾路支語在各自的區域流通。同時,所有人都能說波斯語,都在波斯語的教育體系里長大。

錫斯坦的血,和"中心與邊緣"的老問題

9月30日,錫斯坦-俾路支斯坦省首府扎黑丹,安全部隊向抗議人群開火,至少六十人死亡。這個省在伊朗東南角,居民主要是俾路支人,屬於遜尼派。

什葉派和遜尼派的分野,阿馬納特用兩句話講清了詞源。Sunna 的意思是"大路、主流",遜尼派就是走主流道路的人。Shia 是"黨派"的縮寫,全稱是 Shi'at Ali,阿里黨人,指7世紀伊斯蘭早期圍繞第四任哈里發阿里形成的政治派別。全世界穆斯林多數是遜尼派,伊朗是少數派佔多數的例外,伊拉克和黎巴嫩的情況類似。

伊朗的中心地帶在歷史上逐步皈依什葉派,邊緣地帶保留遜尼派:東南的俾路支人,西北和西部的大部分庫爾德人,東北的土庫曼人,呼羅珊地區靠近阿富汗邊境的社群,西南胡齊斯坦省的阿拉伯語人口。

庫爾德人還有自己的一套宗教傳統,叫 Ahl-e Haqq,也稱作 Yarsan,是庫爾德斯坦原生的信仰體系。阿馬納特提到這一點是為了說明,這個國家的邊緣地帶複雜到不能只用"遜尼派"三個字概括。

這些地區不只有教派差異,還有語言、服飾、飲食、音樂的差異。阿馬納特說,如果把一個伊朗人蒙著眼睛扔到不同省份,摘掉眼罩後他靠口音和食物就能判斷自己在哪裡。俾路支語是完全不同的語言,庫爾德語和波斯語同屬印歐語系所以更接近,亞塞拜然突厥語則更接近土耳其共和國的土耳其語。

19世紀到20世紀初的伊朗語言地圖會讓今天的人吃驚:方言和語言的數量之龐大,來自這個國家的古老,也來自地理的阻隔。四周是高山和大漠,一個個社群被隔開,各自保留了不同的傳統。歷史上一次又一次的入侵,從中亞低地湧入的各族群,又不斷往這口鍋里加新料。

一個在世界上存在了三千年的名字

那為什麼這些地區沒有散掉?

阿馬納特的解釋是現代化。一個世紀的現代化程序,鍛造出了一種強度很高的民族文化。他在《伊朗現代史》的結尾寫,儘管有那麼多給今天的伊朗製造麻煩的東西,仍然存在一種非常牢固的文化認同。

儘管有這一切給今天的伊朗製造了那麼多麻煩的東西,仍然存在一種非常強大的文化認同感。我可以有幾分把握地說,區域身份依然存在,依然精彩,應該被珍視,但今天你去庫爾德斯坦或者錫斯坦,那裡的人都能說波斯語,都接受波斯語教育。(阿巴斯·阿馬納特)

這種認同的來源,可以追溯到國家的自我定義。伊朗過去的正式名稱是"Mamalek-e Mahruse-ye Iran",意思是"伊朗的守護疆域",這個說法本身就承認這片土地由若干地區聯合而成。阿馬納特把它類比成"美利堅合眾國":中心與邊緣之間的張力一直都在,歸屬感也在。

他還提到一個更硬的論據:伊朗這個名字在世界地圖上存在了兩千五百年,很少有國家有這樣的連續性。他不認為自己是民族主義者,但這一點確實解釋了為什麼一片被入侵過無數次、被不同族群統治過的土地,仍然保持著某種一以貫之的身份。

為了說明變化的速度,他講了自己兩次旅行的對比。1968年,他去西北邊境城市霍伊的巴扎買皮革製品,發現那裡幾乎沒人會說波斯語,店主得從別的鋪子叫人來翻譯。當時波斯語是官方語言,可學校教育覆蓋有限,保守地區的成年人一輩子沒怎麼接觸過。

2004年,他再去同一片地區,在一家餐廳吃午飯。年輕人一聽說他從外地來,立刻開始跟他聊西方電影:聊某位導演的新片,聊某位演員的表演。用的是一口流利的波斯語,還能說不少英語。他們關心的東西和德黑蘭同齡人沒有區別。

三十六年,從"沒人會說國語"到"聊好萊塢"。教育、城市化、媒體三者疊加,加速度就是這樣產生的。

他為什麼不願意用"革命"這個詞

阿馬納特對這場運動的定性非常謹慎。他反覆說,自己不確定該不該用"革命"這個詞。

我猶豫要不要用"革命"這個詞,因為我對革命並不特別有好感。全世界範圍內的革命,在伊朗,其結果總是那麼悲慘,我們必須小心,不要輕易使用"革命"這個詞。(阿巴斯·阿馬納特)

這個保留有歷史依據。1906年的立憲革命,催生了議會,也被外部干預和內部專制反覆碾壓。1979年的伊斯蘭革命,推翻了巴列維王朝,建立了人類歷史上滲透個人生活最深的體制之一。伊朗的兩次大變革,結局都讓發起者失望。

他還指出一個反覆出現的模式:革命結束時掌權的那些人,總會把自己的想象強加給全社會,然後建立起新的專制。伊斯蘭共和國在這條序列裡是最壞的一個,它的侵入不止於政治領域,還伸進每個人的私人生活。這種侵入以非常連貫的方式日復一日地進行,從不停歇,所以"自由"這個詞才會在運動的訴求裡佔據那麼重的位置。

更細一層,他講到這種侵入的形態。它不只是禁止某個政黨、干預某場選舉,而是每天出門前你戴什麼、穿什麼、頭髮露出多少、能不能和異性同乘一輛車。政治壓迫可以躲,日常生活的規訓躲不掉。

老一代為什麼沒有大規模上街

一個值得看仔細的現象是,中老年人的參與度遠低於年輕人。阿馬納特說這是個"大謎題",原因複雜。

一部分是恐懼。1979年之後的鎮壓記憶還在,參與過政治活動的人知道代價。一部分是失望。經歷過革命、戰爭、改革失敗的一代,對任何形式的集體行動都不抱期待。還有一部分是利益。四十三年裡形成了一個與體制繫結的階層,退休金、工作、補貼都掛在體制上。

年輕人的座標畫在 Instagram 上:那裡的世界是柏林、是首爾、是洛杉磯,1979年和兩伊戰爭根本不在他們的人生經驗裡。他們沒有"上次失敗了所以這次算了"的心理負擔,因為他們沒有"上次"。

這也解釋了運動的組織形態為什麼是去中心化的。沒有領袖,沒有政黨,沒有統一指揮,靠社交網路傳播和模仿。這種形態難以被斬首,也難以上談判桌。政權的困境在於,找不到可以談判的物件。

接下來會發生什麼

阿馬納特沒有給出預測。作為歷史學家,他更願意談條件。

條件之一是經濟。斷網每天燒掉五千萬美元,通脹高企,貨幣貶值,年輕人的失業率居高不下。制裁疊加管理失當,讓體制的分配能力持續下降。一個發不出錢的體制,靠什麼維持忠誠?

條件之二是代際。8300萬人口裡,革命後出生的佔大頭。這批人的生育率是1.1,意味著他們自己也不太願意生孩子。一個人口持續萎縮、年輕人不斷外流的社會,很難長期支撐一套僵硬的意識形態。

條件之三是女性。受教育程度最高的群體被法律定義為二等公民,這個矛盾不可能無限期維持。伊朗大學裡女性比例超過一半,她們畢業之後面對的是監護人要簽字的人生。

三個條件彼此耦合。經濟下行讓年輕人看不到未來,看不到未來就不願意生育和留下,人才外流削弱經濟,受過教育的女性被壓制又加劇人才外流。這個迴圈閉不上。

這次對話錄於2022年11月初,抗議進入第七週。Lex 在開場說,他把這段話獻給正在爭取自由的伊朗人。阿馬納特在整場對話裡保持了歷史學家的剋制,只在一個地方流露出情緒:他描述德黑蘭街頭的年輕女孩把圍巾扔進火堆、圍著火跳舞的時候,語速慢了下來。

  • 把資訊源換到一線。BBC Persian、Iran International、Radio Farda 都有 YouTube 頻道,即使不懂波斯語,畫面、時間線、人物出鏡也比英文大媒體的二手轉述更接近現場。
  • 看伊朗新聞時先分清三個行為主體:最高領袖與革命衛隊、名義上的民選政府、街頭社會。三者的表態經常互相矛盾,混為一談就會誤判。
  • 要理解今天,必須讀長時段歷史。阿馬納特的《Iran: A Modern History》是標準讀物,厄爾萬德·亞伯拉罕米安的《伊朗史》可以對照讀。看完再聽政客評論,判斷力完全不同。
  • 碰到"外國煽動"這類解釋時,回到人口和教育的基本面:8300萬人口、86%識字率、56所國立大學加321個阿扎德校區、生育率1.1。這些數字解釋的動員能力,比任何陰謀論都強。
  • 把注意力分一部分給邊緣省份。錫斯坦-俾路支斯坦、庫爾德斯坦、胡齊斯坦、土庫曼薩赫拉,中心與邊緣的張力是理解伊朗政治的關鍵線索,也是傷亡最集中的地方。
  • 對"革命"這個詞保持謹慎。判斷變局時盯住具體指標:網際網路開放程度、道德警察是否上街、頭巾執法是否鬆動、政治犯釋放數量。這些比宏大的定性有用得多。
文稿由本站用語音識別模型(基於官方釋出音訊)機器轉寫,可能有識別錯誤,人名與數字請以音訊為準。
Lex Fridman Podcast #334 – Abbas Amanat: Iran Protests, Mahsa Amini, History, CIA & Nuclear Weapons Machine transcription by Qwen3-ASR 0.6B (MLX, local, Apache-2.0). May contain recognition errors. The following is a conversation with Abbas Amnat, a historian at Yale University specializing in the modern history of Iran. My love and my heart goes out to the Iranian people in their current struggle for freedom. I hope that this conversation helps folks who listen understand the nature and the importance of this struggle. And now a quick few second mention of a sponsor. Check them out in the description. It's the best way to support this podcast. We got Henson Shaving for great razor and shave, Inside Tracker for bio monitoring, Onit for supplements and Express VPN for privacy. Choose wisely, my friends. And now onto the full ad reads. As always, no ads in the middle. I try to make this interesting, but if you skip them, please still check out our sponsors. I enjoy their stuff. Maybe you will too. This show is brought to you by Henson Shaving, a family owned aerospace manufacturer, bringing precision engineering to your shaving experience. This thing is a minimalist razor. That just reminds me of great design and of great engineering. They use aerospace grade CNC machines to achieve extreme precision. The razors extend just point zero zero one three inches, which is less than the thickness of a human hair. It makes me feel good to know that you can mass manufacture a consumer product with that level of precision. Obviously, there is precision electronics, so you know your smartphone is manufactured at scale with a tiny, tiny, tiny little electronics inside there that work incredibly well for months and years. But to have that in a razor is especially nice because you don't see it that often. The thing is, the razor works with standard double edge blades you can buy anywhere. It's all about building the best razor, not razor business. So no subscriptions, no plastics, and no planned upsell lessons. Check out hensonshaving dot com slash lex to pick your razor and also use code lex you'll get a hundred free blades with your razor just make sure to add them to your cart. This show is also brought to you by Inside Tracker, a service I use to track biological data as I lean back in comfort in my chair and scream from a distance into the microphone. It's obvious to me that the future is all about using data that comes from your own body to make lifestyle decisions, diet decisions, career decisions, all kinds of decisions. Another term for this is personalization. I think I've heard somebody use the term like deep personalization. So personalization based not just on a few manually set preferences but that comes from the entirety of the rich amount of signal that comes from the human body. It's obvious that this is what the future is about. So it's great that companies like Inside Tracker are doing this kind of thing. You can use all kinds of data that comes from your body—blood data, DNA data, fitness tracker data—to make good decisions about your life. Get special savings for a limited time, and you go to insidetracker dot com slash lex. This episode is also brought to you by Onit, a nutrition supplement and fitness company. They make Alpha Brain, a nutropic that helps support memory, mental speed, and focus. I just saw Duncan Trosco pop up on the Joe Rogan Experience. I need to listen to that episode. He's probably my favorite guest, and both of them I associate with Onit. Duncan in particular I associate with extreme level of high mental performance. No, well actually yes in a in a very non standard definition of what high levels of performance is. He's just an incredible human being, kind, brilliant. With thoughts that are sometimes filled with humor, non sequitur humor, but also deep profound insights of the like I haven't heard from anybody else. He must be using Alpha Brain. Well, I don't know that, but for me I use Alpha Brain when I need to really focus when I know it's going to be a deep work session when I have to solve a particularly challenging problem. I'll use Alpha Brain to give me a boost. Anyway, you can get a special discount on Alpha Brain at lexfreeman dot com slash onit. This show is also brought to you by Express VPN. I use them to protect my privacy on the internet. I am actually having a great conversation with somebody about tour coming up. And tour is like an extra layer of protecting your your privacy when you are browsing the internet. But for most of us, we should be using the sort of the low hanging fruit—the technology that works for everybody for everything—not just browsing. That's a VPN and my favorite VPN and the ones I've used for many, many, many years is Express VPN. Big sexy button you press and it just works. You set the location that you want your computer to emulate and. Bam and the connection is super fast, plus it's stable. Everything's very intuitive, works on any operating system, including my favorite one which is Linux. But obviously on mobile devices too, iPhone all the Android devices. I have so many Android devices now that I feel like I am like a sheep herder and those are my sheep. But instead of being sheep, they are actually super computers. Although you can argue that a sheep too is a super computer. Anyway, go to expressvpn dot com slash lexpod for an extra three months free. This is the lexfreeman podcast. To support it, please check out our sponsors in the description. And now dear friends, here is Abbas Amnat. Let's start with the current situation in Iran. On September sixteenth, protests broke out in Tehran and quickly spread over the death of a twenty two year old Maza Amini. Eyewitnesses saw her beaten to death by the morality police. This is a heavy topic, but it's a really important topic. What can you explain what happened? The protests are now in their sixth week. The death of that young woman occurred, who was visiting Tehran as a tourist. Sparked something very deep that particularly concerned the younger generation. That is what you would call the equivalent of the Z generation in this country. Yes, they call themselves Daheh Hashdidi in Persian because Iran follows the solar calendar of its own as an ancient solar calendar. And this the the time that they were born, they were in the thirteen eighties. That's what they call themselves Hashdidi eighties Hashdidi for the eighties. And the well the circumstances that surrounds the unfortunate death of this young beautiful Kurdish woman is really tragic. She was arrested by the what is referred to as the morality police. Morality patrol called Gashte Ershad guidance police that is presumably there were two women fully clad that is officers serving on that force and two men. And nobody exactly knows what had happened. She had been beaten up and apparently there was no sign of any wrongdoing on her side. She was fully covered. It seems that there was some altercation in the process, and the outcome was that she was unconscious. Not necessarily when she was arrested, but in the course of the detention when they take them to a center presumably to re educate them. And she apparently collapsed and maybe my senses that she must have had some kind of a problem because of the skull being broken or something had happened and she died in the hospital the next day. And that through the social media was widely spread throughout Iran and almost the next day surprisingly you could see this outburst. Of sympathy for her, people are in the streets weeping because she was seen as such an innocent young woman twenty two years old. And the family, the mother and the father, also mourning for her. And being a Kurd visiting Tehran, this all added up to really turn her into some kind of a martyr of this cause. And that's what it is and her picture graphics that were artistically produced based on her portrait has now dominated basically as the symbol of this protest movement. And the protest movement goes on. Everybody was thinking or at least the authorities were thinking that is going to die out in a matter of a few days. But it became more intense first in the streets of Tehran by young women mostly probably between I would say seventeen eighteen teenagers to twenty two twenty three. Or thereabout and then to university campuses all around the country, and then even to high schools, and that also made it a very remarkable protest movement because first of all it involves the youth. And not necessarily the older generations, you see them around but not as many. Also, you see men and women together, young girls and boys, and they are adamant, they are desperate in the sense of the tone of their protest. And they are extremely courageous because they stand against the security forces that were immediately. Were sent off to the streets so and in full gear that is. So what are the the currents of pain emotion? What is this turmoil that rose to the surface that resulted in these big protests? What are the different feelings, ideas that came to the surface here that resulted in such quick scaling of this protest? Well, if you listen to the main slogan, which is the message of this movement, it's called "Women, Life, Freedom, Zan Zendeji Azadi." Which is a translation of actually the Kurdish equivalent, which is close to Persian being the Indo European language. And it's apparently initiated first in the Syrian Kurdistan, where they were fighting against the Islamic Daesh forces. Because they were attacking the Yazidis there and the women being enslaved, but the message as it moved historians are interested in this kind of trends. So it has moved to Kurdistan and from Kurdistan now being the message of this movement. Reflects pretty much sums up what this movement is all about. Women in the forefront because of all the one might say discriminations, the treatment, the humiliation that this younger generation feels. Well, not only the younger generations but most of the Iranian secular middle classes since nineteen seventy nine basically. For the for the past forty three years, and they would think that these all basically symbolized or represented by the wearing the mandatory wearing of the hijab. Which is at the core of this protest. You see the young women if you look at many of these clips that comes through in the past six weeks. Women in streets take off their mandatory scarves, which is a young shawl or some kind of a head covering. That's all, and they throw it into the bonfire in the middle of the street and they dance around it. And slogans. So there is a sense of complete rejection of what this regime for forty three years forty three years have been imposing on women. It's not as it sometimes been portrayed a movement. Against hijab through and through, but it basically says you know there has to be a choice for those who want to wear hijab and those who want to remain without hijab. Yeah, the hijab is a symbol of something much deeper. Much deeper and actually before we get into that, it's interesting to note that in many of these demonstrations we see in the university campuses or in the streets you see women with hijab. Young women with hijab are next to those have to remove their hijab and they are together basically protesting. That's most interesting feature of this of these demonstrations and then men and women together against the segregation that the regime has imposed upon them for all these years. Now in terms of what it represents, as I pointed out, one is the question of the whole series of one might say civil and legal discriminations against women. You are considered as a kind of a second class citizen. You depend on your man is a kind of a patriarchy that has been institutionalized in the Islamic Republic in a very profound fashion. And that means that probably in matters of divorce, marriage and divorce, in matters of custody of your children, in matter of inheritance, in matter of freedom of movement, you depend. On your husband, your father, your brother, a male member of your family, your child even your your son could could be the case. And because of that, obviously a younger generation who is so well informed through social media knows about the world as much as an American does. American kid does probably sometimes more. They're very very curious. It's from what I hear or sometimes that I met a few of them outside Iran. You'll see that how this new generation is completely different from what the Islamic Republic wanted to create in its social engineering. It's basically the failure of forty three years of the Islamic Republic's act of imposition of a certain so called Islamic values on women. Then it's matter of education. You would see that there is segregation in the schools. One of the issues that now right now is at the heart of these demonstrations is that self services in many of the campuses of Iranian universities are segregated, male and female to different rooms to different halls. Now they are breaking through the walls virtually everywhere and sit together in order to basically resist the authorities who wants to impose segregation. In matters of appearance in the public, of course it it may seem to us as a kind of trivial and secondary, but appearance is important. Clothing is important. How you would imagine yourself is important. They don't want to be seen in the way that the authorities would like to impose upon them as this kind of an idea of a chaste Islamic woman who is fully covered and is fully protected. The idea of a male member of the family protects the female. That is what you would see at the heart of this rebellion, and of course that goes with everything else. The second part of this message, the idea of life. Basically means, if you like to use the American equivalent of this, the pursuit of the happiness. That's what they want. They want fun. They want music. They want dancing. They want to be free in the street. They want to have girlfriends. And live freely and don't be constantly looked by the big brother to tell them what to do and not to do or or not to do. So that is that they share virtually with the entire with the entire Iranian society as a whole. Although the older generations, that's a big puzzle. What you would see that the older generation don't so far at least don't take part as extensively as one might imagine. And this is variety of reasons. Perhaps you can get to that later on if you like. But as far as this younger generation, they don't care. They don't listen even as much to their parents as the older generations did. So all one might say even the nature of the relationship between the parents and the youth has changed. It's not the concept of again a a patriarchy. That a father or even a mother would tell the daughter or son what to do, because basically they have to negotiate. It's fundamentally a rejection of the power of authority, parents, government. Yes, it's that every person can decide their own fate and there is no lessening of value of the wisdom of old age and old institutions. Precisely that's what it is. And. They are surprisingly aware that where they are as a generation, so it's a sense of a pride as we are different from the older generation, from your parents who compromised and lived with the restrictions that the Islamic regime put on you, your grandpa, your their grandparents or the generation that actually involved in the revolution of seventy nine, the parents which were the middle generation, and these are the third generation after the revolution of nineteen seventy nine, and therefore they differentiate themselves in terms of their identity from the older generation, so that's the life part of it, and one can go more and more they want to access and they see on social media what happens in the rest of the world, they're aware they are much better digitally skilled than my generation for instance, and and they know about all the personalities they know about all the celebrities they know about all the trends that goes out outside Iran, so that's a second part of this message and then of course the third part is the word azadi meaning freedom or liberty, which is this longstanding demand of the Iranians I would say for the whole century ever since the constitutional revolution of nineteen six, Iran has witnessed this problem of authorities that usually emerged at the end of a revolution, to basically impose its own image on the population on the youth, and create authoritarian regimes of which over the course of time, I would say that the Islamic Republic is the worst, the sense that it's it's intrusion and is not only in the political sense in the for instance banning the freedom of speech, you know meddling with the elections, banning political parties all kinds of that things which are the political or civil freedoms but it's intrusion into the personal life of the individual, which is the worst kind in a sense as you would see that there is always an authority that basically dominates your life or monitors your life, so I and they do it in a kind of a very consistent fashion which makes this idea of freedom so important as part of the message of this new movement, you would see that in today's Iran there are no independent political parties, there is very little probably freedom of the press I wouldn't say that it's entirely gone, but it's fairly limited, there is enormous amount of propaganda machine which dominates the entire radio and TV system in Iran, it's completely in the hands of the government, and of course you would see this variety of other tools for trying to indoctrinate Iranian population across the board, so that's another sign of this kind of a sense of a sense of being totally left out, you are not belonging to to what's going on in terms of power empowerment and disempowerment, so that's that's the situation as far as the idea of a freedom of this concept, and these three somewhat miraculously and perhaps unintentionally, the three parts of this message complements each other because perhaps for the first time we see that women are in the forefront of a of a movement I hesitate to say revolution because I am not particularly happy with revolutions, revolutions worldwide in Iran have always been so miserable in terms of their outcome that we have to be careful not to use the word revolution yeah, so that's where where it stands now and the regime was thinking that well these are kids, they are going to go away and of course they are completely conspiratorial in their thinking, they constantly think that these are all the instigations and provocations of foreign powers these are the Great Satan United States this is Israel or these are the it's actually the supreme leaders that in so many words, his only response so far that he had in past six weeks with regard to these demonstrations is that these are the children of the sabak sabak being the security forces of the Shah state, that's forty three years later, he claims that the children seventeen years twenty years old kids in the street are the grandchildren or children of some imaginary survival of the Shah security force, so there is the idea is that these protests are internal and external saboteurs so people trying to sabotage the government yes and they are misled misled as far as they can go and then there is the Great Satan United States and other places are controlling sort of either controlling the narrative feeding propaganda or literally sending people to engage, I don't think that they have I don't think even they have that kind of imagination precisely to say what you have said that they would say that they are controlling the narrative they basically say no these are agents of of the foreign powers and their families are all sold out and they are basically lost their loyalties to the Great Islamic Republic and therefore they can be treated so brutally they can be suppressed so brutally which I haven't actually said what they are doing because I thought perhaps first we should talk about who these kids are in the streets before we move on about the response of the government but one major factor which seems to add to the anxiety of well the regime is extremely anxious now because they are in a position this shows that they don't have their lack of confidence in a sense that they would see them reacting in a very forceful way because basically they don't seem to have that kind of a confidence to allow this this message or the movement to air to be aired, but there one element which corresponds to that is that there is a expatriate population of Iranians worldwide, there are probably now according to some estimates close to four million even more Iranians abroad and they are all over the world from Australia New Zealand Japan Western Europe Turkey and United States Canada, so just to give you one example last last Saturday there was a mass demonstrations in Berlin by the Iranians from Germany and all over Europe Western Europe, and it was at least I think probably the conservative estimate was about one hundred thousand, so one hundred thousand Iranians showed up in Berlin demonstrating against the treatment of the women in Iran or the movement in Iran, the government thinks obviously this must have been some instigation by foreign powers and they want to destroy the Islamic Republic, and not only that but their propaganda is kind of ridiculous because I listened actually to how they portrayed it in the newspapers I listened to the Iranian news that is officially controlled government controlled news, and and in the papers there is much of the papers that are in the control of the government, one of them or actually the the major news program portrayed the demonstrations that ten thousand people showed up in Berlin and protested against the rising prices or rising rates for gas and oil in Germany, so that's how they misled in a very rather stupid fashion because probably ninety five percent if not hundred percent of the Iranians are listening to Persian speaking media outside Iran, so it's a BBC Persian there is Iran international there are at least five or six of them that's probably really important to highlight that Iran is a very modern and tech savvy nation, not just the young people probably more than more than I feel sometimes when I compare myself to what they are doing, since nineteen seventy nine the earlier years for a decade or two, they tried in a very crude fashion to restrict access to media outside Iran because this is all through dishes okay and satellite dishes are everywhere you know if you look at the you know buildings of small houses small towns and villages in Iran there is always a dish and they watch all kinds of things through this and particularly because of what's happening now they listen to all the news broadcasts from all this media and they're extremely active, there are probably some of them even twenty four hours or close very extensive coverage of every clip that comes through, so what the government is doing now the Islamic Republic is that they restrict the entire internet they shut down the internet but they cannot afford shutting down the internet because much of the business much of the everyday life much of the government affairs depends on the internet like everywhere else and Iran is extremely if you if I hear from many of the colleagues and friends you know it's like in certain respects it's like Sweden where you go there there is no more currency and for very good reason because there is so much inflation that that the banknotes are worthless in a sense so everything is true you know sweeping your card, and that the entire system is in a standstill because people cannot buy food they can you you go to the supermarket that's how you would do it you you order food to come to your house which Iranians at least the middle classes the more prosperous middle classes doing all the time, so they deliver everything and because of the COVID it became even more and they have to pay all through this system, so what happens is that now they are estimating that every day fifty million dollars the Iranian government or the Iranian economy is losing because of slowing the internet plus the frustration is growing because you can't order food, among others, I mean they are they are in touch with I mean WhatsApp every Iranian virtually every Iranian, that has education and education in the sense that has gone through the high schools and universities knows how to use the WhatsApp, so there is a big middle class like you said secular middle class in Iran and there there is a lot of at least capacity for if not revolution then political ideological turmoil, and a huge amount of hatred, so the hatred is growing, yes hatred of the of the policies of the regime of isolation that's a huge point that you hear a great deal about, that we don't want to be isolated we don't want to be humiliated Iran is not but this this miserable regime that is ruling over us, we have a great culture so there is a sense of a pride in their own culture some of it you know Islamic some of it pre Islamic so they there is a huge sense of a pride in that and they see that they cannot communicate with the outside world they they want to travel abroad which they do I mean for one thing the Iranian regime never actually for majority of the population never put restrictions it's not like Soviet Union where you have to have a you used to have a permission to move from one place to another, and then of course the the Islamic regime since nineteen seventy nine basically chased away or destroyed the old middle class that's my generation basically or my parents generation these are the secular middle class of the Pahlavi era in the hope that they can do this social engineering and create this Islamic society of their own, the bad news for them was that that didn't happen and that memory persisted and the middle class that was created since past forty years is much larger in size than what it was because there was of course the demographic revolution that's a very that's a very foundation of it is the demographic revolution, population in Iran I've written an article about it actually, population in Iran since the turn of the century last century that's twentieth century population of Iran was about nine million or so, is now eighty three million and that is since nineteen seventy nine the population was thirty five million between the past forty years it's basically doubled so it's eighty three million although one of the great successes I don't want to bore you with the details about the demography but it's important in it, demographics is not boring you well you can see that the birth rate was very high otherwise you wouldn't have doubled your population in matter of four decades, but Iranians because of the urban shift to an urban population because of the growth of the middle class because of the education, they basically the pattern of the of growth population growth changed Iran used to be two point eight or three percent birth rate in around nineteen eighties I would say nineteen seventies nineteen eighties now it is one point one, and it's one probably the most successful country in the Middle East in terms of the population control despite the government a consistent attempt to try to encourage people to have more kids, middle class refuses to do that, and this is middle class not only anymore in the capital but this is when smaller towns and cities places that used to be villages, now you look at them they have a decent population fifty thousand hundred thousand and they live an urban life and they don't want to be subjected to that old pattern of agrarian society when you had ten children or eight children and of course it's much more advanced in terms of in terms of health and medicine so you don't lose lose children as they used to the antibiotics there is always of kids to survive and therefore if you have ten kids you stick with ten kids you don't end up with four as it used to be in the past, six of them would have died in the in the after the age of five actually but now because of that you see that this urban population in the cities have completely different demands, and of course the education is important that's another area of how the social engineering of the Islamic Republic went away because they were thinking that you know the growth of the population the growth of the educated higher educated middle classes in their benefit or they could not even control it in a sense now Iran in my time probably had in the nineteen seventies probably by the time of the revolution at ten twelve universities, now it has fifty six universities all across the country, and there is something referred to as the free university Azad which has campuses all over the country it has three hundred and twenty one campuses all around Iran, what does that mean in many respects this youth that were brought up in these families even in small towns in very traditional families in families that belong to that kind of a more religious loyal to the clergy or to the clerical classes, their children can now move on which particularly women because in in my times it would have been unheard of that you would have a young woman of eighteen or seventeen eighteen nineteen, from a traditional city such as for instance Yazd or in in in in Sartistan Iran. To move on elsewhere for education, as you do in this country, okay. Now it's completely accepted that a woman wears her job because he is forced to wear her job. To go to a university completely on the other side of the country. And this movement of the population, not only because of the universities, but in general, if you now visit Iran. You hear accents, local accents, provincial accents, all over the country. That is a Azerbaijani Turkish accent from the northwest of the country. You can hear it in the far provinces in the south, and vice versa. So, and Kurdish, for instance, or even more marginal regions such as Sistan province in the southeast of Iran. Which has been the subject of this recent massacre when they actually attacked the population when demonstrating and killed a fair number of at least sixty people. So this movement of the population, this creation of a larger middle class, the better educated middle class, much better educated Iran has. Eighty six percent literacy, which I think probably I haven't checked that, but probably is better than Turkey even. Is probably better than anywhere else in the Middle East. And it sounds like there's a that's quickly increasing, so because because of the movement because of the growth of a education system that's. Iran has one million school teachers, which may not seem as much if you are in the United States, but it's a fairly big number actually. Can you linger on the massacre? What happened there? Well, the Sistan province is a Baluchi ethnicity of Baluchi ethnicity. Baluchi is a particular ethnic group in southern Iran which is Sunni rather than Shi. Majority. And we should say that most of Iran is Shi, is Shi, and those are that's a branch of Islam. Shiism. Yes. Let's maybe just briefly linger Shiism and Sunni. What? Just let's not get into it. Yeah, let's do it. Let's do a one sentence summary, and that maybe which which is what most of Iran is. Majority of the population of the Muslim world are Sunnis. That are these are main street if you like to call that. Actually, Souna means that kind of a main street. Can you actually linger on the Sunni Souna? She she she means a party, means those that belongs to a party of Ali, which was goes back to the early Islamic history of seventh century. I mean I'm almost lingering to the silly notion of pronunciation and stuff like that. So ah ah means part like what. What is the extra I at the end? Yeah. Shee means belonging to the Shi community. Yeah. Shea means a person of Shia. That if you say are you a Shia? Yes, I'm a Shia. Yeah, and she is the community. Community. And in English, when it was anglicized, it becomes Shiite. So if you say Shiite in today, it's perfectly acceptable. And of course, I myself in my writings always. Switch between one and the other. One of my books is always Shiite. The other book is always Shi, and that hasn't been settled. This, but the Shi population is the smaller compared to the Sunni population in the world. In the world, in the world, but in Iran is the opposite. The Iran and Iraq, and possibly now Lebanon, are the three countries who barely Iraq and Lebanon have barely majority Shi population. Whereas Iran is a large Shi population due to its history of conversion to Shiism. That by itself is another story. But in the sense that the way that historically it evolved, the center became more Shi. And the peripheries remained Sunni, so you have communities of the Baluchi in the southeast. You have the Kurds, a large portion of the Kurds are Sunnis. They have Shi as well. Then they have the indigenous religion of their own ideal, was called Aliak, which is the religion of indigenous Kurdistan. There are Turkmans in the northeast of Iran who are also Sunnis. There are other communities in the Chorasan region in the in the peripheries of Afghanistan. There are also Sunnis, and you have some Arab population, Arab speaking population in the Choristan province in the southwest of Iran, which is also or across the Persian Gulf. Is there a lot of conflict between these regions? And also, like if I blindfolded you and dropped you off in one of the regions, would you quickly recognize the region like by the food, by the music, by the accents, by so on. Yeah, the answer to your lovely question, which I think I hope it would have happened to me, is that yes, you would see different cultures. Yes, but different food, most important different accents. Yeah. Or different languages, so they have dialects. There's Baluchi's a different language altogether. But or so for that matter, Kurdish, which is closer to Persian because they are Indo European languages. But Turkish, Azerbaijani Turkish, which is probably closer to the Turkish of Turkey, Republic of Turkey, or to the Republic of Azerbaijan in the north. They're the same basically. Actually, if you would have looked, that's a fascinating picture. If you have looked at the let's say even nineteenth century early twentieth century linguistic map of Iran, you would have been amazed. In the number of dialects, in the number of languages that has survived, and this is an ancient country, is an ancient land, and it's a lot of mountains all around it, or big deserts. So there's a sense of isolation. So you would say here and there you see a different community that speaks differently. All ancient traditions and languages. Yeah, and because of the great number of invasions that Iran witnessed over more than two and a half millennia. Of course, there are all kinds of cultures were introduced into Iran. There are all ethnicities were introduced to Iran, mostly coming from the northeast of Iran from. From the lowlands of Central Asia and beyond, and and continued into Iran proper. So, but now what has happened? That's what my point that the writer to make. Century of modernity or modernization. Has produced a national culture of great length, great strength in a sense. I would say I ended my book, the book on Iran Iran modern history. Basically saying that despite everything else that has created so much trouble for today's Iran, there is a sense of a cultural. Identity that is very strong, and I think I can say with with some confidence. That despite this, despite this regional identities that are still there and they are great and they should be celebrated. Today, if you go to to Kurdistan or if you go to Sistan, they all can speak Persian. They all have an education in Persian, so they all basically are becoming part of whether they like it whether they like the regime in power or not. They have a sense of belonging to a culture and an identity with the center. And of course, the idea of a center versus periphery in Iran is very old. It goes back to ancient times because when the name of the country was the guarded domains of Iran. This is the this is the official name of Mameluke Mahrusi Iran. Namely that it was recognized that this is not just one entity, but it's a it's a collection of entities like the United States of America. Exactly, exactly. But the United States of America, in a sense, you can say that it was a very successful. Well, it remains to be seen how successful to be continued to be to that that was basically invented created that you would have this sense of it in in the case of an old nation which has been on the map of the world for three thousand years, two thousand five hundred years. This is not an exaggeration. I'm not a nationalist per se, but I mean if you look Persian on the map of the world in ancient times, it is still there as it is today. Very few countries in the world are like that. That they would have that kind of a continuity over a course of time, and that's not without a reason because there was this sense of a. Center versus periphery that had found some is that there's a huge amount of tension, but there is also a sense of belonging. To something and state is very much at the center of it. I mean, that's why the concept of a state matters for the creation for the shaping of of this culture. What happened is therefore you can see that today in answer to your point about traveling blindfolded. Is that you would be surprised to see how much people share? And in terms of, I just give you one anecdote: in 1968, I believe must have been. I traveled to Azerbaijan. I used to travel and actually photograph. Not blindfolded. Mostly. Well, yeah, not blindfolded. No, no, not blindfolded. So I went to a bazaar in the city of Koi, which is in the northwest of Iran, on the border with what is today the. Republic of Turkey, and I went to the bazaar and I was interested in the kind of a leather work that they produce. So I tried to buy some stuff and they were surprised to see that how few people knew Persian. So they could not communicate in Persian with you either. They have to ask somebody from some other store to come and translate for you. This is 1968. So even though the official language was Persian of the country, that's still. Yeah. So what are they teaching school? So it doesn't matter. Was Persian. But this guy. It doesn't go to school. He hasn't been to the school or he was not fully exposed to it. And but guys usually are very conservative places. So it's stuck in my mind. Now in recently in 2004, I was traveling to the same area, not to the same city, but to the same area. And I was amazed to see how the youth, as soon as they would know that you were coming from somewhere else, opening conversation with you talking about the latest movies that was produced in the West. And it's not only Hollywood. Of course, there is a huge amount of fascination with Hollywood and Western cinema. Cinema is a major thing. Filmmaking is a major thing. So these kids in the city of Ahad were asking me, we're having lunch, asking me, okay then, what do you think about this producer, not producer, this director or that actor. American. American European as well, but mostly American. Were they speaking Persian? It's a complete Persian that I would converse with them. Do they speak English too? Interesting. Yes, actually you would be surprised to see what percentage of the Iranian youth. At least in big cities, are fascinated with learning language, and for a reason because they think that's the way to get access either on social media or eventually leave Iran. Unfortunately, and and because they don't see a future for themselves in the country, either you have to be part of this. Part of this regime, or if you hate them and you don't like the way of their life, you look up outside. You know I was having drivers to drive me around the country in the cities around Iran. And the guy was a young, extremely well educated, well dressed, and we would have looked at him. We could have found him in any street in any

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