第 478 期·中文精讀

斯科特·霍頓:反戰立場與軍工複合體

Scott Horton: The Case Against War and the Military Industrial Complex

反戰記者斯科特·霍頓梳理美國介入戰爭的代價,剖析軍工複合體如何持續推動衝突與干預。

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9/11 之後,美國發動了一系列所謂“反恐戰爭”。布朗大學“戰爭成本”專案給出的數字是:直接死亡 90 萬到 94 萬人,間接死亡 360 萬到 380 萬人,3700 萬人流離失所,花費 8 萬億美元,其中阿富汗 2.2 萬億,伊拉克和敘利亞 2.9 萬億。

斯科特·霍頓(Scott Horton)是自由主義研究所所長、Antiwar.com 編輯總監。在這次訪談裡,他把這個賬本翻到最後一頁,給出一個讓人不太舒服的結論:整個反恐戰爭,美國社會唯一確鑿的收穫,是假肢技術的進步。

“如果你想把它濃縮成一句話,除了有些人從洛克希德拿到一張分紅支票,這個社會到底得到了什麼?”他說,“我們現在有了比從前更好的盧克·天行者式機械手。就這些。”

先看阿富汗:戰前一戰後

霍頓要求把鏡頭從美國人的賬本挪開,看一眼被“解放”的那個國家。戰爭前後,阿富汗面臨糧食不安全的人口比例從 62% 升到 92%;五歲以下兒童嚴重急性營養不良的比例從 9% 升到 50%;生活在貧困線以下的人口從 80% 升到 97%。

“重建失敗”這種溫和說法覆蓋不了這幅圖景。這更像是把一個本就脆弱的社會,推到幾乎所有人都在飢餓邊緣的位置。美國這邊付出的代價同樣沉重:伊拉克戰場約 4500 名軍人陣亡,阿富汗約 2500 名,加上承包商和其他人員。霍頓提醒,這還只是能被統計的部分。

“同一個研究團隊還得出過一個結論:至少三萬美國退伍軍人在這之後自己轟掉了自己的腦袋,或者用某種方式故意騎摩托撞死自己。戰爭的代價遠遠超出戰場上的死亡數字。”(斯科特·霍頓)

他提到《紐約時報》或《華爾街日報》當時的一篇報道,列出了一名抑鬱士兵同時被開了十五種精神類藥物,用來壓制彼此之間的副作用。這些藥本身就可能引發自殺或殺人傾向,這一點連電視廣告都不得不說明。霍頓的話帶著一種冷掉的黑色幽默:有些人本來也許能活下來,如果政府的醫療系統沒有在最後關頭“幫”他們一把。

尼克松是怎麼給軍工複合體續命的

越戰結束,是理解這一切的起點。

尼克松面對的問題是:戰爭結束了,軍工複合體吃什麼?他的解法之一是轉向伊朗國王巴列維,請對方大規模採購美國軍火。伊朗至今還留著 F-4 和 F-14,來源就是尼克松和福特兩屆政府的這輪推銷。這位國王痴迷於用一支自己其實養不起的一流軍隊來裝點門面,這也在一定程度上動搖了他的政權根基。

再往前推,1953 年 CIA 參與策劃政變,把巴列維重新扶上臺。二十多年後,1979 年伊朗革命爆發,街頭是要求終結舊政權的大規模人群。CIA 和國務院告訴卡特:霍梅尼這個人沒那麼糟,我們認識他,1953 年反摩薩臺的時候,他所在的那批什葉派教士還幫過忙,我們覺得能跟他打交道。

霍頓對此的判斷是:這些人可能真的相信了。

“威廉·沙利文說,霍梅尼就像伊朗的甘地。第一,他不是和平主義者;第二,甘地不正是把大英帝國趕出印度的那個人嗎?你在說什麼?你是在故意扶一個會限制你影響力、會對你宣佈獨立的人上臺,你打算怎麼收場?”(斯科特·霍頓)

結果美國放霍梅尼從巴黎登上飛機回國。霍頓說,他小時候就納悶:法國不是我們的盟友嗎?他們做這件事之前不是問過我們嗎?後來他找到了當時彼得·詹寧斯採訪的畫面,這位大牌主播能想到的最聰明的問題是:“您凱旋歸國,心情如何?”

一個叫“公共選擇理論”的解釋

為什麼這套機器一次次做出既害別人也害自己的決定?霍頓給出的框架來自公共選擇理論(public choice theory),自由至上主義政治經濟學的一個分支。

核心命題很樸素:所謂“國家利益”並不存在。 存在的只是做決策那批人的私人利益。一旦“國家利益”被替換成“對我現在有好處的東西”,那麼告訴所有上級“你們全錯了”就變成了一件對自己沒好處的事。

埃爾斯伯格講過自己的經歷:他當副助理部長的時候,全部工作就是讓上司顯得正確,不管他同不同意。大家都盼著明年自己坐上那個位子,上司再往上走一格,然後自己的新工作就是讓新的上司顯得正確。真相和現實,就是這樣一層層被洗掉的。

霍頓的朋友、寫過韋科事件最佳著作的律師戴維·哈迪(David Hardy)說得更直白:世界上有真,有假,但政府工作裡還有第三種東西,叫“我們的立場”。它執行在完全不同於真假的另一個平面上。“我們的立場”是一屋子人開會達成共識之後要一起說的話、一起做的事。而一旦決定做出,回頭就意味著讓當初拍板的人難堪,等於宣佈他們錯了、當初不該那麼幹。於是就有了那種絕對的不願改變。

“資本主義裡,老闆再自負,最終也得看賬本說這不行,我得嚥下這口氣,否則就破產。政府不是這樣。他們幹得越糟,處境越好。”(斯科特·霍頓)

這就是越戰士兵給軍隊起的那個綽號,“自己舔自己的冰淇淋蛋筒”(self-licking ice cream cone)。它製造混亂,然後修復混亂就是它的工作。阿富汗戰爭結束時,多位級別夠高、能被媒體引用的軍官公開說:這事完了,我們得找點別的幹,準備轉向非洲,去那兒找幾個伊斯蘭主義者。因為“保持全球介入”本身就是他們的利益所在,至於這對非洲好不好、對美國人民好不好,是另一個問題,他們並不真的在處理。

辛西婭·斯托勒不知道帕特里克·科伯恩是誰

霍頓講了一個自己採訪中的細節。他採訪過一位 CIA 分析師辛西婭·斯托勒(Cynthia Storer),據說是反恐戰爭中相當高層的角色。他問她:你讀不讀帕特里克·科伯恩(Patrick Coburn)?

她反問:帕特里克·科伯恩是誰?

霍頓說,科伯恩是伊拉克最重要的英國人,他對這整件事的理解超過你們所有人,他給《獨立報》寫稿,註冊個郵箱就能免費看,天哪。

她還是:那是誰?

這件事的分量在於,埃爾斯伯格講過另一個機制:一旦你能接觸機密資訊,你就不再聽任何接觸不到的人說話,因為他們能知道什麼? 你的傾聽圈子立刻收縮到極小。斯托勒可能知道很多秘密,但她不知道科伯恩知道的東西,而科伯恩知道的那部分,恰恰是她必須知道才能理解局勢的。霍頓的判斷很乾脆:她並不理解她需要理解的東西。

薩達姆是 CIA 一路養大的

時間線繼續往前。1979 年 2 月革命成功到 11 月人質危機爆發之間,有九個月的空檔。這期間美國在做什麼?在警告伊朗新政權提防伊拉克的新獨裁者薩達姆·侯賽因,此人剛透過一場血腥政變上臺。

霍頓提醒,薩達姆從 1950 年代起就斷續被 CIA 培養,在開羅流亡過,參與過一個又一個獨裁政權。那段著名的體育場點名影片裡,被叫到名字的人被帶出去槍決。“那是對人性的一次黑暗研究,太可怕了。”他說,然後補了一句:滿屋子都是懦夫,但你得問自己,如果你在那間屋子裡,你會怎麼做?你已經輸了。所以在那些地方敢於站出來的人,更值得敬佩,因為那比在美國難得多。

然後是那場巨大的諷刺:兩伊戰爭中,美國支援薩達姆,用蘇聯武器的一方,去對抗伊朗。

布熱津斯基的誘餌

再跳到阿富汗。1979 年 7 月 3 日,卡特簽署了一份總統“總統令”(finding),授權 CIA 秘密支援阿富汗的聖戰者,可以直接提供,也可以透過第三國。霍頓在自己的網站上放了這份檔案。

為什麼要這麼幹?因為越戰之後,美國人得了一種政府眼裡的“精神病”,越戰綜合徵:不想再為遏制共產主義付這種代價,越南變紅就變紅吧,反正現在也跟人家做生意。布熱津斯基(Zbigniew Brzezinski,卡特的國家安全顧問)和國防部的沃爾特·斯洛庫姆(Walter Slocum)想出的辦法是:把蘇聯引誘進過度擴張。

“我們不想讓他們入侵西德,但阿富汗人是可以犧牲的。如果我們能把蘇聯引誘進阿富汗並陷在那裡,就是在駱駝背上再加一根稻草。”(斯科特·霍頓引述布熱津斯基一派的思路)

“越南”這個詞當時在美國意味著什麼?它指的不是地圖上一個國家的名字。它指的是一場愚蠢、無解、把自己腳和腿都打穿、還害死街坊鄰居的泥潭。現在他們想:讓紅軍也嚐嚐這個滋味,把他們拖住,放血到破產,讓他們用最難受的方式退出去。

1979 年 12 月 26 日布熱津斯基給卡特的備忘錄裡寫著:“這可能變成一場蘇聯的越南戰爭。”霍頓的資料來源是羅伯特·蓋茨的第一本回憶錄,蓋茨明確說,真正在推動這套政策的就是布熱津斯基和斯洛庫姆。

同一份備忘錄還提到:蘇聯入侵的初步效果可能對我們不利,會讓鷹派說我們必須對伊朗做點什麼,這可能把我們帶進與蘇聯的正面衝突。

這就連上了伊朗。美國把情報轉給霍梅尼,提醒他蘇聯的威脅。因為此刻伊朗因革命而失穩,而美國剛剛(至少是試圖,看起來也成功了)把蘇聯誘進阿富汗,現在又擔心蘇聯擴張主義順勢滾進波斯,一路抵到波斯灣。於是 1980 年卡特發表國情諮文,宣佈波斯灣是美國的湖泊,任何大國(讀作蘇聯)的任何動作,美國都將以任何必要手段回擊。

埃爾斯伯格:他是那個從房間裡走出來的人

霍頓稱埃爾斯伯格是朋友,十五年的交情,埃爾斯伯格給他的前兩本書寫了推薦語。

埃爾斯伯格是天才,這一點霍頓說得很肯定。他父親為原子彈造了第一條裝配線,政府請他照做氫彈時,他因為道德理由拒絕了。埃爾斯伯格本人在蘭德公司工作,寫博弈論核戰爭計劃,那裡當時與五角大樓關係極緊密。

他做的一件事是:肯尼迪政府反覆爭取,才從五角大樓拿到真正的戰爭計劃。計劃上寫的是,一旦與蘇聯開戰,就核平蘇聯和中國的每一座城市。這個思路的邏輯是:如果美蘇互相毀滅、歐洲也完了,那也不能把地球留給那些“骯髒的共產主義者”,所以把中國也一起滅了。 埃爾斯伯格把這件事告訴了肯尼迪,肯尼迪讓他去逼五角大樓重寫計劃,把範圍收窄。

《五角大樓檔案》的來源是這樣的:麥克納馬拉委託他們寫一部真正的、絕密的越南戰爭史,涵蓋二戰後美國介入印度支那的全過程,屬於“僅供國防部長本人閱讀”的材料。埃爾斯伯格和萊斯利·蓋爾布(Leslie Gelb,後來當了對外關係委員會主席)一起寫。埃爾斯伯格勇敢地把檔案帶了出來,一次次試圖交給參議院,邁克·格拉韋(Mike Gravel)最終在國會念了一部分,最後是《紐約時報》鼓起勇氣開始連載。

檔案證明了什麼?他們從一開始就知道打不贏。 南越政府站不住,沒有民眾同意;南方的叛亂有北方的支援,但更根本的是本地人自己發起的革命,他們認為外來干預不可容忍,想把美國人趕出去。

麥克納馬拉後來說:我們當時只是確信這是資本主義對共產主義,那些人不想被外國白人主子統治,這一點我們從來沒想過。霍頓的回應就一個字:拜託。

“喬姆斯基說過一句話:得了,是美國入侵了南越。那個請我們留下來的政府,是我們自己扶上去的(至少在我們推翻了不喜歡的那個之後)。跟後來卡爾扎伊請我們留在阿富汗是一回事。到底是誰在邀請誰?”(斯科特·霍頓)

還有一段電話錄音。約翰遜對一位共和黨參議員朋友說:“我不能成為第一個輸掉戰爭的總統。”所以他先退休,把包袱甩給尼克松。小布什在伊拉克戰爭時是同一套話術:結束的事,交給後面幾任總統決定,不是我的責任,我做的只是發動它。

霍頓把這歸到民主制度的經濟學上:任期太短,時間偏好太高。他並不主張反過來搞獨裁,他只是在說這個現實必須承認。你的視野被壓縮得很短:誰給我下一場競選出錢,讓我還能有點話語權。一百年後人類會怎樣,排在很後面。 尤達和帕爾帕廷都同意一件事:所有掌權的人都害怕失去權力,因為萬一是另一個人掌權,情況只會更糟。

“這從根本上說是懦弱。”霍頓說。真正偉大的領導者要有勇氣,做讓世界、讓國家長期變好的艱難決定。而如果一個領導人真的理解一場戰爭的全部代價,以及它將如何收場,他就不會發動它。

為什麼“被騙”這件事值得反覆講

北部灣事件是這套機制最乾淨的樣本。埃爾斯伯格的第一本書《秘密》(Secrets)開頭,就是他第一天上班,電傳機打進來“艦船在北部灣遭襲”,然後很快發現是誤報,然後他看著總統照樣拿它做文章。歷史學家加雷思·波特(Gareth Porter)說麥克納馬拉在明知是誤報的情況下對約翰遜撒了謊,而且他能證明。

霍頓的總結是:拿一小片資訊,衝出去用它為戰爭辯護,這件事一遍又一遍地發生。

這也解釋了他在書裡為什麼反覆強調“被騙”的機制:這跟某一次情報失誤無關。它是一套穩定的、可重複的、有明確受益者的生產方式。受傷的人支付成本,做決定的人獲得晉升和分紅。

訪談到這裡並沒有給出“怎麼辦”的完整答案,但霍頓三十年的工作本身指向一個方向:把代價說清楚,把歷史線頭接起來,讓普通人看見那間屋子裡發生的事。埃爾斯伯格從那個房間走了出來,代價是被起訴、被抹黑、被列入敵人名單。霍頓說,這就是為什麼必須給吹哨人以敬意,尤其是在那些站出來比在美國更危險的地方。

他講薩達姆體育場那段影片時的那句話,其實是整場訪談的底色:滿屋子都是懦夫,可你得問自己,如果你在那間屋子裡,你會怎麼做。

如果你想把這件事看得更清楚

訪談資訊量很大,落到可操作的層面,有幾件事值得做:

  • 讀原始材料,不讀轉述。布熱津斯基 1979 年 12 月 26 日給卡特的備忘錄、卡特 1979 年 7 月 3 日的總統令、五角大樓檔案,都能公開找到。霍頓把它們放在 ScottHorton.org 上,就是為了讓人自己去核對,而不是聽任何人(包括他)複述。
  • 讀埃爾斯伯格的三本書:《秘密》《五角大樓檔案(越南與檔案)》《末日機器》。第一本講他從體制內醒來的過程,第二本講檔案本身,第三本講核戰爭計劃的瘋狂。霍頓稱他為天才,同時強調他的價值不止於“洩密者”這個標籤,他是在房間裡看懂了房間裡發生了什麼的人。
  • 看資料來源,不看結論。布朗大學“戰爭成本”專案(Costs of War)的數字是公開可查的,9/11 後戰爭的死亡、流離失所、財政成本都在裡面。任何人跟你談“反恐戰爭的成果”時,請他把這個表拿出來。
  • 對每一個“我們得做點什麼”的呼籲,追問三件事:誰受益、代價由誰承擔、這件事怎麼結束。霍頓說,一個真正理解戰爭全部代價和收場方式的領導人不會發動戰爭。這句話對普通人也成立,因為普通人也在參與輿論。
  • 記住“我們的立場”這個詞。當你在新聞裡看到某個政策明明失敗了卻沒人調整,先別急著罵“愚蠢”,先想想是不是有一群人已經公開表態支援過它,回頭對他們意味著什麼。

最後是霍頓提到的那句士兵的玩笑:自己舔自己的冰淇淋蛋筒。識別出這個結構,比記住任何一場具體戰爭的細節都更有用,因為下一次它換一張地圖、換一個敵人的名字,還會再來。

文稿由本站用語音識別模型(基於官方釋出音訊)機器轉寫,可能有識別錯誤,人名與數字請以音訊為準。
Lex Fridman Podcast #478 – Scott Horton: The Case Against War and the Military Industrial Complex Machine transcription by Qwen3-ASR 0.6B (MLX, local, Apache-2.0). May contain recognition errors. The following is a conversation with Scott Horton. He's the director of the Libertarian Institute, editorial director of Antiwar dot com, co-host of Provoked, and host of the Scott Horton Show, on which he has done over six thousand interviews since two thousand and three. He's the author of Provoked Enough Already and other books and articles that have over the past three decades criticized U.S. foreign policy, especially in regard to military interventionism and the military industrial complex. And now a quick few second mention of each sponsor. Check them out in the description or at lexfreeman dot com slash sponsors. It's the best way to support this podcast. We got Allio Capital for investment, Hampton for connecting with founders, BetterHelp for mental health, NetSuite for business management software, and AG One for my daily multivitamin. Choose wisely, my friends. And now onto the full ad reads. They're all here in one place. I try to make them interesting, but if you must skip, please still check out the sponsors. I enjoy their stuff. Maybe you will too. Oh, and to get in touch with me for whatever reason, go to lexfreeman dot com slash contact. All right, let's go. This episode is brought to you by Allio Capital, an investment app designed by people who understand global markets and the macroeconomics of a world that is increasingly becoming divided, politically, socially, and economically. Allio is powered by Altitude AI, which identifies shifts in inflation, interest rates, and global risk, and based on that, adapts portfolios in real time. I used it; took me a few minutes to set up. It is obviously the future that AI should be integrated deeper and deeper in your investment processes, whether you are hands on or hands off investor. I am very much hands off. Set it and forget it, and in that case, certainly AI needs to be part of the set it and forget it way of life. One of the things I've come to understand more and more that the twenty first century is not going to be defined by the economy of one nation. It is not going to be a unipolar world. It is going to be a large collection of nations cooperating and competing, trading and starting conflicts. And through all of that turmoil and tension, it is difficult to know what to do with your money, so you don't get screwed over. And that's why I am happy there is people like Allio that once again look at the global markets. Download their app in the App Store, Google Play, or text Lex to five eleven five eleven. That's Allio Capital. Text Lex to five eleven five eleven. 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This episode is also brought to you by AG One, an all in one daily drink to support better health and peak performance. Anyway, I drink it for the multivitamin and for the deliciousness and it makes me feel like I have my life together. Otherwise, I feel like it's all falling apart. I am doing a lot of crazy physical stuff. I've been under a lot of strain mentally for a variety of reasons. That's life. I am sure as it goes on it will continue so and probably will get harder or at least the ups will get higher and the lows will get lower and then it'll be over too soon and maybe it'll be over tonight and tomorrow and I have to accept that and have to meditate on it. All of that is just the human condition. The best we can do is try to hold on and do the basic low hanging fruit of getting our vitamins and minerals, eating healthy, doing a little bit of exercise, trying to minimize stress and surround yourself with good people or at least see the good in the people in the situation that you are surrounded by. All of the things I contemplated as I sip on a cold AG One after a long run in the Austin heat. All of it—the run, the AG One, life, everything—the people I meet on the run. The whole thing just makes me truly happy. Anyway, they'll give you a one month supply of fish oil when you sign up at drinkagone dot com slash lex. This is the Lex Friedman podcast to support it. Please check out our sponsors in the description or at lexfreeman dot com slash sponsors. And now, dear friends, here is Scott Horton. I think one of the darkest and most disturbing chapters of modern American history is everything that happened around conducting the so called wars on terror. I think to me it was a wake up call. I think it was a wake up call to a lot of Americans in understanding and seeing the military industrial complex and seeing what the government's capacity is to mislead us into war and to continuously erode basic human freedoms. If I can allow me to list some of the estimates from the cost of war project from Brown University, just so we understand the costs of these wars. The post nine eleven wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Pakistan, and Yemen led to an estimated nine hundred thousand to nine hundred forty thousand direct deaths and three point six to three point eight million indirect deaths. And the cost in terms of dollars was eight trillion dollars with two point two trillion on Afghanistan and two point nine trillion on Iraq and Syria and the result on every front as we'll talk about. I think it's fair to say they did not accomplish this purpose and in fact if we even just look at the human toll of the people of Afghanistan. I was also looking at the the numbers before the war and after the war. Percent of Afghans facing food insecurity went from sixty two percent to ninety two percent. Percent of children under five experiencing acute malnutrition went from nine percent to fifty percent. Percent of Afghans living in poverty went from eighty percent to ninety seven percent. So it was extremely costly for Americans and it was extremely costly for Afghans. As you do in your book Enough Already, can you lay out how the full history, the full context of how it is that the American people were misled into this war on terror that was so costly in so many ways. Yeah, first of all, thank you for having me again. It's great to be with you on the show. One important statistic that you could have mentioned from the cost of war project as well is thirty seven million people displaced from their homes. Right, and the same group, it was Lex. I am telling you, it was at least five years ago. God, it's the future now. It was maybe seven, eight years ago that they did a study that determined that thirty thousand American servicemen had blown their own brains out since then while one way or the other deliberately crashing their motorcycle or whatever it is. So talk about the cost of war. That's far beyond you know the actual deaths in the war. We had about forty five hundred in Iraq and about twenty five hundred in Afghanistan of just official airmen, marines, and soldiers on the ground killed plus contractors and all that. So that's speaking not just to the things that could be measured. But you can just imagine the the scale of suffering that's going on in the veterans' minds. Yeah, and you know what too, like you would have guessed this probably right. You probably know more about this subject than me. It was a New York Times headline I think yesterday was, oh my god, look at or maybe it was the Wall Street Journal. Look at this insane list of the kinds of drugs that all these depressed soldiers get put on. Here is fifteen different psychoactive drugs all to temper the side effects of the others and whatever. Where you know and then they say that this could lead to suicide because of course we know that right. They even have to say that on TV sometimes that some of these drugs cause suicidal or homicidal obsessions and this kind of thing that we know that's one of the side effects. So some percentage of these guys might have made it if the government healthcare system hadn't helped them in the end. Is another bitter irony you know. The whole thing is just you know you said we got nothing out of it. I I said half in jest but it is serious but it's also it shows by relief what a disaster is that the only thing we did get out of it. Like literally was advancements in prosthetic limbs for amputees, whether they lost their limb in war or otherwise. Like if you want to boil it down, what did anyone get out of this other than you know some people got a dividend check from Lockheed or that kind of thing but that's not to the benefit of the society whatsoever. So that does not count. You want to talk about what society got out of it, what America got out of it. We have better Luke Skywalker hands than before. That's it. I don't think there is any more clear illustrations of the complete failure of the military industrial complex. How did this begin? How do we get into this? Yeah, well, so I'll try to tell the somewhat fast version of the Lex. That's a kiss of death every time I say that. Please, we'll go through. Please go the slow version. Okay, so the slow version is. I'll start with the end of Vietnam. Okay, so one major aspect at the end of Vietnam was that Richard Nixon felt like he had to bribe the military industrial complex some other way, and so one of the things that he did was he turned to the Shah of Resipalavi in Iran and asked him to increase arm sales. Now I guess I could go back. I think everybody knows that the CIA helped with the coup of nineteen fifty three to reinstall the Shah who was the son of the last dictator and had already been in for a while and they put him back in and so now this is in that was in fifty three so now this is in the early seventies twenty years later and Nixon saying hey you know it really helped me would be if you would buy a bunch of fighter jets so I think it's kind of notorious right that Iran still has F fours and F fourteen s that's where they got them from was the Nixon and Ford administration this push to do that and the Shah was apparently pretty obsessed with looking very first world with his very fancy first world army that he couldn't really afford and it helped to destabilize his regime somewhat and then I don't know the full extent of America turning on him before the revolution but I know that by the time of the revolution in nineteen seventy nine he was sick with cancer and very sick and the Americans secretly knew that CIA knew that you know but it was not public knowledge that it was whatever stage four whatever he was doomed and so they knew the revolution was coming and they were trying to figure out how to handle it and there was the revolution was coming anyway and it wasn't just there is going to be a change of leadership when we say revolution here we mean mobs in the street demanding an end to the old regime in huge numbers right a very large scale popular revolution and they're trying to figure out how to get the handle on it some of Carter's critics said what he should have done was have the military just massacre all those people that will shut them up or like you know what I mean they were trying to figure out what to do well the CIA and the State Department told Jimmy Carter listen this Ayatollah Khomeini he's not so bad we know this guy he was part of a group of Shiite clergy who helped to agitate against Mossadek in nineteen fifty three and so we have at least some contact and we think that we can deal with him did they actually believe that I think so is this incompetence or malevolence like how does this whole process happen that you go into this process of regime change and keep installing people that are creating more and more instability and destruction in the world and then you use that to then justify invading and starting wars how does this happen well there is a lot of things and the whole time we in our discussion here we'll be talking about a massive conspiracy of interests at play all the time but this is and I've never read a bunch of books about this I probably should at least interview these guys you'd be interested in this if you don't already know the subject is public choice theory it's kind of a branch of libertarian political economy studies that says that essentially one of its major aspects is that there really is no national interest the way you and I might think of it sitting here hashing it out across the table because what becomes the national interest is the interests of the people in charge of making the decisions for the nation and so they all ultimately are private choices aren't they and the national interest becomes subsumed by what's good for me now and so telling all my bosses they're all wrong is not good for me now and on the very basic level you know I've read quite a few books just from former insiders like Daniel Ellsberg and other people like that Ellsberg tells a story of where he's the deputy undersecretary of state for making up nonsense or whatever it is or defense of the no no state I believe and his whole job is making his boss look good whether he agrees with him or not and then the hope is that next year he'll be in his boss's position and his boss will move up one and then his job will be making his boss look good then and how and he explains how the truth and reality just gets washed out of this right another famous one or should be famous is my friend David Hardy who wrote the best book about the Waco massacre he is a great lawyer and he had been a former interior department cop and he said there is truth and there is falsity like that's the world we live in but in government work there is our position and our position takes place on an entirely different plane than truth and falsity our position is the thing a bunch of people in a room agreed that they would say and do as they can in committee like come to a consensus and then a lot of times once those decisions are made now to go back on that decision means that you are attempting to disgrace the people who led the decision making on that thing and say that they were wrong and they shouldn't have done the thing they did now they got to do this instead and so you see just an absolute unwillingness to make change and this is something that capitalism ultimately like everybody's got ego problems but ultimately the boss has to look at an accounting sheet and say this isn't working so I am going to have to swallow my pride or go out of business right in government it's not like that the worse they do the better off they are this is why it was the soldiers in Vietnam called the military itself the army itself the self licking ice cream cone because it means that they cause chaos but then chaos is their job is to go and fix that and so you know and and if you are a government bureaucrat getting paid way above the market then what do you want to do go get a job a great example this I cite in the book is at the end of the Afghan war there are multiple military officers like not too too high but like high enough to be quoted by the news saying well now that that's over we're looking for other things to do so we're going to pivot to Africa and go find some Islamists there because we are looking for ways to stay globally engaged because of course that's their interest to do whether that's good for Africa or good for the American people is just it's kind of a separate question that they're not really dealing with and so I think that's a huge part of it I mean one of the things was William Sullivan said that well Khomeini he's like the Iranian Gandhi well first of all he's not a pacifist but second of all didn't Gandhi kick the British Empire out of India so what are you saying you are. Deliberately putting in a guy who's going to limit your influence there and is going to declare independence for you from you how are you going to handle that like they don't seem to think this through and I I have to say one of the great disappointments of growing up is you find out that the rest of the adults aren't so smart they're just regular dudes like you and I think a lot of times state department people might have very advanced knowledge doesn't mean they have very advanced wisdom you know there's something else Daniel Ellsberg talks about is when you have access to classified information then you don't pay any attention to anybody who doesn't because what do they know you know all these things that they couldn't possibly be taking into account so you immediately close your circle of people who you listen to and I'll tell you great example this from my own experience was I interviewed a CIA analyst apparently a pretty important executive at one time in the terror war named Cynthia Storer and I asked her I forget if it was in the interview or not I hope I'm not like speaking out of school I believe it was in the interview that I asked her about well I can't remember the exact context but I asked her about well don't you read Patrick Coburn and she goes who's Patrick Coburn and I go who's Patrick Coburn Patrick Coburn is the most important Anglo in Iraq he's the one who understands all of this stuff more and better than all of y'all and he writes in the Independent you can read it for free just register with your email address for God's sake man I can't believe and she's like who even is that so a lack of basic curiosity rigor of research understanding the situation and she could know a lot of secret things but without understanding what he understands she does not understand what she needs to know I can promise you that much you know I think it's a basic lack of humility the ego grows the power grows then you to self preserve to maintain power you start deluding yourself in that in those closed rooms you start shutting yourself off from the reality of the world and then as as your own delusion drifts you're more incentivized to grow that delusion incentivized to hide to do secrecy and then it just goes off and that's that's why I was hoping you could speak to more to Daniel Ellsberg so the importance of somebody like that so it sounds like if we think about the machinery of how this happens it feels like heroic whistleblowers are essential to this process if we talk about Snowden and Assange and one of the OGs is Daniel Ellsberg who just reading here was an American military analyst economist and renowned whistleblower best known for leaking the Pentagon papers in 1971 can you tell me about who he was and the importance of him oh yeah well he's absolutely brilliant guy I've been proud to say I was a friend you know for 10 15 years there I don't know quite a while so he endorsed my first two books I'm very proud to say and um and he did not have a chance to read provoked unfortunately but I know he would have liked it because we were email buddies and I know that he thought very much along the same lines as me and John Mirschimer and others you know as as people are probably familiar well think we'll get more to that but um on that issue he was great but um he was a brilliant genius and and he was a nuclear war planner that was his second book was called the Doomsday Machine Confessions of a nuclear war planner and he had liberated a bunch of documents about nuclear war as well but he had decided with his quote unquote co conspirator that they should just focus on Vietnam first that's the thing that it matters the most right now and that was the Pentagon Papers and then all the papers that he had hidden away he gave them to his brother and his brother lost them and so then he decided later you know what I remember enough of this stuff that I can go ahead and just write from memory and he was so brilliant dude I mean I don't know what his IQ was but I know his father built the first assembly line for the atom bomb and they asked him if he would do the same for the H bomb and he refused for moral reasons so that was his background in the first place and he's just such a great guy man so he's a person who's able to see the situation like you mentioned like that room and in that room understand that there's some shit that's wrong that's going on here and to be able to speak up and he was at Rand right his job was writing and this was when Rand I guess was much more important and very closely tied to the Pentagon and their whole thing was like writing up game theory nuclear warfare plans one of the things he did was he found out and and Jack Kennedy had to fight like mad they had to go back and forth over and over and over to even get the war plan from the Pentagon and they finally got the war plan from the Pentagon and it said if we have a nuclear war with the Soviet Union we nuke every single city in the Soviet Union and China so that would be I don't know if that includes all the Warsaw Pact but it includes all the republics and China and the thinking was that if America and the Soviet Union destroy each other and Europe well we'll be damned if we're going to leave Earth to those dirty Checoms so we're going to kill all them too and that was the thinking in the thing and it was Ellsberg told Kennedy that and Kennedy told Ellsberg to make sure and force the Pentagon to rewrite the plan and narrow that thing down so that's part of the guy's background where he comes from I beg people to read the it's called secret so memoir Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers and then also the Doomsday Machine and by the way his first book secrets begins with his first day on the job I was joking around earlier he's Deputy Under Secretary of State for whatever it was was I can't remember if it's State or Defense maybe it was Defense it had to have been Defense forgive me for before and then the first thing that happens when he clocks in that day for his job is the thing starts coming across the teletype ships attacked in the Tonkin Gulf and then he's reading oh never mind that was a mistake and then he sees the president run with it anyway and now the historian Gareth Porter says that actually McNamara lied to B J and he can prove it and I can't cite all the chapter in verse but I trust Gareth he's great and he says it actually was McNamara lied to B J when they knew that it was a mistake and the same thing happened again and again you take a little piece of information and run with them in order to justify war that's right that's going to be a theme what was what was important in the Pentagon Papers what are some key ideas okay so so the Pentagon Papers first of all was and and he wrote this while he was working at Rand but he had full top secret clearance and they were commissioned by Secretary of Defense McNamara to write a real secret top secret history of the Vietnam War and the entire history of our involvement in Indo-China since the end of the Second World War and so that was what they did was they wrote like eyes only for the Secretary of Defense type material so it had everything in there and Ellsberg was in charge of writing it along with Leslie Galb who shut his mouth and went along and later became the chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations and was a good dog right but anyway they were the ones who wrote it together and Ellsberg was brave enough to liberate the thing and he tried to leak it to the Senate over and over and over again Mike Revel eventually started reading it into the record and then finally the New York Times got the courage to start publishing the thing and it showed that they knew that they couldn't win all along they knew that the South Vietnamese government could not stand they did not have popular consent that the insurgency in the South was not just based on support from the North but their own indigenous revolution against what they see you know as intolerable for an intervention and and wanted to force us out and it's funny because McNamara later says that I guess he didn't read the Pentagon Papers that no we were just sure that it was the capitalists versus the communists like all this stuff about they didn't want to be ruled over foreign white devils and that never occurred to us you know like come on um you know as Chomsky said come on America invaded South Vietnam that the government that was inviting us to stay was the government that we put in there or at least after we overthrew the one we didn't like the one we put in there no different than as we're going to talk about Ahmed Karzai inviting us to please stay in Afghanistan it's like come on who zooming who here um but um so it showed and that was the deal and that was why it was such a big deal in how he made Nixon's enemies list and all these things even though it didn't really expose Nixon it exposed B J and and the predecessors but um it was a huge shock that they have been lined us and lined us and lined to us deliberately knowing that this is got to be somebody else's problem right there's a phone call of LBJ saying to a Republican senator friend of his that I can't be the first president to lose a war it's right he's just going to retire first and make it Nixon's problem right same as George W Bush said oh the end of Iraq well that'll just have to be up to other presidents to decide not my responsibility all I did was do it you know and that's how they are and they have that's there is this is also part of the economics of democracy too where they have such and I'm not arguing for the opposite but I'm just saying the reality is you have such short terms of office you have very high time preference right instead of like working on long term projects about what's the future of mankind going to look like 100 years from now you're looking at a much shorter time horizon you know including who's going to finance your next election so that you'll have any say so whatsoever and as Yoda and Palpatine agree that like all who have power are afraid to lose it because what if the other guy had it instead it would be worse everybody knows that which is of course a huge part of the story of the American Empire here you know well but fundamentally that's cowardly right so what what we want from leaders from great leaders is courage and courage means making difficult decisions that are going to make the world a better place long term that the country a better country long term and that means if you start a war that means understanding the full cost of that war and how it's going to have to end and then if if you understand the full cost of war you're not going to start it yep right so how does how do we go from the CIA 1979 the Shaw Ayatollah Nixon what is the thread that now starts inching towards the 90s and right towards 911 in Iraq I know there's so much but we're going to do it man um so here's what happens America goes ahead and allows Ayatollah get on the plane in Paris France and go home now I remember even as a kid saying but aren't the French our friends when they had checked with us before doing that in fact I just recently found the clip of Peter Jennings interviewing him and the smartest thing Peter Jennings can think up to say is so how do you feel on your triumphant return Mr Ayatollah right which USA is just completely aiding and abetting right these are shots they called and made happen right they sent him home to inherit the thing and then they did work with him people forget man and I was just very young at that time um but I you know was raised kind of in the atmosphere of all of this and even back then people conflated the revolution itself with the hostage crisis as just one story it all is spoken in one breath but in fact the revolution was in February of 1979 and the hostage crisis didn't break out until November so what was happening in the meantime well one of the things was the Americans were warning the new Iranian regime about threats from the new dictator of Iraq Saddam Hussein who had just overthrown the government in a bloody coup d'état no revolution there and you can watch the video of this have you ever seen the video of Saddam's overthrowing Iraq and he's got a huge stadium of guys and he just starts calling names and everybody whose name he calls has to go out back and get shot like it's gnarly man I think that video is a dark study of human nature it's terrifying that video that's ugly man because everybody is afraid and of there's a disgusting faces that Saddam Hussein has oh I don't know I don't know if if there's a sadistic sure he was a psychopath man no question he was a brute of a dictator right there's a lot of L presidents in the world not all of them like train their sons to torture people from the time they're young and stuff oh fuck all the cowards in that room but then you have to ask yourself what would you do if you were in that room yeah you've already been bested at that point I mean they could all rush the stage but then I'm going to do them any good you know but before you how did you get to that room yeah and then that's why you have to give props to whistleblowers you have to give props to people that stand up and risk their life in situations like that which in those parts of the world is even harder than it is in the United States of America and you know what by the way I usually forget to mention this when I told a story takes another few seconds to mention that Saddam Hussein had been groomed by the CIA since the 1950s on and off and he had been part of different dictator regimes on and off he'd been in exile in Cairo for a little while in this kind of thing and then in the 70s leading up to the coup I think it was really closer to the Soviet Union and um and so we'll get to the I guess I'll mention now the huge irony of the fact that in the Iran Iraq war it was America supporting Saddam Hussein in his Soviet military versus Iran and it's American one right um but anyway the absurdity of this is insane well I'm skipping ahead a step but I just like that part but so okay so America supports the revolution in 79 in February they're warning this guy hey you better look out for Saddam Hussein and his intentions and we're going to get back to that in one moment here um and they were also warning them about the threat from the Soviet Union now why is that well that's because skip over Iran now we're talking about Afghanistan and Zbigniew Brzinski's policy that let's support the Mujahedin in Afghanistan in order to try to provoke Soviet intervention there and so there's a memo people can find this at Scott Horton dot org slash Barry use if you want to look at it it's um from you want to go ahead pull it up so okay if if you allow me to read President Jimmy Carter's July 3rd 1979 finding in quotes authorizing covert support for the Mujahedin in Afghanistan secret sensitive and the important part is provide unilaterally or through third countries as appropriate support to Afghan insurgents this is now a finding is an order from a president to the CIA to do something that's what a finding means so this is an order to CIA to do this now on that order they did start pouring in support to the Mujahedin now I have to tell you that my best uh experts on this like Eric Margolis and I got this also from reading Andre Sokolov the famous Soviet nuclear physicist and dissident that they both said that it was an American support for the Mujahedin that really provoked the Russians into invading Afghanistan because what it was was the sock puppet dictator was a basket case and he had created so many enemies that he just couldn't hold it together so the first thing the Soviets did when they invaded in December of 79 was take him out back and shoot him and replace him with a new guy so that was really the cause of the Soviet intervention there they had a commie sock puppet regime it was not one of the Soviet republics right but they had a sock puppet regime there but they they wanted to you know um maintain it and it was falling apart so they rushed to intervene however Lex the point still remains that the United States of America was trying to bait the Soviet Union into invading Afghanistan we're going to get back to why it's so relevant to the Iran thing in just one second but let's stop and talk about this for a second why would they do that and they would do that also because of Vietnam because at the end of Vietnam Americans had what the government considered to be a mental illness Vietnam syndrome that meant that Americans didn't want to do this anymore contain communism at this cost and who really cares if Vietnam goes commie we do business with them now and you know and so um people weren't into it anymore so this is where Zbigniew Brzinski and his he was National Security Adviser under Jimmy Carter and his I guess counterpart at defense a guy named Walter Slocum they came up with this brilliant idea that what we'll do is we will bait the Soviets into over expansion now we don't want them to invade West Germany but the Afghans are expendable so if we can bait the Soviets into Afghanistan and bog them down we will be adding straw to the camel's back this is a way to inflict because by then think of it the word Vietnam that's not even the name of a country over there somewhere anymore Vietnam at that time that word means some horrible stupid no-win quagmire thing that you shouldn't have done you shot yourself in the foot and the leg and lost your friend Jimmy down the street and everything and for we don't want to do that you know that was what Vietnam meant to America was like god dang what a mistake that was so now they're saying let's do that to the Reds okay we'll bog them down bleed them to bankruptcy and force them out the hard way and and hurt them in doing that so that's what they were trying to do that was the wisdom behind the operation in the first place and now if you go click back one to Brzinski you'll see where and he later misparaphrases this a little bit he's kind of cute Brzinski but National Security Adviser's big new Brzinski's memo to President Carter on December 26 1979 regarding the Soviet invasion of of Afghanistan and the important part here I mean there's a lot it's a bit but if you go down you will see where oh here this could become a Soviet Vietnam while it could become a Soviet Vietnam in other words see they're already talking about in that context here in writing we see and it's from Robert Gates's first memoir by the way where he says it was Brzinski and Slocum by the way that's my source for that when I say that those two were the ones really innovating this policy um and he says the initial effects of the invasion are likely to be adverse for us for the following reasons and then he says that it'll make the Hawks talk about how we better do something about Iran and he says this could bring us into a head-to-head confrontation with the Soviets so this is very interesting Lex because well one this is why America's passing intelligence to the Ayatollah about threats from the Soviets we think that now that Iran is essentially destabilized because of the revolution and we just deliberately or at least we're trying to and apparently succeeded in a sense in baiting them into invading Afghanistan now we're worried that they're too expansionist and that they're going to roll into Persia next and then they'd be right on the Persian Gulf and we can't have that so that was when Jimmy Carter announced in his speech in 1980 the Carter Doctrine that said that the Persian Gulf is now an American lake and we will take any move by any power read the USSR to move into

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