特別節目·中文精讀

保羅·克魯格曼:創新經濟學、自動化、社會保障與全民基本收入

Paul Krugman: Economics of Innovation, Automation, Safety Nets & Universal Basic Income

經濟學家談技術創新與自動化對就業和收入的影響,以及社會保障與全民基本收入的爭論。

官方音訊00:00 / --:--
中文精讀由 AI 基於原始訪談改寫,非官方翻譯,可能存在偏差或錯誤;表述以原音訊與官方文稿為準。說明

在 Lex Fridman 的播客裡,保羅·克魯格曼(Paul Krugman)被問到美國社會的狀況,他的判斷沒有留餘地:美國是唯一一個公民會因為付不起錢而得不到基本醫療的發達國家。

緊接著他補了一句更刺人的話,說這個國家莫名其妙地把自己搞得比幾乎任何一個富裕國家都更殘酷,而且找不出什麼好理由。

我們不知怎麼搞出了一個比幾乎所有富裕國家都更殘酷的社會,而且沒有好理由。(保羅·克魯格曼)

但這場一個多小時的對話裡,克魯格曼真正想拆掉的東西是另一套更流行的敘事:機器人正在搶走工作,所以我們需要全民基本收入,所以中產階級工資停滯,所以焦慮是不可避免的。

他的態度是:這套故事聽起來很順,資料不站在它那邊。

如果自動化真的在消滅工作,生產率應該飆升

克魯格曼給了一個非常樸素的檢驗辦法。

生產率(productivity)的定義是總產出除以總工時。一個經濟體的總產出用實際 GDP 衡量,雖然把蘋果和橘子加在一起這件事本身是個構造物,靠市場價格折算再剔掉通脹,但作為"這個經濟體生產了多少東西"的度量,它還算靠譜。拿它除以全社會工作的小時數,得到的就是"平均一個工人一小時能生產多少東西"。

如果技術真的在以空前的速度替代人力,這個數字應該猛漲。歷史上確實漲過:二戰之後那代人,生產率以每年 2% 的速度穩定增長。然後掉下來了。九十年代中期到 2000 年代中期有十年回升,之後又掉回去。現在的水平,用克魯格曼的話說,"不令人印象深刻"。

2020 年初這場對話發生時,美國正處在失業率終於降下來的階段。克魯格曼的解釋很直接:之前那輪高失業跟技術毫無關係,是需求不足,是宏觀經濟學的問題。

他舉了兩個已經完成的案例。紐約曾經有成千上萬的碼頭工人,把貨從船上搬上搬下。現在這批人基本消失了,伊麗莎白港的巨型起重機直接吊集裝箱。那東西不叫機器人,一點也不高科技,但它實打實摧毀了一個職業。另一個案例是農民。美國曾經是個農民佔多數的國家,現在農民所剩無幾,原因不是大家不吃飯了,是農業效率高到不需要那麼多人。

這兩次衝擊的規模都不小,社會都消化了。"所以關於現在發生的事情有什麼本質不同這個說法,到目前為止不成立。"(保羅·克魯格曼)

他留了一個例外口子:也許會有奇點,也許機器某天真的比人聰明,把人類幹掉。但那些東西在當下的任何資料裡都看不見。

被追問機器翻譯這類具體的崗位衝擊時,他承認確實有:翻譯的需求明顯下降了,機器翻譯不完美但夠用。他的判斷是,這類區域性的替代會持續發生,但是總量上的證據不支援"這次不一樣"。

為什麼"機器人搶工作"這套說法這麼有市場

克魯格曼給的解釋分三層,一層比一層不留情面。

第一層關於可見性。現在正在進步的技術,恰好是"閒聊階層"能看見的那一類。集裝箱消滅碼頭工人的時候,沒幾個大學教授跟碼頭工人是朋友。但今天被衝擊的是寫文案的、做翻譯的、做客服的,這些人的處境就發生在知識分子眼皮底下,於是被放大成時代主題。

第二層關於宏觀經濟學有多反直覺。剛經歷完一場嚴重的金融危機,失業率長期高企。克魯格曼說得很清楚:那輪高失業是需求失敗,是宏觀問題。麻煩在於宏觀經濟學違反直覺,人們很難相信"大家只是花錢不夠多"這種聽起來很瑣碎的原因,能造成 1930 年代那種規模的大規模苦難,或者 2008 年之後那種沒那麼嚴重但同樣真實的苦難。於是人們傾向於找一個更宏大的解釋:一定是技術變了,我們不再需要工人了。1930 年代也流行過同一套說法。

第三層關於工資,這一層最政治。工資停滯有很大一部分原因來自工會運動的衰落,來自那些壓縮工人議價能力的政策。這套解釋讓一部分很有影響力的人不舒服,他們更願意相信這是自然規律,是技術讓中產階級工資變得不可能。

有大量有影響力的人不想聽這個故事。他們希望這是不可避免的自然之力。(保羅·克魯格曼)

所以技術決定論從來不缺聽眾,因為它免除了所有人的責任。

丹麥和美國用同樣的技術,做出了不同的選擇

克魯格曼在紐約市立大學(CUNY)教一門關於福利國家經濟學的課,他說這門課反覆要傳達的一個資訊是:所有發達國家的治理能力大致相當,技術相同,面對的是同一個全球經濟,做出的選擇卻天差地別。

他用的例子是工會。美國工會衰落後,流行的說法是"世界變了,工會沒有位置了"。可是丹麥三分之二的工人是工會成員,丹麥用的是同樣的技術,面對同樣的全球化。

經濟和政治的關係,他的表述是"一切都以至少兩種方式影響其他一切",這是他在經濟學訓練裡學到的規則之一。經濟當然驅動政治,政治對經濟形態的影響同樣巨大。

這也解釋了他對美國處境的基本判斷:市場規律並沒有要求社會殘酷。殘酷是一系列政策選擇疊加出來的結果。

殘酷是有代價的,而且是全體人付

對話裡有一個很容易被跳過的追問:照顧社會里不幸的人,除了道義上正確,對經濟本身有好處嗎?

克魯格曼的回答是,大體上,做道義上正確的事同時也是經濟上正確的事。

他先承認反面情形的理論可能:如果一個社會稅率高到消滅所有激勵,安全網慷慨到沒人願意工作,那確實會出問題。但他補了一句:他不認識任何一個長這樣的社會。即便在安全網非常慷慨的歐洲國家,人們照樣工作、創新、折騰。

正面證據在於缺失基本保障會造成的破壞。在缺乏足夠醫療、缺乏足夠營養的環境里長大的孩子,發育會受影響,成年後達不到自己的潛力。這筆賬最後是整個社會在付。

我們殘酷,我們無情,而我們因為殘酷無情讓自己變窮了,不只是那些個體,是整個社會。(保羅·克魯格曼)

他點出的具體缺口有三處。兒童支援幾乎為零,多數國家的年輕父母能拿到實質幫助,美國常常什麼都沒有。老年人的長期護理時有時無。醫療保險覆蓋存在硬缺口。

還有一句他講得很平,但資訊量很足:這個國家不去照顧那些"犯下投錯父母這個錯誤"的孩子,也不去照顧那些"犯下生病這個錯誤"的人。這兩件事,富裕國家本該做到。

基尼係數為什麼不是好指標

被問到該用什麼指標衡量一個社會的好壞,克魯格曼先潑了一盆冷水給基尼係數(Gini coefficient)。

基尼係數是不平等的度量,流行是因為它是單一數字,而且通常和其他指標同向變動。問題在於它沒有自然解釋。你可以告訴別人 0.25 是丹麥,0.45 是巴西,但從 0.25 到 0.45 之間到底意味著什麼樣的社會,沒有容易的對映方式。

他自己看的是另一組東西:中位數家庭收入、前 1% 的收入、按各種口徑統計的貧困人口數量,然後是健康水平、預期壽命、生活滿意度。

他特別區分了幸福(happiness)和生活滿意度(life satisfaction)這兩個指標,認為生活滿意度更適合衡量,聽著軟,但有意義。按民調,丹麥人對生活相當滿意,美國人不太滿意。他順帶開了個玩笑說瑞典總是贏,其實這幾年贏的是丹麥和挪威。

用一個不夠嚴謹但很好用的標準收尾:怎麼知道一個社會像樣?看到了就知道。他自己叫它"色情測試"。

看不見的手是個機制,不是神話

話題轉到亞當·斯密。克魯格曼的立場很清楚:市場在配置激勵上非常有效,沒有哪個明白人希望政府去經營鋼廠或者擁有農場。農民種糧食是因為能賺錢,結果確實把糧食種出來了。

但他堅持一件事:這裡面沒有任何神秘的東西。看不見的手是一個機制,一種組織經濟活動的方式,它在一組前置條件下運轉良好。

農業符合條件,製造業符合條件,很多服務業符合條件。醫療不符合,教育不符合。

他給的比例是:一個社會大概四分之三靠看不見的手,四分之一靠看得見的手,這個配比最管用。而這個"看得見的手"的部分,亞當·斯密自己在《國富論》裡就寫過為什麼銀行需要監管。

Lex 在這裡插了一段個人經歷。他從蘇聯來,第一次走進美國超市看見成堆的水果,包括他此前沒見過的香蕉,那種衝擊無法用語言描述。而這一切沒有一個總排程在指揮。

克魯格曼接了一句很克魯格曼式的回應,引了句老電影臺詞:有時候魔法奏效,有時候不奏效,你得知道它什麼時候不奏效。

政府有些事做得挺好,包括被嘲笑的那部分

他提到一個荒誕的現實:美國人對政府的敵意裡,有一部分是花錢買來的。但政府確實有些事做得不錯。

醫保就是例子。政府辦的醫保如此受歡迎,以至於出現了一種奇觀:有人舉著牌子說"別讓政府碰我的 Medicare"。人們愛政府提供的醫保,遠超過愛私人醫保。

基礎教育也是。本地公立高中是培養孩子的地方,而營利性教育整體上是一團糟,充斥著欺詐和宰客,學生拿不到他們以為付了錢該拿到的東西。

他還替 DMV(車管所)說了句話,說自己去 DMV 的經歷一直是正面的,大概只是去對了地方。

方法上,他認為一部分可以靠先驗推理,比如從邏輯上講清楚醫療為什麼不適合交給市場;另一部分只能靠經驗。有些國家試過把鋼鐵業國有化,效果不好。美國試過把教育私有化,效果也不好。你得試過才知道。

醫療為什麼在每一個維度上都不符合競爭條件

克魯格曼搬出了肯尼斯·阿羅(Kenneth Arrow)1963 年的那篇論文,說它至今依然站得住。

競爭要運轉,需要一長串條件:交易雙方都充分知情,都有能力做出明智判斷,都理解自己在幹什麼。醫療在每一個維度上都不滿足。

他特意強調,這不只是醫保的問題,醫療本身就不滿足。說"你可以貨比三家去做一臺大手術",這話讓他懷疑對方是不是生活在同一個世界裡。

Lex 把話題引到"充分知情"這件事有多難。克魯格曼的回答是資訊量的分佈極不均勻。歷史上從沒有這麼多資訊擺在指尖,麻煩在於其中一部分是假的,另一部分是真的但太難懂。

買車的場景裡,查查《消費者報告》,你大致能搞清楚自己買的是什麼。做手術的場景裡,第一,它經常在你來不及規劃的時候發生;第二,醫學院要念很多年,上網搜點建議通常不是個像樣的替代品。

兩種正義觀,以及第二層爭論

克魯格曼在課上給學生講,關於正義大體有兩派看法。

一派看結果,代表是約翰·羅爾斯(John Rawls):一個正義的社會,是你在不知道自己會投胎成誰的前提下願意選擇去生活的那個社會。另一派看過程:正義的社會是沒有強制的社會,除非絕對必要。

他說這兩派之間沒有客觀辦法可以裁決。而他本人基本是羅爾斯派,也認為很多人實際上都是。

這是第一層爭論。第二層爭論關於什麼管用:任何持證經濟學家都會說激勵重要,但重要多少?稅率提高究竟在多大程度上讓人不願工作?更強的安全網究竟在多大程度上讓人變懶?

他的自評是,證據指向的結論比多數政客的立場明顯偏左。但他承認這一層裡存在正當的分歧空間。

"兩邊都得聽聽對方"這句話,有時候是偷懶

Lex 問了一個不太好答的問題:左右兩派經常把對方當成徹底的蠢貨,這種開放心態到底有沒有用?對方有沒有可能真的對?

克魯格曼的回答繞開了客氣話。他說必須面對一個事實:外面有大量純粹虛假的東西,而且這些東西和政治陣營高度繫結。他願意尊重值得尊重的觀點,但很多觀點不值得。

他拿自己的專業舉例。他承認自己錯過很多次,但在經濟學內部,可以實際展開有意思的討論的觀點,和那些純粹是怪力亂神、或者純粹是因為有人拿錢在傳播的觀點,兩者之間有清晰界線。

然後是一句很重的判斷:有不少嚴肅的中右翼經濟學家,願意對話,但這些人沒有一個在特朗普政府裡有位置。共和黨國會議員整體上只想聽怪人的意見。

關於極端觀點,他的標準並不排斥激進本身。激進沒問題,但接著要問:這種激進有沒有依據?如果它沒有依據,如果它已經被證據反覆駁倒而人們還在重複,那它就是一個"殭屍思想",到某個點就不值得再假裝尊重了。

Lex 舉了地平說作為例子,說它基本已被證偽,但 popularity 還在漲。克魯格曼的回答是:這種東西你沒法靠許願讓它消失,如果假裝它不存在,對讀者不誠實。

他也點了名,說靠讀安·蘭德(Ayn Rand)的小說學貨幣經濟學,這條溝通的路根本走不通。

經濟學做不了量子力學,但能接受現實的檢驗

被問到經濟理論的可檢驗性,克魯格曼先承認了侷限:這是個複雜系統,而且你基本上沒法做實驗,經濟學永遠不會變成量子力學那樣。

但自然實驗是存在的,而且有時候相當乾淨。他給的例子是金融危機之後那場大檢驗。

一套宏觀理論,源頭追到凱恩斯,當時做出了幾個預測:在這種環境下印錢不會引發通脹;鉅額財政赤字不會推高利率;削減政府開支的緊縮政策如果真做,會導致深度蕭條。

另一批人的預測完全相反。結果這場檢驗相當明確:利率一直低,通脹一直低,實施嚴厲緊縮的國家遭遇了嚴重的經濟下滑。

他還提到一個細節,年輕一代經濟學家現在的訓練重度依賴資料,他認為這個方向是對的。

經濟學家之間的共識,比外界想象的高得多

克魯格曼說,在嚴肅研究者之間,分歧其實遠小於公眾的印象。芝加哥大學布斯商學院有一個意識形態多元的小組,定期回答問題,多數議題上呈現出的共識程度相當驚人。很多被外界當成有爭議的議題,爭議本身是被政治力量餵養出來的幻覺。

他舉了最低工資。證據相當壓倒性地顯示,從當前水平做溫和上調不會對就業產生明顯負面影響。但界線在哪?12 美元按現有知識看相當安全,15 美元就有正當的分歧空間了。他說真的不知道臨界點在哪裡。

這類問題本質上是在做樣本外推斷,而且有充分理由相信它非線性,過了某個點,過去的行為模式就不成立了。

哪些領域是真的不知道?他點名了對科技產業的監管:什麼才是有效的監管方式,我們確實沒有答案。

七到八成的增長來自知識進步,但我們不肯投

克魯格曼說,人均收入增長裡大約 70% 到 80% 來自知識的進步。堆資本堆不出這個速度,真正的來源是我們變得更聰明瞭。

而這裡面很大一部分技術相當樸素。他喜歡講的例子是集裝箱,還有更早的瓦楞紙箱。沒有那個發明,亞馬遜的送貨體系根本不存在。網路技術當然重要,但沒有紙箱你打算怎麼辦?

那為什麼不投?他反問:為什麼我們不再挖一條哈德遜河底的鐵路隧道?需求明擺著,壓倒性地明顯。

他的解釋是價值觀爭議的外溢。政客們大概正確地相信存在一種光環效應:只要政府在某一類事情上被看見做得成功,公眾對政府在別的事情上的看法也會變好。而給人們增加社保福利,跟挖一條隧道,本來是兩件很不一樣的事。

結果是保守派反對任何非軍事的政府支出增長,不管這個專案本身多合理,因為他們怕這是通往更大政府的楔子。自由派則傾向支援這類支出,部分原因是想借此證明政府能幹,從而為更宏大的社會目標鋪路。

一場本該是技術官僚層面的討論,關於政府在科研和基礎設施上該投多少,就這樣被"政府"這個詞本身汙染了。

火星上該用什麼制度

Lex 問,如果人類真的去火星從零建一個社會,該用什麼政治經濟制度。

克魯格曼先說他不認為人類真會去做這件事,然後才進入假設。

他的選擇是代議制民主。直接民主他不贊成,理由是讓所有人對一切事情投票在操作上有硬傷:人沒有時間去精通每一個議題。加州的大量公投就是現成的觀察樣本,效果不太好,因為很難向選民解釋清楚,他們投票支援的幾項提案之間可能互相沖突。

他對代議制的評價借了丘吉爾那句老話:除了其他所有制度之外,它是最壞的制度。

如果真從零開始,他提了一個具體的修改:你不會想要一個 60% 的人口只佔一半席位的參議院,你會想要一個比現在更具代表性的結構。至於細節,他也說不太清。各種代議制,議會制也好,美式總統制也好,日子好的時候都運轉得不錯,而且各有各的崩潰方式。

他還順手錶了個態,說自己挺喜歡《蒼穹浩瀚》(The Expanse),劇裡火星那套制度叫"火星國會共和國",讓他覺得挺欣慰。

國際貿易的髒秘密,不在國家之間,在國內

Lex 說自己能理解兩個相鄰農民之間的交易,但國家之間的貿易太複雜。

克魯格曼的回答是,國際貿易沒那麼特殊,只是玩家多得多、複雜得多。國家之間貿易的原因和個體之間貿易的原因基本一致:彼此不同,透過專注於自己相對擅長的事獲得共同利益。此外還有規模經濟。你不太可能既當外科醫生又當會計師,國家也一樣。

現代貿易的複雜之處在於多階段分工。一部"中國製造"的 iPhone,零件來自全世界。但這不改變基本原理。

他講了一個被他說成國際貿易衝突"骯髒小秘密"的判斷:國家之間的衝突其實沒那麼重要。絕大多數貿易對雙方都有利。真正巨大的影響發生在國內的收入分配上。

美國對華貿易的增長讓兩國都更富了,但對北卡羅來納傢俱業的從業者相當糟糕,他們的崗位確實被來自中國的進口潮沖掉了。

他的立場因此分成兩半。他不打算推翻已經發生的事,但他希望美國有更好的政策去支援和補償那些在增長中受損的人。

關於中美貿易戰,他認為美國對中國確實有真實的問題,比如智慧財產權保護,但這些問題跟當前的貿易戰沒什麼關係。貿易戰的驅動力是一個根本錯誤的觀念:把東西賣給中國是好事,從中國買東西是壞事。這誤解了整件事的重點。

安全的邊界和它的前提

安全網的討論裡,克魯格曼給了一個相當實用的分析框架:普遍性和定向性之間的取捨。

普遍性乾淨,代價是給不需要的人也在發錢。定向性更容易把有限資源送到關鍵問題上,但兩者都有激勵扭曲,也都有政治和心理層面的問題。

社保(Social Security)和醫保(Medicare)最大的優點是不問問題。你不需要證明自己需要它,到 65 歲它就來了。他提到自己名義上在 Medicare 裡,透過《紐約時報》的保險計劃走,但他從來沒有向醫保部門提交申請去證明自己需要。

這件事對尊嚴有好處,對政治支援同樣有好處:每個人都拿到 Medicare,所以每個人都護著它。

UBI 的困境就在這裡。要麼定得太低,低到根本沒法生活;要麼就是一個天文數字的專案。

他傾向的替代路線是在現有安全網上加建:食品券、勞動所得稅抵免(EITC),以及大量缺位的家庭支援政策。失業保險他也認為覆蓋時間太短、給得太吝嗇,應該更全面。

他把話說得很明白:UBI 的流行和"機器人要搶走所有工作"這個信念手拉手。如果那件事真的在發生,他可能會重新考慮自己的立場。但他看不到那件事在發生。

公共話語碎片化了,但政策報道其實變好了

克魯格曼的評價是分裂的。一面是碎片化:以福克斯新聞為主要資訊源的人,和讀《紐約時報》的人,看到的公共話語是兩個世界。

另一面是主流政治和政策報道的水準提高了。他回憶自己剛入行做評論員時的情況,用詞是"糟透了",大量議題根本沒人報道,報道了也永遠是對半開。

他給了個流傳很久的例子:2000 年競選期間,如果某個候選人說地球是平的,第二天頭條會是"雙方在地球形狀上存在分歧"。

這種情況現在沒那麼普遍了,懂政策的記者比以前多。至於普通選民有多知情,他的回答是"不清楚"。民主黨初選辯論上站二十幾個人,他希望最後能收斂到正常數量。辯論本身還算有實質內容,劇場式的評論依然很多,但沒有過去那麼壓倒性。

寫專欄的人和仇恨郵件

最後一段對話,Lex 問了一個關於恐懼的問題:在一個觀點極端化、動輒被網路圍攻的時代,公開表達不受歡迎的觀點,會不會害怕。

克魯格曼的回答是:一直害怕。不難想象某種情形下自己會成為靶子。然後他自嘲說,自己是仇恨郵件之王,收到過最驚人的通訊。

會影響他嗎?早期會,現在皮厚了。他甚至開玩笑說,如果一篇專欄發出去沒有招來一波罵聲,那一天大概就浪費了。

給別人的建議,他分了兩類。對多數經濟學家,答案是做好研究。公共知識分子這活,多數人不該去做,也不該去試。他很慶幸自己直到快五十歲才進入這一行,最好的做法是把思維最靈活的那幾十年用來對付深層問題,而不是對付推特暴民。

至於寫作本身,他的信條很乾脆:像沒人在看一樣跳舞。寫你相信是對的東西,儘量寫得清楚、有說服力,但別因為有人要說難聽的話就被嚇住。你要是顧慮批評,這活就沒法幹。

節目最後,Lex 引了《國富論》裡那段最著名的話。我們能吃上晚飯,靠的是屠夫、釀酒師和麵包師對自身利益的關切,跟他們的仁慈沒什麼關係。我們訴諸的是他們的自愛,從不跟他們談我們的需要,只談他們的好處。

這段話放在整場對話的末尾很合適。克魯格曼一輩子都在解釋這個機制的強大之處,也一輩子都在解釋它的邊界在哪裡。

如果只帶走幾件能用的東西

  • 看到"技術必然導致失業"這類論斷,先查生產率資料。總產出除以總工時的趨勢線,比任何一篇關於未來的文章都誠實。生產率沒有明顯加速,說明替代效應還沒到顛覆性的量級。
  • 遇到跨國的制度差異,先找"技術相同、選擇不同"的對照組。丹麥和美國用同樣的技術、面對同樣的全球化,工會化率一個是三分之二,一個是個位數。這類對照能立刻把"自然規律"和"政策選擇"分開。
  • 評估一項公共政策時,把"是否普遍覆蓋"當成一個獨立變數看,而不只看金額。不問問題就發放的制度,同時買到了尊嚴和政治可持續性,這兩樣東西在設計定向補貼時最容易被犧牲掉。
  • 判斷某個行業該不該交給市場,先過一遍阿羅 1963 年那份清單:雙方是否充分知情,是否有能力做明智判斷,是否理解自己在幹什麼。醫療在每一項上都不合格,教育也差不多。這個檢查比意識形態標籤好用得多。
  • 面對"兩邊都有道理"的呼籲,先分辨爭議的層級。是價值層面的分歧(羅爾斯式的結果公平,還是過程公平),還是事實層面的分歧(稅率對勞動供給的實際彈性)。第一層可以長期共存,第二層應該由證據裁決。
  • 做公共表達時,把仇恨郵件的數量當成噪音,不當訊號。它衡量的是話題的陣營敏感度,跟論點的質量關係不大。
  • 如果你還在職業生涯的前二十年,把這段時間押在深問題上。公共寫作隨時可以開始,而思維最靈活的那段視窗不會重來。
文稿由本站用語音識別模型(基於官方釋出音訊)機器轉寫,可能有識別錯誤,人名與數字請以音訊為準。
[00:00:00] The following is a conversation with Paul Krugman, Nobel Prize winner in economics, professor CUNY and columnist at The New York Times. His academic work centers around international economics, economics, geography, liquidity traps and currency crises. But he also is an outspoken writer and commentator on the intersection of modern day politics and economics, which places him in the middle of the tense, divisive, modern day political discourse. If you have clicked dislike on this video and started writing a comment of derision before listening to the conversation, I humbly ask that you please unsubscribe from this channel and from this podcast, not because you're conservative, a libertarian or liberal, a socialist, an anarchist, but because you're not open to new ideas, at least in this case, especially at its most difficult from people with whom you largely disagree. [00:00:56] I do my best to stay away from politics of the day because political discourse is filled with the degree of emotion and self-assured certainty that to me is not conducive to exploring questions that nobody knows the definitive right answer to the role of government, the impact of automation, the regulation of tech, the medical system, guns, war, trade, foreign policy are not easy topics. I have no clear answers despite the certainty of the so-called experts, the pundits, the trolls, the media personalities and the conspiracy theorists. [00:01:33] Please listen, empathize and allow yourself to explore ideas with curiosity and with our judgment and without derision. I will speak with many more economists and political thinkers trying to stay away from the political battles of the day and instead look at the long arc of history and the lessons it reveals in this. I appreciate your patience and support. This is the artificial intelligence podcast, if you enjoy it, subscribe on YouTube. Good five stars, an Apple podcast, follow on Spotify, supported on page one or simply connect with me on Twitter. [00:02:11] And Lex Friedman spelled F.R. Idi Amin. I recently started doing ads at the end of the introduction. I'll do one or two minutes after introducing the episode and never any ads in the middle that can break the flow of the conversation. I hope that works for you and doesn't hurt the listening experience. This show is presented by Kashyap, the number one finance app in the App Store, Kashyap Leslie said, My friends buy Bitcoin and invest in the stock market with fractional share trading, allowing you to buy one dollars worth of stock no matter what the stock price is. [00:02:46] Broker's services are provided by cash up investing. A subsidiary of Square and member SIPC get cash out from the App Store and Google Play and use the code leks podcast. You'll get ten dollars in cash. Will also donate ten dollars. The first one of my favorite organizations that is helping to advance robotics and stem education for young people around the world since Kashyap does fractional share trading. Let me say that to me it's a fascinating concept. The order execution algorithm that works behind the scenes to create the abstraction of fractional orders for the investor is an algorithmic marvel. [00:03:25] So big props to the Kashyap engineers for that. I like it when tech teams solve complicated problems to provide, in the end, a simple, effortless interface that abstracts away all the details of the underlying algorithm. And now here's my conversation with Paul Krugman. What does a perfect world, a utopia from an economic perspective, look like? Wow, I don't really I don't believe in perfection. I mean, somebody once once said that his ideal was slightly imaginary Sweden. [00:04:18] I mean, I like an economy that has a a really high safety net for people, good environmental regulation, and, uh, you know, not something that's not that's kind of like. [00:04:33] Some of the better run countries in the world but have with fixing all of the smaller things that are wrong with them. [00:04:40] What about wealth distribution? [00:04:42] Well, obviously, you know, total quality is is neither possible nor, I think, especially desirable. [00:04:48] But I think you want one where basically one where nobody is nobody is hurting and where everybody lives in the same material universe. Everybody is basically living in the same society. So I think it's a bad thing to have people who are so wealthy that they're really not in the same world as the rest of us. [00:05:08] What about competition? You see the value of competition and what may be its limits? Oh, competition is great when it can work. [00:05:16] I mean, there's a I remember I'm old enough to remember when there was only one phone company and there was really limited choice. [00:05:26] And I think the arrival of multiple, uh, multiple phone carriers, uh, and all of that has actually been a really good thing. And that's that's true across many areas. [00:05:38] But not every industry is not every activity suitable for competition. [00:05:43] So there are some things like health care where competition actually doesn't work. [00:05:48] And so it's it it's not one size fits all. It's interesting. [00:05:53] What is competition, not work in in health care? [00:05:58] Oh, there's a long list. I mean, there's a famous paper by Kenneth Arrow for nineteen sixty three, which still holds up very well where he kind of runs down the list of things you need for competition to work. Well basically both sides to every transaction being well informed, having, you know, the ability to make intelligent decisions, understanding what's going on. And health care fails on every dimension. [00:06:23] You get health care. So not health insurance, health care. [00:06:25] Well, both health care and health insurance, health insurance being part of it, but no health insurance is. [00:06:31] It is really the idea that there's effective competition between health insurers is wrong in health care. I mean, the idea that you can comparison shop for four major surgery is is just, you know, it it's to when people say things like that, you you wonder, are you living in the same world I'm living in? [00:06:50] You know that the piece of well informed that was always an interesting piece for me. Just observing as an outsider, because so much beautiful, such a beautiful world is possible and everybody's well informed. [00:07:04] A question for you is, how hard is it to be well-informed about anything, whether it's health care or any kind of purchasing decisions or just life in general in this world? Oh, information. [00:07:16] You know, it varies hugely. I mean, there's more information at your fingertips than ever before in history. [00:07:24] The trouble is, first of all, that some of that information isn't true. So it's really hard and and then some of it is just too hard to understand. [00:07:35] So if I'm if I'm buying a car, I can actually probably do a pretty good job of looking up, you know, going to Consumer Reports reviews. You can get a pretty good idea of what you're getting when you get a car. [00:07:47] If I'm going in for surgery, first of all, it's fairly often it happens when without your able being able to plan it. [00:07:58] But also there's a, you know, medical school takes many, many years. And going on the Internet for some advice is not usually a very good substitute. [00:08:09] So speaking about news and not being able to trust certain sources of information, how much disagreement is there about I mentioned utopia, perfection in the beginning, but how much disagreement is there about what Utopia looks like? [00:08:24] Or is most of the disagreement simply about the path to get there? [00:08:28] Oh, I think there's two levels of disagreement. One. Maybe not utopia, but justice. You know, what is a just society. And that's there are different views. [00:08:41] I mean, I teach my students that there are, you know, broadly speaking, two views of justice. [00:08:47] One focuses on on outcomes. [00:08:51] But you ask it's a just society is the one you would choose if you were trying to what the one that you would choose to live in if you didn't know who you were going to be. [00:09:03] And that's kind of John Rawls and the other focus on process that just society is one in which there is no no coercion except where absolutely necessary. [00:09:14] And there's no there's no objective way to choose between those. I'm pretty much a rolls in and I think many people are playing with it. [00:09:22] There's so there's a legitimate dispute about what what we mean by a just society anyway. [00:09:29] But then there's also a lot of dispute about what actually works there. There's a range of legitimate dispute. [00:09:37] I mean, any card carrying economist will say that incentives matter, but how much do they matter? How much does a higher tax rate actually deter people from working? [00:09:49] How much does a stronger safety net actually lead people to to to to get lazy? [00:09:56] I have a pretty strong view that the evidence is points to conclusions that are considerably to the left of of where most of our politicians are. But but there is legitimate room for disagreement on those things. [00:10:13] So you've mentioned outcomes. What are some metrics you think about the keep in mind, like the Gini coefficient, but really anything that measures how good we're doing, whatever we're trying to do, what are the metrics to keep an eye on? [00:10:29] Well, I'm actually I'm not a fan of the Gini coefficient, not because. What is the Gini coefficient? Yeah, the Gini coefficient is a is a measure of inequality and it is commonly used because it's a single number. [00:10:42] It usually tracks with other measures. [00:10:46] But the trouble is there's no sort of natural interpretation of it. [00:10:52] You asked me what you know what what does a society with a genie of zero point four or five look like as opposed to a society with a genie of point two five? [00:11:01] And I can tell you, you know, one point twenty five is Denmark and point four or five is Brazil. [00:11:07] But it's that's a really it is no sort of easy way to do that mapping. [00:11:14] I mean, I look at things like what is first of all, things like what is the income of the the the median family? [00:11:24] Uh, what is the income of the top one percent? [00:11:27] How many people are in poverty by various measures of poverty? And then I think we want to look at. [00:11:35] Questions like how healthy are people, how how is life expectancy doing and how satisfied are people with their lives? [00:11:47] Because there is you know, it's that the sounds like a squishy no, not so much happiness. It turns out the life satisfaction is a better measure than happiness, but life satisfaction that there is quite a lot. [00:11:58] And I think I think it's meaningful, if not too rigorous to to say, look, according to that kind of according to polling, people in Denmark are pretty satisfied with their lives and people in the United States, not so much so. [00:12:16] And of course, Sweden wins every time. No, actually, Denmark wins these animals. Denmark and Norway tend to win these days. [00:12:23] Sweden doesn't do badly. [00:12:24] But there, there, there it's none of these are are perfect. [00:12:29] But look, I think by and large, I think there's a bit of a pornography test if you. How do you know a decent society? Well, you kind of know when you see it, right. [00:12:41] Where does America stand and that we are having reman our society. [00:12:46] I mean, it's there are a lot of virtues to America, but there's a level of harshness, brutality and ability for somebody who just has bad luck to fall off the edge. [00:13:00] That is really shouldn't be happening in a country as rich as ours. [00:13:06] So we we have somehow managed to produce a crueller society than almost any other wealthy country for no good reason. [00:13:17] What do you think is lacking in the safety net that the United States provides? There's a harshness to it. And what what are the benefits and maybe limits of a safety net in a country like ours? [00:13:31] Well, every other advanced country has some universal guarantee of adequate health care. [00:13:36] The United States is the only place where citizens can actually fail to get basic health care because they can't afford it. That's that's that's why it's not hard to do. Everybody else does. But we don't. We've gotten a little bit better at it than we were. But still, that's that's a big deal. [00:13:54] We have remarkably weak support for, um, for children. [00:14:02] We most countries have substantial safety. You know, parents of young children get much more support elsewhere. [00:14:10] They get often nothing in the U.S. we have limited care for people. Long term care for for the elderly is a very hit and miss thing. [00:14:24] But I think that the really big issues are that we don't take care of children who make the mistake of having the wrong parents, and we don't take care of people who make the mistake of getting sick. And those are those are things that a country rich countries should be doing. [00:14:43] Sorry for sort of a question, but what you just said kind of feels like the right thing to do in terms of a just society. But is it also good for the economic health of society to take care of? Take care. [00:14:59] The people who are the unfortunate members of society, by and large, it looks like the the doing the right thing in terms of justice is also the right thing. [00:15:10] In terms of economics. [00:15:12] If we're talking about a society that has extremely high tax rates that deter, you know, remove all incentives to provide a safety net that is so generous that why bother working or striving? [00:15:27] That could be a problem. [00:15:28] But I don't actually know any society that looks like that. [00:15:32] Even even in European countries with very generous safety nets, people work and hide and innovate and do all of these things. [00:15:40] And there's a lot of evidence now that lacking those basics is actually destructive, that children who grow up without adequate health care, without adequate nutrition, are developmentally challenged. [00:15:55] They don't live up to their potential as adults so that the United States actually probably pays a price. [00:16:01] You know, we're we're we're harsh, we're cruel, and we actually make ourselves poorer by as a society, not just the individuals, by by being so harsh and cruel. [00:16:11] OK, so invisible hand Smith. Where does that fit in the power of just people acting selfishly and somehow everything, taking care of itself to where, you know, the economy grows? Nobody there's no cruelty, no injustice that the markets themselves regulate themselves. What is is their power to that idea and where what are its limits? There's a lot of power to that. [00:16:39] I mean, there's a reason why I don't think sensible people want the government running steel mills or they want the government to own the farms. [00:16:50] Right. [00:16:51] The way the markets are a pretty effective way of getting incentives aligned, of inducing people to do stuff that works. [00:17:03] And the invisible hand is saying that, you know, people farmers aren't growing crops because they want to feed people. They're growing crops because they can make money by it. But it actually turns out to be a pretty good way of getting of getting agricultural products grown. [00:17:18] So the invisible hand is an important part, but it's not there's nothing mystical about it. It's a it's a mechanism. It's a way to organize economic activity which works well, given a bunch of preconditions, which means that it actually works well for agriculture. [00:17:34] It works well for manufacturing. It works well for many services. It doesn't work well for health care. It doesn't work well for education. [00:17:43] So there are we having a society which is kind of three quarters invisible hand and one quarter invisible hand seems to be something something on that order seems to be the balance that works best. It's just don't want to you don't want to romanticize or, you know, make something mystical out of it. [00:18:06] It's just this is is one way to organize stuff that happens to have broad but not universal application. [00:18:13] So then forgive me for romanticizing it, but it does seem pretty magical that, you know, I kind of have an intuitive understanding of what happens when you have like five, ten, maybe even one hundred people together, the dynamics of that. [00:18:26] But the fact that these large society of people, for the most part, acting in a self-interested way and maybe electing representatives for themselves, that it all kind of seems to work is pretty magical. [00:18:39] The fact that there's that right now, there's, uh, uh, a wide assortment of fresh fruit and vegetables, uh, uh, in you know, in at the in the local markets up and down the street, you know, who's who's planning that. [00:18:57] And the answer is nobody. That's the whole that's the invisible hand at work. And that's great. [00:19:01] And, um, and that's a lesson that's that Adam Smith figured out more than two hundred years ago. [00:19:08] And it's it continues to apply in the book. You know, even Adam Smith, uh, has a section in his book about why it's important to regulate banks. So the invisible hand has its limits. Yeah. And that example is actually a powerful one in terms of the supermarket food. That was my experience coming from Russia, from the Soviet Union is when I first entered a supermarket and just seeing the assortment of fruit bananas. Yeah, I don't think I've seen bananas before, first of all. [00:19:39] But just the selection of fresh fruit was just mind blowing and it beyond words and the fact that, like you said, I don't know what made that happen. [00:19:49] Well, there is some magic to the market, but the others as showing my age. But, you know, the old movie quote, sometimes the magic works and sometimes it doesn't. And you have to have some idea of when it doesn't. [00:20:01] So how do you get regulation? Right. How what can government at its best to government? Strangely enough, in this country today seems to get a bad rap like everyone seems to everybody's against the government. [00:20:18] Yeah, well, a lot of money has been spent on making people hate the government. [00:20:21] But the reality is government does some things pretty well. [00:20:25] I mean, we, uh, government does health insurance pretty well. So much so. I mean, given our anti-government bias, it really is true that there are people out there saying don't let the government get its hands on Medicare. So government that people actually love the government health insurance program far more than they love private health insurance, basic education. [00:20:51] It turns out that your local public high school is the right place to have students trained and private for certainly for profit. [00:21:02] Education is is a by and large, a nightmare of of rip offs and and grift. And people are not getting what they thought they were paying for. [00:21:16] It's just my case and it's funny. [00:21:18] There are things I mean, everybody talks, there's talks about the DMV as being how do you want the economy? [00:21:26] And actually, my experiences at the DMV have always been positive. [00:21:30] Maybe I'm just going to the right DMV. [00:21:32] But in fact, a lot of government works pretty well. [00:21:35] So it is you have to to some extent, you can do these things on apriori grounds. [00:21:41] You can talk about the logic of why health care is not going to be handled well by the market. [00:21:46] But partly it's just experience. We tried or at least some countries have tried nationalizing their steel industries. That didn't go well, but we've tried privatizing education and that didn't go well. So you find out what works. [00:22:00] What about this new world of tech? How do you see what do you think works for tech? Is it more regulation or less regulation? [00:22:09] There are some things that need more regulation. [00:22:13] I mean, we're finding out that, uh, the world of social media is is one in which compared competitive forces aren't working very well. [00:22:25] And trusting the companies to regulate themselves isn't working very well. [00:22:30] But I'm, on the whole, a tech skeptic, not in the sense that I think the tech doesn't work and it doesn't do stuff. But the idea that we're living through greater technological change than ever before is really an illusion. [00:22:44] We've ever since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, we've had a series of epical shifts in the nature of work and in in the kinds of jobs that are available. [00:22:56] And it's not at all clear that what we're what's happening now is any bigger or faster or harder to cope with than past shocks. [00:23:06] It is a popular notion in today's sort of public discourse that automation is going to have a huge impact on the job market. Now, there is something, something transformational happening now. [00:23:20] He talk about that, maybe elaborate a little bit more. [00:23:25] Do you not see the software revolutions happening now with with machine learning, availability of data, that kind of automation, being able to sort of process clean, find patterns in data and, you know, you don't see that disrupting any one sector to a point where there's a huge loss of jobs? [00:23:48] Well, there may be some things. [00:23:50] I mean, actually, you know, translators, there's certainly reduced demand for translators because with machine translation, they aren't perfect, but it ain't bad. [00:23:58] Um, there are some kinds of things that are changed, but, uh. [00:24:06] It's not overall productivity growth has actually been slow in recent years, not it's been much slower than than in some past periods. [00:24:16] So the idea that automation is taking away all the jobs, that counterpart would be that we would be able to produce stuff with many fewer workers than before. And that's not happening. There are a few isolated sectors. There are some kinds of of jobs that that are going away. But that keeps on happening. [00:24:33] I mean, the New York City used to have thousands and thousands of longshoremen taking stuff off of ships and putting them on ships. They're almost all gone now. [00:24:46] Now you have these giant cranes taking containers on and off ships in Elizabeth, New Jersey. [00:24:53] That's not robots. [00:24:56] It doesn't doesn't sound high tech, but it actually pretty much destroyed an occupation. [00:25:03] Well, you know, that was it wasn't fun for the longshoremen, to say the least. [00:25:06] And but it's not we coped. We moved on. And that that sort of thing happens all the time. [00:25:14] You mean farmers? We we we used to be a nation which was mostly farmers. [00:25:20] There are now very few farmers left. [00:25:23] The and the reason is not that we've stopped eating, it's that farming has become so efficient that we don't need a lot of farmers and coped with that, too. So the idea that there's something qualitatively different about what's happening now so far isn't true. [00:25:41] So, yeah, your intuition is there is going to be a loss of jobs, but it's just the thing that just continues. So, you know, there's nothing qualitatively different about this. [00:25:50] Some jobs will be lost. Jobs will be created, as has always been the case so far. Maybe there's a singularity. Maybe there's a moment when when the machines get smarter than we are and tech kills us all or something like that. [00:26:03] But that's not visible in anything we're seeing now. [00:26:08] You mentioned the metric of productivity. Could you explain that a little bit, because it's a really interesting one. I've heard you mentioned that before, the connection with automation. So what is that metric? And if there is something qualitatively different, what should we see in that metric? [00:26:23] Well, OK, productivity, first of all, production. [00:26:26] We do have a measure of the economy's total production, you know, real GDP, which is itself that's a little bit of a construct because it's quite literally it's adding apples and oranges. [00:26:39] So we have to add together various things, which we basically do by using market prices, but we try to adjust for inflation. [00:26:47] But it's kind of it's a reasonable measure of how much the economy is producing. [00:26:51] Goods started to drop as the goods and services and services its everything OK, productivity is he divide that total output by the number of hours worked. [00:27:02] So we're basically asking how much how much stuff does the average worker produce? [00:27:08] An hour of work. [00:27:09] And if you're seeing really rapid technological progress, then you'd expect to see productivity rising at a rapid clip, which we did for the generation after World War Two. [00:27:21] Productivity rose two percent a year on a sustained basis. Then it dropped down for a while. [00:27:29] Then there was a kind of a decade of fairly rapid growth from the mid 90s to the mid 2000s, and then it dropped off again. [00:27:37] And it's not it's not impressive right now. So you're just not seeing an epical shift in the economy. [00:27:45] So let me then ask you about the psychology of blaming automation. A few months ago, you wrote in The New York Times, quote, The other day, I found myself, as I often do at a conference discussing lagging wages and soaring inequality. There was a lot of interesting discussion, but one thing that struck me was how many of the participants just assumed that robots are a big part of the problem, that machines are taking away the good jobs or even jobs in general. [00:28:11] For the most part, this wasn't even presented as a hypothesis, just as part of what everyone knows. [00:28:16] Yeah. [00:28:17] So why is maybe Keynes psychoanalyse or the public intellectuals or economists or asexually in the general public, why this is happening, why this assumption is just infiltrated public discourse? [00:28:35] There's a couple of things. [00:28:36] One is that the particular technologies that are advancing now are ones that are a lot more visible to the chattering class. [00:28:47] The you know, when you had a when containerisation did away with the jobs of longshoremen. Well, not a whole lot of college professors are close friends with longshoremen. Right. And so so we see this one. [00:29:01] Then there is a second thing, which is we just went through a severe financial crisis in a period of very high. [00:29:08] Unemployment has finally come down. The there's really no question that that high unemployment was about macroeconomics, it was about a failure of demand, but macroeconomics is really non-intuitive. [00:29:22] Intuitive people just have a hard time wrapping their minds around it. [00:29:26] And among other things, people have a hard time believing that something as trivial as well, people just aren't spending enough can lead to the kind of mass misery that we saw in the 1930s or the not quite so severe, but still serious misery that we saw after 2008. [00:29:41] And there's always a tendency to say it must be something big, it must be technological change. That means we don't need workers anymore. That was a lot of that in the 30s. [00:29:50] And that same thing happened after 2008. The assumption that it has to be something some deep cause, not something as trivial as a failure of investor confidence and inadequate monetary and fiscal response. [00:30:05] And the last thing on wages did a lot of what's happened on wages is at some level political. It's the collapse of the union movement. [00:30:16] It's the it's policies that have squeezed workers bargaining power. [00:30:20] And for obvious reasons, there are a lot of influential people who don't want to hear that story. They want it to be an inevitable force of nature. [00:30:30] Technology has made it impossible to have people earn middle class wages. [00:30:35] And they so they don't they don't like they they don't like the story that says actually, no, it's kind of the political decisions that we made that have caused this this income stagnation. And so there are a receptive audience for technological determinism. So what comes first, in your view of the economy or politics in terms of what has impact on the other? [00:30:58] Oh, they look at everything interacts on one of the rules of that. I was taught in economics. Everything everything affects everything else in at least two ways. [00:31:08] But the the I mean, clearly, the economy drives a lot of political stuff. [00:31:17] But also clearly politics has a huge impact on on on the economy here. You know, we we look at the decline of unions in America and say, well, you know, the world has changed and unions don't have a role. [00:31:32] But, you know, two thirds of workers in Denmark are unionized and Denmark has the same technology and faces the same global economy that we do is just a difference in political choices that leads to that difference. [00:31:44] So I actually teach a course here at CUNY on the economics of the welfare state, which is about things like health care and retirement and to some extent wage policy and so on. [00:31:56] And the message I keep on trying to drive home is that, look, all advanced countries have got roughly equal competence. [00:32:04] We don't have the same technology, but we make very different choices. Not that America always makes the wrong choices. We do some things pretty well. Our retirement system is is one of the better ones. But but the point is that there's a huge amount of political choice involved and in the shape of the economy. [00:32:23] What is what is a welfare state? [00:32:25] Well, welfare state is the old term that but it basically refers to all the programs that are there to mitigate, if you like, the the risks and injustices of the market economy. [00:32:40] So the US welfare state is Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, minimum wages, food stamps. [00:32:46] When you say welfare state, my first sort of feeling is a negative one. Well, that's what I like all. I probably generally, at least theoretically, like all the welfare programs. Well, that's it's been demonized. [00:33:00] And to some extent, I'm being a little doing a little bit of a thumbing my nose at all of that by just using the term welfare state, although it's not as say, yeah, I got you. [00:33:12] But everybody, every advanced country actually has a lot of of of welfare state than the US. [00:33:18] I mean, we, uh, uh, that's a fundamental part of the fabric of our society. [00:33:23] Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid are just things we take for granted as part of the scene. [00:33:30] And so if you you know, there's a lot of there's people on the right wing who are saying, oh, it's it's all socialism. [00:33:40] And, uh, well, I guess I mean, what you want them to mean and we just just today, I, I told my class about the on the record that Ronald Reagan made in 1961, warning that Medicare would destroy American freedom and but sort of didn't happen. [00:34:04] On the topic of welfare state, what are your thoughts on universal basic income? And that's sort of a. [00:34:11] Not a generic, but a universal safety net of this kind, there's always a trade off when we talk about social safety net programs, there's always a trade off between universality, which is clean, but means that you're giving a lot of money to people who don't necessarily need it and some kind of targeting, which makes it easier to get to to deal with the crucial problems with limited resources. [00:34:41] But but both has incentive problems and kind of political and I would say even psychological issues. [00:34:50] So the great thing about Social Security and Medicare is no questions asked. You don't you don't have to prove that you need them. [00:35:02] It just comes. You know, I didn't. I'm on Medicare, allegedly. I mean, it's run through my my, uh, my, my New York Times health insurance. But, you know, I didn't have to file an application with the Medicare office to prove that I needed it. It just happened when I turned 65. [00:35:21] There's that's good for dignity and it's also good for the political support because everybody gets Medicare. [00:35:30] On the other hand, if you and we can do that with health care to give everybody a guarantee of an income, that's enough to live on comfortably, what that's a lot of money. [00:35:45] What about enough income to carry you over to difficult periods, like if you lose a job, that kind? [00:35:54] Well, we have unemployment insurance and I think our unemployment insurance is too short lived and too stingy. [00:36:00] It would be better to have a more comprehensive unemployment insurance benefit. [00:36:07] But the trouble with with something like universal basic income is that either the bar is set too low. [00:36:14] So it's really not something you can live on or it's an enormously expensive program. [00:36:19] And so at this point, I think that we can do far better by building on the kinds of safety net programs we have. I mean, food stamps, earned income tax credit, we should have a lot more family support policies. [00:36:34] Those things can deal with can do a lot more to really diminish the amount of misery in this country. [00:36:41] UBI is something that is being I mean, it goes kind of hand in hand with with this belief that the robots are going to take all of our jobs. [00:36:52] And if that was really happening, then then I might reconsider my views on UPI, but I don't see that happening. [00:36:58] So are you happy with discourse that's going on now in terms of politics? You mentioned a few political candidates. Is is the kind of thing going on and on both on Twitter and debates in the media through the written word is a spoken word. How do you assess the public discourse now in terms of politics? [00:37:20] We're in a fragmented world, so much more so, more so than ever before. So at this point, the public discourse that you see if if you're if Fox News is your principal news source, is is very different from the one you get if you read The New York Times. [00:37:43] On the whole, my sense is that mainstream political reporting, policy reporting is a not too great but be better than it's ever been because of when I first got into the pundit business, it was just awful. [00:38:00] Lots of things just never got covered. [00:38:02] And if things did get covered, it was always both sides. [00:38:06] I mean, it's the line that comes back from me writing during the 2000 campaign was that if one of the candidates said that the earth was flat, the headline, would these views differ on shape of planet? [00:38:19] I mean, it's and it's that's less true. There's still a fair bit of that out there, but it's less true than there used to be. [00:38:25] And there are more people reporting, writing on on policy issues who actually understand them than ever before. [00:38:35] So that's good. But I still I have how much the. [00:38:42] Typical voter is actually informed, unclear. [00:38:48] I mean, the the the Democratic debates, I think we I'm hoping that we finally get down to having a not having twenty seven people on the stage or whatever it is they have. [00:39:03] But yeah, they're reasonably substantive, certainly better than before. [00:39:09] And while there's a lot of still, you know, theater criticism instead of actual analysis and the reporting, it's it's not as totally dominant as in the past. [00:39:20] Can I ask a maybe a dumb question, but from an open minded perspective, when you know people on the left and people on the right, I think view the other the others as sometimes complete idiots. Yeah. What do we do with that? You know, is it possible that the people on the right are correct about their what they currently believe? [00:39:53] Is that kind of open mindedness helpful or is this division long term productive for us to sort of have this food fight? [00:40:05] Well, the trouble you have to confront is that there's a lot of stuff that just is false out there and Buckman's extensive political allegiance. [00:40:16] So the idea, well, both sides need to listen to each other respectfully. [00:40:21] I'm happy to do that. When there's a view that is worthy of respect, but a lot of stuff is not, and so take economics is something where I think I know something and I'm not sure that I'm always right. [00:40:37] In fact, I know I've been wrong plenty of times, but I think there is a difference between economic views that are within the realm of we can we can actually have an interesting discussion and those that are just crank doctrines or things that are purely being disseminated because people are being paid to disseminate them. [00:41:03] So there are there are plenty of good serious center right economists that are happy to to talk to none of those center right economists has any role in the Trump administration, Trump administration and by and large, Republicans in Congress only want to listen to people who are cranks. [00:41:22] And so I I think it's being dishonest with my readers to to pretend otherwise. [00:41:28] There's no way I can reach out to people who think that that reading Ayn Rand novels, this is how you learn about monetary economics. [00:41:38] Let me linger on that point. So if you look at Ayn Rand. OK, so you said center right. What about extreme people who have, like, radical views? [00:41:45] You think they're not grounded in any kind of data and the kind of reality I'm just sort of curious about how open we should be to ideas that seem radical. [00:42:01] Oh, radical ideas is fine. But then you have to ask, is there some basis for the radicalism? [00:42:08] And if it's if it's a if it's something that is not grounded in anything, then and particularly, by the way, if it's something that's been refuted by evidence again and again, and the people just keep saying if it's a zombie idea and there's a lot of those out there, then there comes a point when it's not worth trying to fake respect for it. [00:42:33] I see. So there's a through the scientific process, you've shown that this idea does not hold water. But I like the idea that zombie ideas, but they live on through. It's like the idea that the earth is flat, for example, has been, for the most part, disproven. [00:42:49] Yeah, but it lives on actually growing in popularity currently. [00:42:55] Yeah. And there's a lot of that out there. And you can't you can't wish it away. And it's you're not being fair to either yourself or if you're somebody who writes for the public, you're not being fair to your readers to pretend otherwise. [00:43:09] So quantum mechanics is a strange theory, but it's testable. And so while being strange is widely accepted amongst physicists. How robust and testable are economic theories if we compare them to quantum mechanics and physics and so on? [00:43:28] OK, economics, look, it's a complex system and it's also one in which, by and large, you don't get to do experiments. [00:43:36] And so economics is never going to be like quantum mechanics. [00:43:41] That said, you get natural experiments, you get tests of rival doctrines. [00:43:48] You know, in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis, there was one style one, one basic theory of macroeconomics, which ultimately goes back to John Maynard Keynes. That made a few predictions. [00:44:02] It said, under these circumstances, printing money will not be inflationary. Running big budget deficits will not cause a rise in interest rates. Slashing government spending. Austerity policies will lead to two depressions if tried. [00:44:21] Other people had, you know, exactly the opposite predictions and we got a fairly robust test and one one theory, one interest rate stayed low, inflation stayed low, austerity countries that implemented harsh austerity policies suffered severe economic downturns. [00:44:40] Don't get much. You know, that's that's pretty clear. And that's not going to be true on everything. [00:44:46] But there's a lot of empirical I mean, the younger economists these days are very heavy, heavily data base, and it's and that's great. And I'm I think that's that's the way to go. [00:45:00] What theories of economics are is there currently a lot of disagreement about what you said? [00:45:05] Oh, um, first of all, there's just a lot less disagreement, really, among serious researchers in economics than people imagine when we actually we can track that the Chicago Booth School has a panel, an ideologically diverse panel, and they post regularly posed questions. [00:45:24] And on most things there there's a huge there's remarkable consensus. [00:45:30] There's lots of of things where there people imagine that there's dispute. But the the illusion of dispute is something that's basically being fed by political forces. [00:45:41] And there isn't really I mean, there are, I think, questions about what are effective ways to regulate. [00:45:52] Technology industries, we really don't know the answers there, there is or look. [00:46:04] I don't follow every part, minimum wages, I think there is there is a pretty overwhelming evidence that that a modest increase in the minimum wage from current levels would be would not have any noticeable adverse effect on on jobs. [00:46:22] But if you ask how high can it go? Twelve dollars seems pretty safe, given what we know. [00:46:30] Fifteen is fifteen. [00:46:31] OK. There's some legitimate disagreement there, I think. [00:46:35] Probably, but but I people have a point twenty where where is the line at which it starts to become a problem. [00:46:42] And the answer is truly we don't know. [00:46:45] It's fascinating to try to such a cool economics school in that sense because you're trying to predict something that hasn't been done before. The impact, the effects of something that hasn't been done before. Yeah, you're trying it. [00:46:57] You're going out of sample. And we have good reason to believe that that there are you know, that it's non-linear, that there comes a point at which it doesn't work the way it has in the past. [00:47:08] So as an economist, how do you see science and technological innovation? When I took various economics courses in college, technological innovation seemed like a no brainer way of growing an economy, and we should invest in it aggressively. I may be biased, but it seemed like the various ways to grow an economy seems like the easiest way, especially long term. Is that correct? And if so, why aren't we doing it more? [00:47:37] Well, that's OK. The first question is, yeah, I mean all. It's pretty much overwhelming. We think we can more or less measure this, although there are some assumptions involved, something like 70 to 80 percent of the growth and per capita income is is basically the advance of knowledge. [00:47:56] It's not just it's not just a crude accumulation of capital. It is it is the fact that we can get smarter. A lot of that, by the way, is more prosaic kinds of technology. [00:48:07] So, you know, we, uh, I like to talk about things like containerisation or, you know, an earlier period, the, uh, the invention of the flatpack cardboard box that had to be invented. [00:48:24] And and now all of your deliveries from Amazon are made possible by the existence of that technology. The Web stuff is important, too. But but what would we do without cardboard boxes? [00:48:36] So but all of that stuff is really important in driving economic progress. Well, why don't we invest more? Uh, why don't we invest more in it? [00:48:50] Again, more prosaic stuff? Why aren't why haven't we built another goddamn rail tunnel under the Hudson River? Uh, which is the for which the need is so totally, overwhelmingly obvious. How do you think about first of all, I don't even know what the word prosaic means, but I inferred it. But how do you think about it? Because it the really most basic dumb technology innovation, or is it just like the lowest hanging fruit of what benefit can be gained? [00:49:21] When I say prosaic, I mean stuff that is not sexy and fancy and High-Tech, it's building bridges and tunnels. Yeah. [00:49:32] Having inventing the cardboard box or the I don't know where do we put an easy pass in there. [00:49:45] That's it is. It is actually using some modern technology and all that, but it's not going to have I don't think you're going to make a movie about the about the fact that the guy, whoever it was that invented, easily passed. But but it's actually a pretty significant productivity booster to me. [00:50:03] It always seemed like something that everybody should be able to agree on and just invest. So like in the same way, the investment in the military in the DOD is huge. [00:50:19] Right? So everyone kind of not everyone. But there's a there's a there's an agreement amongst people that somehow that a large defense is important. [00:50:31] It always seemed to me like that should be shifted towards if you want to grow prosperity of the nation, you should be investing in knowledge. [00:50:42] Yes, prosaic stuff, infrastructure, investing in infrastructure and so on. I mean, inside linger on it. But do you have any intuition? Do you have hope that that changes? Do you have intuition why it's not changing? It's unclear. [00:50:56] And I have a theory. I'm reasonably certain that I understand why why we don't do it. And it's it's because because we have a real. [00:51:09] Values dispute about the welfare state, about how much the government should do to help the unfortunate and politicians believe. [00:51:21] Probably rightly, that there's a kind of halo effect that surrounds any kind of government intervention that even though providing people with. [00:51:32] Enhanced Social Security benefits is really very different from building a tunnel under the Hudson River. Politicians of both parties seem to believe that the government is seen to be successful at doing one kind of thing. It will make people think more favorably on it, doing other kinds of things. [00:51:49] And so we have conservatives tend to be opposed to any kind of increase in government spending except military, no matter how obviously a good idea it is, because they fear that it's the thin end of the wedge for bigger government in general. [00:52:06] And to some extent, liberals tend to favor spending on these things, partly because they see it as a way of proving that government can do things well and therefore it can turn to broader social goals. It's clearly there's a, if you like, the what you might have thought would be a technocratic discussion about government investment, both in research and in infrastructure, is contaminated by the fact that government is government and people link it to other government actions. Perhaps silly question, but as a species, we're currently working on venturing out into space one day, colonizing Mars, so when we start a society on Mars from scratch, what political and economic system should operate under? [00:52:59] Oh, I'm a big believer in. First of all, I don't think we're actually going to do that. [00:53:03] But let's let's imagine hypothesize that we colonize Mars or something. [00:53:09] Look, representative democracy is, uh, versus pure democracy. [00:53:18] Well, yeah. [00:53:19] Pure democracy where people vote directly on everything is is really problematic because people don't have time to, uh, to, uh, to try and master every issue. I mean, we can see where government by referendum looks like. There's a lot of that. [00:53:35] And in California, and it's it doesn't work so good because it's hard to explain to people the various things they vote for may conflict. So representative democracy is it? [00:53:49] It's got lots of problems. [00:53:52] And I kind of the Winston Churchill thing, right. It's the worst system we know except for all the others. [00:53:59] But so, yeah, sticking with a representative. And basically, the American system of regulation and markets and the economy we have going on is a pretty good one for Mars. [00:54:12] If you start from scratch, if you just start from scratch, you wouldn't you wouldn't want a Senate where 60 percent of the population has half the seats. Uh, you probably would want one, which is, you know, more actually more representative than what we have. [00:54:29] And the details, it's unclear. [00:54:32] I mean, the we when times are good, all of the various representative democracy systems, whether it's parliamentary democracies or a US style system, whether you have a prime minister or the head of state as an elected president, they all kind of work well. And they all when times are good and they all have different modes of break down. So I'm not sure I know what the answer is. [00:54:58] But but something like that is, given what we've seen through history, it's the least bad system out there. [00:55:08] I mean, I don't know if you I'm a big fan of of the TV series The Expanse. And and it's kind of gratifying that out there, the the, uh, it's the Martian Congressional Republic. [00:55:25] OK, in a brief sense. So amongst many things, you're also an expert at international trade. What do you make of the the complexity? [00:55:40] So I can understand trade between two people, say two neighbouring farmers? It seems pretty straightforward to me. But international, we need to start talking about nations and nations. Trading seems to be very complicated. So from a high level, why is it so complicated what all the different factors that weigh the objectives need to be considered in international trade? And maybe feeding that into a question of do you have concerns about the two giants right now of the US and China and in the tension that's going on with international trade there, with the trade war? [00:56:19] Well, first of all, international trade is not really that different from trade among individuals where it's it it's vastly more complex. And there are there are many more players. But in the end, the reasons why countries trade are pretty much the same as the reasons why individuals trade countries trade because they're different and they can derive mutual advantage from constraining the things they do relatively well. [00:56:43] And also, there are economies of scale. [00:56:49] You know, you don't not individuals have to decide whether to be a surgeon or a or an accountant. It's probably not a good idea to try and be both. And countries benefit from specializing just because of the inherent advantages of specialization. And that's so now the fact it's a big world and the we're talking about millions of products being traded. And in today's world, often trade involves many stages. So that made in China iPhone, it is actually assembled from components that are made all over the world. [00:57:26] And, uh, but it doesn't really change the fundamentals all that much. [00:57:31] There's a recurrent I mean, the Baekje. The big. The dirty little secret of international trade conflict is that actually it's not conflicts among countries are really not that important. [00:57:46] Most trade is beneficial to both sides, to both countries, but it has big impacts on the distribution of income within countries. [00:57:57] So the growth of U.S. trade with China has made both U.S. and China richer. But it's been pretty bad for people who were employed in the North Carolina furniture industry who did find that their jobs were displaced by a wave of imports from China. And so that's where the complexity comes in. [00:58:20] Not at all clear to me. [00:58:23] I mean, we have some real problems with China, although they don't really involve trade so much as as things like respect for intellectual property are not clear that those real problems that we do have with China have anything to do with the current trade war. Trade war seems to be driven instead by a fundamentally wrong notion that when we sell goods to China, that's good. And when we buy goods from China, that's bad. And that's that's misunderstanding. The whole point is there is trade with China in both directions. [00:58:56] A good thing? [00:58:57] Yeah, we would be poorer if it wasn't for it. But but there are there are downsides as there are for any economic change. It's like any new technology makes us richer, but often hurts some. Some people trade with China, makes us richer, but hurts some people. And I wouldn't undo what has happened. [00:59:18] But I wish we had a better policy for supporting and compensating the losers from that growth. [00:59:26] So we live in a time of radicalization, of political ideas, Twitter mobs and so on. And yet here you are in the midst of it, both tweeting and writing in The New York Times articles with strong opinions writing this chaotic wave of public discourse. Do you ever hesitate or feel a tinge of fear for exploring your ideas publicly and unapologetically? [00:59:51] Oh, I feel fear all the time. It's not too hard to imagine scenarios in which this is you know, I might personally find myself kind of in the crosshairs. And I mean, I'm the I am the king of hate mail. [01:00:07] I get the most amazing correspondence. [01:00:11] Does it affect you? It did. It did when I started. These days, I've developed a very thick skin, so I know I don't usually get in fact, if I if I don't get a wave of hate mail after a column and then I probably wasted that that day. [01:00:28] So what do you make of that as a as a person who's putting ideas out there? If you look at the history of ideas, the way it works is you write about ideas, you put them out there. But now when there is so much hate mail, so much division, what advice do you have for yourself and for others trying to have a discussion about ideas, difficult ideas? [01:00:51] Well, I don't know about advice for others. I mean, if, you know, for most economists. [01:00:57] You know, just do your research. That's why we can't all be public intellectuals and we shouldn't try to be. And in fact, I'm glad that I didn't get into this business until I was and until I was in my late 40s. I mean, this is it's probably best to spend the the your decades of greatest intellectual flexibility addressing deep questions, not not confronting Twitter mobs and the, um. [01:01:27] And as for the rest, when I think when you're writing about stuff, the, uh, it's sort of, you know, dance like no one's watching. [01:01:37] Right. Like nobody is reading. Right. What's your what you think is right. Trying to make it obviously trying to make it comprehensible and persuasive. [01:01:45] But don't let yourself get intimidated by the fact that some people are going to say, say nasty things. It's, uh, you can't you can't do you can't do your job if you are worried about criticism. [01:02:05] Well, I think I speak for a lot of people and saying that I hope that you keep dancing like nobody's watching on Twitter and New York Times and books. So it's been an honor. Thank you so much for talking to a great. Thanks for listening to this conversation with Paul Krugman and thank you to presenting sponsor cash app, download it and use Cold Legs podcast. You'll get ten dollars and ten dollars will go to first, an organization that inspires and educates young minds to become science and technology innovators of tomorrow. [01:02:36] If you enjoy this podcast. Subscribe on YouTube. Five Stars, an Apple podcast. Follow on Spotify. Support on Patrón or simply connect with me on Twitter, Àlex Friedman. And now let me leave you some words from Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations, one of the most influential philosophers and economists in our history, it is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or the baker that we expect our dinner. But from their regard to their own interests, we address ourselves not to their humanity, but to their self-love and never talk to them of our necessities, but of their advantages. [01:03:17] Thank you for listening and hope to see you next time.

本集資源與出處