特別節目·中文精讀

埃隆·馬斯克:特斯拉自動駕駛

Elon Musk: Tesla Autopilot

馬斯克講述特斯拉自動駕駛的技術方案、感測器取捨與全自動駕駛的實現時間表。

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中文精讀由 AI 基於原始訪談改寫,非官方翻譯,可能存在偏差或錯誤;表述以原音訊與官方文稿為準。說明

2019年4月,Lex Fridman 和他在 MIT 的團隊釋出了一篇論文,研究司機使用特斯拉 Autopilot 時的“功能性警覺”。他們收集了超過18900次 Autopilot 接管行為的影片資料,逐幀標註:系統退出那一刻,司機有沒有把注意力放回路面,有沒有能力接住方向盤。

結論和過去幾十年關於自動化與人類警覺性的文獻預測相反。這些司機保持了功能性警覺,沒有出現人們擔心的那種滑坡:自動化越強,人越走神。

論文釋出後,特斯拉團隊主動聯絡了 Lex,提出讓他在播客裡跟埃隆·馬斯克聊一次。Lex 接受了,條件是問題自己定,公開什麼內容也自己定。他後來在節目開頭說,最終沒有刪掉任何有實質性的部分。

兩人在一件事上分歧明確:基於攝像頭的駕駛員監控,到底有沒有用。Lex 的立場是,實施得當的話,這類監控在短期和長期都有益。馬斯克的立場是,只要 Autopilot 的統計安全性遠遠超過人類,人的介入本身反而會拉低安全水平。

這個分歧幾乎貫穿了整場對話。馬斯克用了好幾個類比來支撐自己的判斷,其中一個是電梯。

兩臺革命同時發生:電動化,和自動化

把時間撥回2014年,Autopilot 的硬體第一次裝進特斯拉的車裡。馬斯克對這件事的願景,要放進一個更大的判斷裡才看得懂。

他認為汽車行業同時發生兩場革命。一場是電動化,另一場是自動化。在他的推演裡,未來任何一輛沒有自動駕駛能力的車,實用性都會變得像馬一樣。“並不是說完全沒用,只是變得稀有,變得有點小眾。”今天還有人養馬,那是有意為之。自動駕駛普及之後,還有人堅持自己開車,也會變成一種刻意選擇。

他甚至給這件事標了價:一輛自動駕駛汽車的價值,可能是沒有自動駕駛汽車的五到十倍。這個判斷至少覆蓋未來五年,也許十年。

從這個前提出發,要不要參與自動化革命,從產品層面的選擇變成了生死層面的選擇。不參與,你的車相對對手就會變得沒用。

儀表盤上那個渲染檢視,是一次健康檢查

Autopilot 早期有一個很有意思的設計決定:在儀表盤上、在 Model 3 的中控屏上,把感測器看到的世界渲染出來。車道線、周圍的車、紅綠燈,以向量的形式畫在螢幕上。

這個決定背後是什麼考慮?Lex 問。

馬斯克的回答很直接:整個顯示的意義,是給這輛車的現實感知做一次健康檢查。車從攝像頭、雷達、超聲波、GPS、IMU 收集資訊,把資訊渲染進向量空間,變成一個個帶屬性的物件。你坐在車裡,往窗外看一眼,再看一眼螢幕,就能確認這輛車到底知不知道周圍發生了什麼。

“這對讓人理解系統、跟系統融為一體,是很有力量的。”

Lex 追問:有沒有考慮過把不確定性也展示出來?計算機視覺在路上是有機率的,邊緣檢測、目標檢測,底層都帶著一組機率。把人眼看不到的那層不確定性畫出來,能不能幫普通人建立對計算機視覺的直覺?

馬斯克說他自己的車一直開除錯檢視。除錯檢視有兩種。一種是增強視覺,在識別到的物體周圍畫框、打標籤。另一種內部叫 visualizer,把所有感測器輸入彙總成向量空間表示,不顯示任何影象,只顯示車對世界的座標級理解。

他覺得第二種對普通人太難了。“他們根本不知道自己在看什麼。”所以最終呈現給普通使用者的,是最佳化過的那一版。得讓一個完全不懂計算機視覺的人,看一眼螢幕就知道車懂不懂。

開發版是另一回事。馬斯克自己的車跑開發版,能看到全部除錯資訊。“那些東西對大多數人來說就是天書。”

99% 的資料握在一家手裡

聊到資源分配,Lex 把 Autopilot 拆成三塊:演算法、資料、硬體。錢和時間都有限,怎麼分?

馬斯克的回答裡跳出一個數字。

特斯拉當時的車隊每天自動匯入海量資料。路上大約有40萬輛車,每輛裝了8個朝外的攝像頭、1個雷達、通常12個超聲波感測器,外加 GPS 和 IMU。這個規模正在逼近50萬輛。

他補了一句:不確定全世界還有多少輛在路上跑的車裝了同等規格的感測器套件,但如果超過5000輛,他會很意外。

換句話說,這個星球上99%的自動駕駛真實路況資料,握在一家公司手裡。

這個數字不一定精確到小數點,量級上的差距是實打實的。別的廠商要麼車隊太小,要麼感測器配置不一樣,要麼資料不上傳。資料飛輪一旦轉起來,落後的一方很難靠單純的工程能力追回來。

資料進來之後,還得有算力處理。特斯拉花了大約三年,做出自研的 FSD 晶片(Full Self-Driving Computer),處理能力是當時車上那套系統的整整一個數量級。替換方式簡單得很:把舊電腦拔下來,插上新電腦,就完了。老車主也能換。

馬斯克說,他們現在還在摸這塊晶片的能力邊界。讓所有攝像頭跑滿幀率、跑滿解析度、甚至不做影象裁剪,即便只用其中一顆晶片,依然有餘量。

FSD 計算機其實是兩臺計算機,兩顆系統級晶片,完全冗餘。馬斯克的描述很形象:你基本可以一槍打穿這個系統的任何部位,它照樣工作。

Lex 問:這兩顆晶片是完全一樣的副本,還是像冗餘架構那樣各自做不同判斷?

馬斯克說純粹是冗餘,沒有雙系統交叉驗證那套設計。他打了個比方:雙引擎飛機,兩個引擎都工作時狀態最好,但只靠一個也能安全飛。眼下他們壓根沒摸到效能上限,所以沒必要把功能分散到兩顆晶片上,直接各跑一份完整副本就行。

凡是人要出手的地方,都記成系統的錯

深度學習的好處是資料越多效果越好。真正值錢的資料,是那些罕見場景。

Lex 提到他聽過馬斯克講“脫離”(disengagement)這個時刻的重要性。馬斯克順著往下講了兩類資料。

一類是正向樣本。比如想搞清楚穿越一個複雜路口的最優軌跡,那就去找那些全程沒有人工干預的片段。系統看到這樣的路況,做出了這樣的走線,結果很順。把海量同類路口的成功樣本收集起來,從中提煉出“看起來像這樣的時候,就這麼走”。

另一類是反向樣本。司機接管,原因未必是圖方便,也可能是真的從 Autopilot 手裡搶回了控制權。

馬斯克給出了一句很有殺傷力的判斷:

把所有輸入都當成錯誤。只要使用者需要做任何輸入,那這個輸入就是錯誤。(埃隆·馬斯克)

這個視角很硬。它把所有人類介入預設標記為系統失敗,然後倒逼系統去追問:為什麼會發生這次介入。

Lex 立刻提出了一個反駁。有時候司機接管只是因為想下高速,這是導航決策,Autopilot 當初就不負責這個。這也能算錯誤嗎?

馬斯克的回答是,這個問題會隨著 Navigate on Autopilot 的釋出基本消失。自動變道、超車、下匝道、走高速互通,絕大部分接管動機都會被消解掉。

Lex 說,人們沒意識到這是多大的一步。

馬斯克說,你開一次就懂了。

從打燈變道,到自己找最快的車道

回顧 Autopilot 的歷史,哪幾步算得上真正的躍遷?

馬斯克挑了當時剛釋出的那個版本:Navigate on Autopilot,不需要司機確認的自動變道。

它做的事情不只是導航,還包括主動尋找最快的車道。前面有慢車,它自己超過去。到了該下的出口,它自己下。遇到高速互通,它自己走。

再往前一步是紅綠燈識別。這個功能最早只給一個警告,而在馬斯克自己開的開發版上,車已經能在紅綠燈前完全停下,再自己起步。

把這些拼在一起,全自動駕駛的輪廓就出來了。

那最大的技術障礙是什麼?

馬斯克的回答是,他其實不覺得還有硬體層面的障礙。FSD 計算機已經在量產,只要下單買 Model S、Model X 或者 Model 3 並選裝全自動駕駛套件,拿到的就是這顆新電腦。基礎算力夠了,剩下的就是打磨神經網路和控制軟體,而這些都能透過 OTA 推送完成。

他在即將到來的投資者日上準備強調的一點是:現在正在生產的車,用現在正在生產的硬體,就已經具備全自動駕駛的能力。

“具備能力”這個詞值得掰開看。硬體是那塊難換的部分,軟體可以一點點升級。能力會隨軟體迭代大幅提升,可靠性會隨之提升,然後拿到監管批准。

由此他丟擲了整場對話裡最有衝擊力的一句商業判斷:

如果你今天買一輛特斯拉,我相信你買的是一項增值資產,而不是貶值資產。(埃隆·馬斯克)

這話在汽車行業裡幾乎是異端。車從來都是落地就掉價的消耗品。如果一輛車能透過軟體升級獲得新能力,甚至在未來某天自己出去跑網約車賺錢,它的資產屬性就變了。

軟體邊際成本接近於零,整個邏輯才立得住。

高速上已經很爽,城市才是硬骨頭

軟硬體路線清楚了,剩下那段路有多難走?

馬斯克說,高速上用 Autopilot 的體驗已經非常好了,對生活質量的改變是徹底的。接下來要做的是把這套能力延伸到城市街道:識別紅綠燈、穿越複雜路口,然後搞定複雜的停車場。

他描述了一個場景:車自己從一個車位開出來找你,哪怕停車場像個迷宮。它把你送到門口,然後自己去找車位停下。

Lex 說,光停車場這一項的價值就很大。人手動停車時的煩躁程度是實打實的,這塊的自動化收益相當可觀。

至少六個月內,還得檢測你的手在不在方向盤上

話題轉向人類。Lex 提到當時那些號稱 Level 4 的玩家,Waymo 之類的,技術上算自動駕駛,設計哲學卻不同,幾乎全都有安全員在監控系統。

特斯拉的全自動駕駛,會不會在很長一段時間裡仍然需要人類監督?能力足夠強,仍然需要一個人像安全員一樣盯著?

馬斯克給出了一個時間尺度:至少六個月內,還是需要檢測手在方向盤上。

真正的變數在監管。一輛車要比人類安全多少倍,才允許不監控?這個問題值得公開辯論,也需要大樣本,需要統計上足夠高的置信度,證明這輛車顯著比人安全,並且加一個人進來不會實質性地改變安全水平。

他給了一個粗略的數字:可能需要比人類安全200%到300%。

怎麼證明?看事故率。每英里事故數、碰撞數、死亡數。死亡是重要指標,但死亡樣本太少,達不到統計顯著性。碰撞樣本多得多,可以先評估碰撞機率,再單獨評估受傷機率、永久性傷害機率、死亡機率。每一項都得顯著優於人類,大概兩三倍那個量級。

Lex 問,跟監管機構能進行健康的對話嗎?

馬斯克的回答帶著一點無奈。監管機構對那些能產生新聞的事件,注意力分配是失衡的。

美國每年大約有4萬起汽車死亡事故。如果其中4起跟特斯拉有關,它拿到的報道量可能是其他廠商的一千倍。

“這背後的心理機制其實很有意思,但我們今天大概沒時間聊這個。”

18900 次接管,和一份讓馬斯克想反駁的論文

Lex 把話題拉回自己的研究。他和 MIT 團隊從 Autopilot 三年前首次公開推送時就開始收集資料,記錄司機的面部影片和身體姿態。

馬斯克說他在推特上引用過論文摘要裡的一句話,所以至少掃過一眼。

Lex 開始講結論:在他們採集的資料裡,18900 次 Autopilot 脫離,逐次標註司機能否及時接管。結果是,這些司機保持了功能性警覺,接管時人是在場的,眼睛是看著路的。

這跟大量關於自動化與警覺性衰減的文獻預測相反。

但樣本有限,只是一小部分司機。Lex 主動提出一個批評:會不會存在一小撮特別負責任的司機,恰恰是他們的警覺性不會隨 Autopilot 使用而下降,從而讓整體資料顯得樂觀?

馬斯克的回應是,這個爭論很快會被掃進歷史。

系統進步太快。如果一件事已經比人安全好幾倍,那麼加一個人進來,對安全的影響是有限的,甚至可能是負的。

Lex 確認了一遍:所以即使有一部分人出現警覺性衰減,也不會影響整體安全統計?

馬斯克說是的,這個轉折點會來得非常快,也許今年年底,最晚明年。到那時候,人類介入反而會降低安全。

他又回到電梯。

過去電梯裡有操作員,你不被允許自己進電梯扳那個杆子在樓層之間移動。現在沒人想要電梯操作員,因為自動停靠的電梯比人安全得多。反過來,讓一個隨機的人在電梯裡握著一根大杆子,在樓層之間移動轎廂,那才叫危險。

攝像頭監控之爭:兩種判斷,都很自洽

Lex 承認馬斯克的類比有力量,但他還是要把自己的立場擺出來。他演算法層面最著迷的問題之一,是基於攝像頭的駕駛員感知:判斷司機在看哪裡、認知負荷多高、身體姿態如何。業界也有很多人相信,攝像頭駕駛員監控是必須的。

馬斯克的回應可以拆成一個條件句:

如果你的系統錯誤率低於人類水平,那麼駕駛員監控有意義。如果你的系統已經顯著比人更可靠,監控就沒多大幫助。

他再次搬出電梯。你真想要一個人握著一根大杆子,隨機地在樓層之間操作嗎?他更信任按鈕。

這一段是兩人分歧最清晰的地方,誰也沒說服誰。Lex 在節目開頭就說明了這一點,他在意的是把兩種判斷都擺出來,讓聽眾自己判斷。

為什麼特斯拉讓 Autopilot 哪兒都能開

另一個早期設計選擇是執行設計域(ODD),也就是 Autopilot 到底允許在什麼範圍內啟用。

Lex 拿凱迪拉克的 Super Cruise 做對照。那套系統被嚴格限制在特定型別的高速公路上,地圖測繪做得非常細,測試也很充分,適用範圍位元斯拉窄得多。

兩種哲學各有代價。特斯拉這種寬 ODD,好處是司機能更早探索系統的邊界,配合儀表盤上的感知渲染,慢慢建立對系統能力的理解。代價是,你基本上讓司機在任何能識別出車道的路上都能開啟它。

這是有意為之嗎?

馬斯克沒有正面回答,他把話題落在一個更大的判斷上:

說實話,讓一個人手動駕駛一臺兩噸重的死亡機器,這件事本身就很瘋狂。(埃隆·馬斯克)

他說,未來的人回頭看會難以置信:那時候居然允許任何人開著這種兩噸重的死亡機器,想去哪去哪。就像電梯曾經允許你扳著杆子隨便停,甚至停在兩層樓之間。

在未來人眼裡,人類自己開車會顯得像一件荒唐事。

馬斯克繞開了 ODD 的權衡,把問題提到另一個層面:在他眼裡,真正的風險基準落在人類駕駛本身有多危險上,Autopilot 該在哪開啟只是次要問題。

對抗樣本:同時教它“是車”和“絕對不是車”

當時有幾個駭客用對抗樣本騙過了 Autopilot,讓它做出異常反應。神經網路對輸入的微小擾動非常敏感,這幾乎是這類系統的通病。整個行業能防住嗎?

馬斯克的回答很乾脆:能。

理由是攻擊的門檻。神經網路本質上是一堆矩陣運算,攻擊者必須非常懂行,基本要逆向工程出這些矩陣是怎麼搭起來的,然後精心構造一個能讓矩陣運算結果偏一點點的輸入。

防守方要做的事情簡單得多。加一層識別,把看起來像矩陣攻擊的輸入排除掉。

訓練資料的構造方式才是重點:

你其實要同時教它什麼是車,以及什麼絕對不是車。這是兩件不同的事。(埃隆·馬斯克)

把對抗樣本作為負樣本喂進去,模型就學會了排除。這套思路在工程上確實成立,雖然學術界對對抗魯棒性的爭論遠沒有結束,馬斯克的表述明顯偏向樂觀一端。

AGI 還差幾個關鍵想法,但會來得很快

從 Autopilot 往外跳一層:現在的深度學習方法,離通用智慧還有多遠?需要全新的想法,還是現有路線能走到?

馬斯克說,還需要幾個關鍵想法。

緊接著補了一句:它會來得非常快,快到我們可能得考慮該怎麼辦,如果那時候我們還有得選的話。

他提醒別把窄 AI 和通用智慧混為一談。讓車識別車道線、在城市裡導航,跟通用智慧是兩件非常不同的事。就像烤麵包機和計算機都是機器,複雜度完全不在一個層級。

Lex 問:你確信自己能造出世界上最好的烤麵包機嗎?或者說,世界上第一輛真正的自動駕駛汽車?

馬斯克的回答罕見地直白:

就目前來看,這盤棋像是已經將軍了。除非我變得自滿或者過度自信,否則這就是它現在看起來的樣子。我可能是錯的,但看上去特斯拉確實遠遠領先於所有人。(埃隆·馬斯克)

“game, set, match”,他說這個詞的時候沒加太多修飾。

物理視角的愛,和模擬之外

最後一個問題很柔軟。我們會不會造出一個我們能愛、它也以深刻的方式愛回來的系統?像電影《她》那樣。

馬斯克的回答沒走情感路線,走的是物理。

他說這樣的系統完全有能力讓你相信你愛上了它,說服力會非常強。至於這算不算“真的”愛,那是個形而上的問題,情感和思想是否存在於另一個領域,他說他不知道。

他的訓練背景是物理,所以他傾向從物理角度看:

如果它愛你的方式讓你分辨不出真假,如果不存在任何可執行的檢驗能讓你區分,那麼就沒有區別。(埃隆·馬斯克)

他把這跟模擬假說連了起來。也許不存在任何測試能區分真實世界和模擬世界,那麼從物理的角度看,兩者就是一回事。

不過他補了一個反向可能:也許有辦法測出自己在模擬裡。也完全可能,一旦模擬中的實體找到了檢測模擬的方法,模擬本身會重啟、暫停或者換一個新的,把這個錯誤修正掉。

Lex 最後問:假如你造出了一個 AGI,你有機會問它一個問題,你會問什麼?

馬斯克的答案只有一句:

模擬之外是什麼?(埃隆·馬斯克)

這場對話真正留下的東西

六年過去,回頭看這場2019年的對話,有些判斷被驗證了,有些被推遲了。

FSD 晶片確實量產了,老車主確實能換。資料規模的優勢確實存在,特斯拉車隊積累的里程至今仍是一個難以追趕的數字。Navigate on Autopilot 確實釋放了高速場景,自動變道、自動超車、自動下匝道都成了標配體驗。

“今年年底或者最晚明年,人類介入會降低安全性”這個時間點,沒有兌現。城市街道、複雜路口、停車場,這幾塊硬骨頭比當時預估的要難啃得多。Robotaxi 的落地時間表一再後移,監管審批的節奏也遠比技術演示慢。

馬斯克在那場對話裡最核心的方法論,倒是一直沒變:把所有人類輸入當成錯誤,然後倒逼系統去消滅這個錯誤。 這個思路解釋了特斯拉為什麼堅持純視覺、為什麼堅持寬 ODD、為什麼不給方向盤加更多感測器。它是一條自洽的工程路線,代價是把所有不確定性都押在系統足夠好這一件事上。

而 Lex 提出的那個問題,在這六年裡沒有被回答掉,反而越來越重要:當系統只在99%的情況下比人可靠,剩下的1%該由誰來兜底?攝像頭看著司機,到底是一種有效的冗餘,還是一種心理安慰?

這個問題沒有標準答案,它取決於你信不信那條指數曲線會一直陡下去。

馬斯克信。他在對話裡說得很清楚,從 FSD 晶片上看到的改進速度是指數級的。

這場對話的價值落在它把兩種判斷世界的框架擺得很清楚:一種相信技術曲線的斜率會解決一切社會學問題,一種相信人在迴路裡的位置需要被認真設計。兩者都能自洽,衝突點在時間尺度上。

如果你想從這場對話裡拿走點能用的東西,可以試試這幾條:

  • 遇到任何“人機協作”的系統,先問一句:這個環節里人的輸入,被當成幫助還是被當成錯誤。這兩種預設設定會導向完全不同的產品設計。
  • 評估一項自動化技術時,別隻看它平均表現,去看它在長尾場景裡的接管率,以及接管那一刻人有沒有能力接住。功能性警覺可以被設計,也會被消耗掉。
  • 判斷一個技術判斷靠不靠譜,看它有沒有明確的時間邊界和可證偽的指標。“安全200%到300%”這種數字比“會非常安全”有用得多,即便最後沒兌現,也能用來校準。
  • 當你聽到“增值資產而不是貶值資產”這類判斷時,先去找它的前提:有沒有一樣東西是買回來之後能持續變好的。軟體定義的產品裡,這個前提才成立。
  • 對媒體放大效應保持警覺。4萬起死亡事故里4起屬於某家廠商,它拿到的報道量可能是一千倍。這條提醒自己別讓新聞頻率替代風險頻率,跟替誰辯護無關。
  • 如果你在做需要人監督的系統,別隻最佳化系統本身。同步設計“人什麼時候必須介入、介入時能看到什麼”這兩件事,否則系統越強,人的位置越模糊。
文稿由本站用語音識別模型(基於官方釋出音訊)機器轉寫,可能有識別錯誤,人名與數字請以音訊為準。
[00:00:00] The following is a conversation with Elon Musk, he's the CEO of Tesla, SpaceX NewLink and a co-founder of several other companies. This conversation is part of the Artificial Intelligence Podcast. The series includes leading researchers in academia and industry, including CEOs and CEOs of automotive robotics AI at technology companies. This conversation happened after the release of the paper from our group at MIT and Driver of Functional Vigilance. [00:00:30] During use of Tesla's autopilot, the Tesla team reached out to me, offering a podcast conversation with Mr. Musk. [00:00:37] I accepted with full control of questions I could ask and the choice of what is released publicly. I ended up editing out nothing of substance. I've never spoken with Elon before this conversation, publicly or privately. Neither he nor his companies have any influence on my opinion, nor on the rigor and integrity of the scientific method that I practice in my position at MIT. Tesla has never financially supported my research, and I've never owned Tesla vehicle. I've never owned Tesla stock. [00:01:10] This podcast is not a scientific paper. It is a conversation I respect you on, as I do all other leaders and engineers I've spoken with. We agree on some things and disagree on others. My goal is always with these conversations is to understand the way the guest sees the world. One particular point of disagreement in this conversation was the extent to which camera based driver monitoring will improve outcomes and for how long it will remain relevant for A.I. assisted driving. [00:01:39] As someone who works on and is fascinated by human centered artificial intelligence, I believe that if implemented and integrated effectively, camera busdriver monitoring is likely to be of benefit in both the short term and the long term. In contrast, Iran and Tasos focus is on the improvement of autopilot such that its statistical safety benefits override any concern of human behavior and psychology. Elon and I may not agree on everything, but I deeply respect the engineering and innovation behind the efforts that he leads. [00:02:16] My goal here is to catalyze a rigorous, nuanced and objective discussion in industry and academia, and I assisted driving, one that ultimately makes for safer and better world. And now here's my conversation with Elon Musk. What was the vision, the dream of autopilot when in the beginning, the big picture system level when it was first conceived and started being installed in 2014, the hardware in the cars, what was the vision? The dream? [00:03:06] I would characterize it a vision or dream simply that there are obviously two massive revolutions and in the automobile industry, one is the transition to electrification, and then the other is autonomy. And it became obvious to me that. In the future, any any car that does not have autonomy would be about as useful as a horse, which is not to say that there's no use, it's just rare and somewhat idiosyncratic. If somebody has a horse at this point, it's just obvious that cars will drive themselves completely. [00:03:44] It's just a question of time. And if we did not. Participate in the autonomy revolution than our cause would not be useful to people relative to cars that are autonomous. [00:04:00] I mean, an autonomous car is arguably worth five to ten times more than I know, which is not autonomous. [00:04:10] In the long term, depends what you mean by long term, but let's say at least for the next five years, perhaps 10 years. So there are a lot of very interesting design choices with autopilot early on, first is showing on the instrument cluster or in the model three on the center stack display what the combined sensor suite sees. What was the thinking behind that choice? Was there a debate? What was the process? [00:04:37] The whole point of the display is to provide a health check on the vehicle's perception of reality. So the vehicles are taking information from the sensors, primarily cameras, but also radar and ultrasonics, GPS and so forth. And then that that information is then rendered into vector space and that, you know, with a bunch of objects with with properties like lane lines and traffic lights and other cars and then in vector space that is rendered onto your display so you can confirm whether the car knows what's going on or not by looking out the window. [00:05:19] Right. I think that's an extremely powerful thing for people to get an understanding, sort of become one with the system and understanding what the system is capable of. [00:05:28] Now, have you considered showing more so if we look at a computer vision? You know, like road segmentation, lead detection, vehicle, detect object detection underlying the system there is at the edges some uncertainty. Have you considered revealing the parts that the uncertainty in the system, the set of probabilities associated with with, say, image recognition or something like that? [00:05:53] Yeah. [00:05:54] So right now it shows like the vehicles in the vicinity of very clean, crisp image. And people do confirm that there's a car in front of me and the system sees there's a car in front of me. But to help people build an intuition of what computer vision is by showing some of the uncertainty. Well, I think it's my car. [00:06:12] I always look at the sort of the debug view, and there's this to debug views. [00:06:17] One is augmented vision wear, which I'm sure you've seen, where basically we draw boxes and labels around objects that are recognized. And then there's what we call the visualizer, which is basically the vector space representation, summing up the input from all sensors. That does not show any pictures, but it shows all of the it basically shows the court's view of of of the world in vector space. But I think this is very difficult for people to not know, people to understand. [00:06:53] They would not know what they were looking at. [00:06:56] So it's almost a nationwide challenge to the current things that are being displayed is optimized for the general public understanding of what the system is capable of. [00:07:05] It's like if you have no idea what how computer vision works or anything, you can look at the screen and see if the car knows what's going on. And if you're, you know, if you're a development engineer or if you're you know, if you're if you have the development build like I do, then you can see, you know, all the debugging information. But those would just be like total gibberish to most people. [00:07:28] What's your view on how to best distribute effort? So there's three, I would say, technical aspects of autopilot that are really important since the underlying algorithms like the neural network architecture, there's the data so that the strain on and then there's the hardware development. [00:07:43] There may be others, but so look, algorithm data, hardware, you only have so much money, only have so much time. What do you think is the most important thing to to allocate resources to a do you see it as pretty evenly distributed between us? [00:08:00] Three, we automatically get vast amounts of data because all of our cars have. Eight external facing cameras and radar and usually 12 ultrasonic sensors, GPS, obviously, and Ayumu. And so we basically have a fleet that has and we've got about 400000 cars on the road that have that level of data. I think you keep quite close track of it, actually. Yes. Yeah. So we're we're approaching half a million cars on the road that have the full sensor suite. [00:08:39] Yeah. So this is I'm I'm not sure how many other cars on the road have this sensor suite, but I would be surprised if it's more than 5000, which means that we we have 99 percent of all the data. So there's this huge inflow of data, absolutely massive inflow of data, and then we it's taken about three years, but now we're finally developed for self driving computer, which can. Process and an order of magnitude as much as the interior system that we currently have in the cars, and it's really just up to you that you unplug the computer and plug the Tesla computer in and that's it. [00:09:20] And it's it's, uh, in fact, we're not we still are exploring the boundaries of the capabilities of being able to run the cameras at full frame rate for resolution, not even crop of the images. And it's still got headroom even on one of the systems. [00:09:36] The force of driving computer is really two computers, two systems on a chip that are fully redundant. So you could put a bullet through basically any part of that system. And it still works the redundancy. [00:09:48] Are they perfect copies of each other or. Yeah. [00:09:51] So it's purely for redundancy as opposed to an argue machine kind of architecture where they're both making this. This is purely for redundancy, if you like. [00:09:59] It's if you have a twin engine aircraft, commercial aircraft. The system will operate best if both systems are operating. But it's capable of operating safely on one, so but as it is right now, we can just run we haven't even hit the edge of performance, so. Well, there's no need to actually distribute functionality across both associates, we can actually just run a full duplicate on each one. [00:10:34] You haven't really explored or hit the limit of this? [00:10:37] No, not yet at the limit. So the magic of deep learning is that it gets better with data. He said there's a huge inflow of data. But yeah, the thing about driving the really valuable data to learn from is the edge cases. [00:10:52] Mm hmm. [00:10:53] So how do you I mean, I've heard you talk somewhere about autopilot, disengagement being an important moment of time. Yes. To use. Is there other cases or perhaps can you speak to those cases? What aspects of there might be valuable or if you have other ideas, how to discover more and more and more cases in driving? [00:11:17] Well, there's a lot of things that are learnt, though, certainly edge cases where I say somebody is on autopilot and they they take over and then that that that that's a trigger that goes off to a system that says, OK, so the take over for convenience or do they take over because the autopilot wasn't working properly? There's also like let's say we're trying to figure out what is the optimal spline for traversing an intersection. [00:11:44] Then are the ones where there are no interventions and are the right ones, so you then say, OK, when it looks like this, do the following and then you get the optimal swine for a complex now getting a complex intersection. So that's for this this kind of the common case, you're trying to capture a huge amount of samples of a particular intersection, how when things went right. And then there's the edge case where, as you said, not for convenience, but something that somebody took over somebody's sort of manual control from autopilot and really like. [00:12:23] The way to look at this is view all input as error. If the user had to do input at all, input is error. [00:12:30] That's a powerful line to think of it that way, because it may very well be error. But if you want to exit the highway or if you want to, it's a navigation decision that all autopilot is not currently designed to do, then the driver takes over. [00:12:44] How do you know that's going to change with navigating autopilot, which we've just released and with talking of? So the navigation like lane change based like asserting control in order to their lane change or exit the freeway or or highway interchange, the vast majority of that will go away with the release that just went out. [00:13:05] Yeah. So that that I don't think people quite understand how big of a step that is. [00:13:11] Yeah, they don't. So if you drive the car then you do. [00:13:15] So you still have to keep your hands on the steering wheel. [00:13:17] Currently when it does the automatic lane change, what are so there's these these big leaps that are the development of autopilot through its history. And what stands out to you as the big leaps? I would say this one, navigate an autopilot without a confirm, without having to confirm is a huge leap. [00:13:38] It is a huge leap to automatically overtake slow cars. So it's both navigation and seeking the fastest lane. So it'll it'll overtake slower cars and exit the freeway and take highway interchanges and. [00:13:57] And then we have traffic like traffic lights, recognition. Which introduced initially as a as a warning, I mean, on the development version that I'm driving, the car fully, fully stops and goes at traffic lights. [00:14:13] So those are the steps, right. You just mentioned some things that an inkling of a step towards full autonomy. [00:14:20] What would you say are the biggest technological roadblocks to full self-driving? [00:14:26] Actually, I don't think I think we're just the force driving computer that we just that that has a recall, the first computer that that's now in production. [00:14:38] So if you order any more or less or X or any model three that has the full self-driving. A package will get the FSD computer that that was that's important that have enough basic computation, then refining the neural net and the control software. But all of that can just be providers and over their update. The thing that's really profound and I'll be emphasizing at the sort of what that Investor Day that we're having focused on autonomy is that the cars currently being produced with the hardware currently being produced is capable of full, self-driving. [00:15:17] But capable is an interesting word because the hardware is. [00:15:22] And as we refine the software. The capabilities will increase dramatically and then the reliability will increase dramatically and then it will receive regulatory approval. So essentially buying a car today is an investment in the future. You're essentially buying. You're buying. I think the most profound thing is that if you buy a Tesla today, I believe you are buying an appreciating asset, not a depreciating asset. [00:15:50] So that's a really important statement there, because if hardware is capable enough, that's the hard thing to upgrade. Yes, usually. Exactly. So then the rest is a software problem. [00:16:00] Yes, I have software. I no marginal cost. Really. [00:16:04] But what's your intuition on the software side, how hard are the remaining steps to to get it to where, you know, the experience, not just the safety, but the full experience is something that people would enjoy? [00:16:26] Well, I think we will enjoy it very much on the highway. So it's a total game changer for quality of life, for using the Tesla autopilot on the highways. So it's really just extending that functionality to city streets and the traffic like traffic, like recognition, navigating complex intersections and and then being able to navigate complicated parking lots. So the car can exit a parking space and come and find you, even if it's in a complete maze of a parking lot. [00:17:03] And and then and then you can just drop you off and find a parking spot by itself. Yeah. [00:17:10] In terms of enjoy ability and something that people would actually find a lot of use from the parking lot is a really you know, it's it's rich of annoyance when you have to do it manually. [00:17:21] So there's a lot of benefit to be gained from automation there. So let me start injecting the human into this discussion a little bit. So let's talk about full autonomy. If you look at the current level, four vehicles being Cesaro, like WAMMO and so on, they're only technically autonomous. [00:17:40] They're really level two systems. With just a different design philosophy, because there's always a safety driver in almost all cases and they're monitoring the system. [00:17:50] Do you see? Teslas for self driving as still for a time to come. Requiring supervision of the human being, so its capabilities are powerful enough to drive, but nevertheless requires a human to still be supervising, just like a safety driver is in a. Other fully autonomous vehicles, I think it will require. [00:18:17] Detecting hands on wheel for at least six months or something like that from here, it really is a question of like. [00:18:29] From a regulatory standpoint, what how much safer than a person does auto pilot need to be for it took to be OK to not monitor the car? You know, and this is a debate that one can have it, and then if you need a large sample, a large amount of data, so you can prove with high confidence, statistically speaking, that the car is dramatically safer than a person and that adding in the person monitoring does not materially affect the safety. [00:19:02] So it might need to be like two or three hundred percent safer than a person. [00:19:06] And how do you prove that incidents per mile, incidents per mile crashes and fatalities? [00:19:13] So the fatality would be a factor, but there are just not enough fatalities to be statistically significant at scale. But there are enough crashes. You know, there are far more crashes than there are fatalities. So you can assess what is the probability of a crash. That then there's another separate probability of injury and probability of permanent injury, the probability of death and all of those need to be much better than a person by at least. Perhaps two hundred percent, and you think there's a. [00:19:52] The ability to have a healthy discourse with the regulatory bodies on this topic, I mean, there's no question that the regulators paid a disproportionate amount of attention to that which generates press. This is just an objective fact. [00:20:07] And Tesla generates a lot of press so that, you know, in the United States there's, I think, almost 40000 automotive deaths per year. But if there are four and Tesla, they'll probably receive a thousand times more press than anyone else. So the psychology of that is actually fascinating, I don't think we'll have enough time to talk about that. But I have to talk to you about the human side of things. So myself and our team at M.I.T. recently released the paper on functional vigilance of drivers while using autopilot. [00:20:41] This is work we've been doing since autopilot was first released publicly over three years ago, collecting video driver faces and driver body. [00:20:51] So I saw that you tweeted a quote from the abstract so I can at least guess that you've glanced at it. Yeah. Can I talk you through what we found? Sure. [00:21:03] OK, so it appears that in the data that we've collected that drivers are maintaining functional vigilance such that we're looking at eighteen thousand disengagement from autopilot. Eighteen thousand nine hundred and annotating. Were they able to take over control in a timely manner? So they were there present looking at the road to take over control. [00:21:27] OK, so this goes against what many would predict from the body of literature and vigilance with automation. [00:21:36] Now, the question is, do you think these results hold across the broader population? So ours is just a small subset. Do you think one of the criticism is that, you know, there's a small minority of drivers that may be highly responsible where their vigilance decrement would increase with autopilot use? [00:21:57] I think this is all really going to be swept. I mean, the systems are proving so much. So fast that this is going to be a moot point very soon. Where vigilance is like if something's many times safer than a person, then adding a person does leave. The effect on safety is is limited and in fact, it could be negative. That's really interesting. [00:22:28] So the the so the fact that a human made some percent of the population may exhibit a visual Sekhmet will not affect overall statistics, numbers of safety. [00:22:39] No. In fact, I think it will become very, very quickly, maybe even towards the end of this year. But I'd say I'd be shocked if it's not next year at the latest. But having the person having a human intervene will decrease safety. Degrees, it's like, imagine if you're in an elevator, I used to be that the elevator operators and and you couldn't go in an elevator by yourself and work the lever to move between floors. And now nobody wants an elevator operator because the automated elevator that stops the floors is much safer than the elevator operator. [00:23:20] And in fact, it would be quite dangerous to have someone with a lever that can move the elevator between floors. [00:23:26] So that's a that's a really powerful statement and really interesting one. But I also have to ask, from a user experience and from a safety perspective, one of the passions for me algorithmically is camera based detection of sensing a human, but detecting what the driver is looking at, cognitive load, body pose and the computer vision side. [00:23:47] That's a fascinating problem. But do you and there's many in industry who believe you have to have a camera based driver monitoring. [00:23:54] Do you think there could be benefit gained from driver monitoring if you have a system that's that's out of that error below human level reliability, then driver monitoring makes sense. But if your system is dramatically better, more reliable than than a human, then driving, monitoring, monitoring is not does not help much. [00:24:16] And like I said, just like you wouldn't want someone, like you would want someone in the elevator or in an elevator, do you really want someone with a big lever? So some random person operating the elevator between floors? I wouldn't trust that or rather have the buttons. [00:24:34] OK, you're optimistic about the pace of improvement of the system from what you've seen with the force driving computer, the rate of improvement is exponential. [00:24:45] So one of the other very interesting design choices early on that connects to this is the operational design domain of autopilot. [00:24:55] So where autopilot is able to be turned on the contrast, another vehicle system that we're studying is the Cadillac Supercar system. That's in terms of very constrained to particular kinds of highways, well mapped, tested, but much narrower than the idea of Tesla vehicles. What's there's there's ADT. [00:25:19] Yeah. As good as it gets a good life. [00:25:24] What was the design decision? What's in that different philosophy of thinking where there's pros and cons, what we see with a wide Odiase drive, Tesla drivers are able to explore more the limitations of the system, at least early on. And they understand together with the instrument cluster display, they start to understand what are the capabilities. So that's a benefit. The con is you're got you're letting drivers use it basically anywhere. [00:25:55] So any way that you could detect lanes with Klayman's was their philosophy of design decisions that were challenging, that were being made there or from the very beginning, was that done on purpose with intent? [00:26:11] Well, I mean, I think, frankly, it's pretty crazy giving it letting people drive it a two ton death machine manually. That's crazy. [00:26:20] Like I like in the future, people were like, I can't believe anyone was just allowed to drive one of these two ton death machines. I think it's drive wherever they wanted, just like elevators was like the elevator with the lever, wherever you want. It can stop it halfway between floors if you want. It's pretty crazy. It's going to seem like a mad thing in the future that people were driving cars, so they have a bunch of questions about the human psychology, about behavior and so on. [00:26:54] And that would be that time because. You have faith in the system, not faith, but the both on the hardware side and the deep learning approach of learning from data will make it just far safer than humans. Yeah, exactly. [00:27:14] Recently, there are a few hackers who tricked the autopilot to act in unexpected ways, adversarial examples. So we all know that neural network systems are very sensitive to minor disturbances. These adversarial examples on input. Do you think it's possible to defend against something like this for long for the industry? [00:27:33] So, yeah. [00:27:35] Can you elaborate on the on the confidence behind that answer? [00:27:40] Well, the you know, a neural net is just like a bunch of matrix math, or you have to be like a very sophisticated somebody who really has neural nets and like basically reverse engineer how the matrix is being built and then create a little thing. That's just exactly what causes the Matrix math to be slightly off. But it's very easy then block. Block that by by having. Basically, and he wrote negative recognition. It's like if if the system sees something that looks like a Matrix hack excluded. [00:28:15] This is such an easy thing to do, so learn both on the validator and the invalid data, so basically learn on the adversarial examples to be able to exclude them. [00:28:26] Yeah, like you basically want to both know what is what is a car and what is definitely not a car. And you train for this is a car and this is definitely not a car. Those are two different things. You have no idea. Neural nets really probably thinking unless it was like, you know, fishing net on me. [00:28:46] So as you know, so taking a step beyond just has an autopilot. Current deep learning approaches still. Seem in some ways to be. Far from general intelligence systems, do you think the current approaches will take us to general intelligence or do totally new ideas need to be invented? [00:29:12] I think we're missing a few key ideas for general intelligence, general artificial general intelligence. But it's going to be upon us very quickly. And then we'll need to figure out what shall we do if we even have that choice? But it's amazing how he can differentiate between, say, the narrow eye that, you know, allows a car to figure out what lane line is and and, you know, and navigate streets versus general intelligence like these are just very different things, like your toaster and and your computer are both machines, but one's much more sophisticated than another. [00:29:55] You're confident with that you can create the world's best toaster, the world's best history as the world's first self-driving? I'm yes, it seemed to me the right now this seems game, set, match. I don't I mean that I must be complacent or overconfident, but that's what it is. That is just literally what it how it appears right now. I could be wrong, but it appears to be the case that Tesla is vastly ahead of everyone. [00:30:27] Do you think we will ever created a system that we can love and loves us back in a deep, meaningful way, like in the movie her? I think I will be capable of convincing you to fall in love with it very well, and that's different than us humans. You know, we're not getting into a metaphysical question of like, do emotions and thoughts exist in a different realm, the physical and maybe they do. Maybe they don't. I don't know. [00:30:54] But but from a physical standpoint, I don't think I tend to think of things, you know, like physics was my main sort of training. And and from physics standpoint, especially if it loves you in a way that you can't tell whether it's real or not. It is real. [00:31:14] It's a physics view of love. [00:31:16] Yeah. If there's no if if you cannot just if you can't prove that it does not if there's no test that you can apply. That would make it. May allow you to tell the difference then there is no difference, right? And it's similar to seeing our world of simulation. There may not be a test to tell the difference between what the real world simulation and therefore, from a physics perspective, it might as well be the same thing. [00:31:46] Yes, and there may be ways to test whether it's a simulation. There might be I'm not saying there aren't, but you could certainly imagine that a simulation could could correct that once an entity in the simulation found a way to detect the simulation, it could either restart, pause the simulation or start a new simulation or do one of many other things that then corrects for that error. So when maybe you or somebody else creates an ajai system and you get to ask her one question, what would that question be? [00:32:33] What's outside the simulation? Elaine, thank you so much for talking today as a pleasure. All right, thank you.

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