Mark Dubowitz (00:00:00): We want to avoid wars, we have to have serious deterrence because our enemies need to understand, we will use selective, focused, overwhelming military power when we are facing threats like an Iranian nuclear weapon. Scott Horton (00:00:12): I’m not seeing the peace through strength. I’m seeing permanent militarism and permanent war through strength. Mark Dubowitz (00:00:16): Do you ever hold our adversaries responsible or do you just don’t think we have any adversaries? Scott Horton (00:00:22): The easiest kind of nuke to make out of uranium is a simple gun type nuke. Mark Dubowitz (00:00:26): Are you saying that Mossad fabricated it? Scott Horton (00:00:29): Yeah. Mark Dubowitz (00:00:30): That’s what you’re claiming. Here’s the offer, take it to leave it. Zero enrichment full dismantlement. Scott Horton (00:00:34): Through the Iranians, told the IAEA, you can inspect any five out 10 facilities here, carte blanche, go ahead and they did and found nothing. Mark Dubowitz (00:00:41): Experts in Iran’s nuclear program, including David Albright, who actually saw the archive, went in there, wrote a whole book on it, and there’s a lot of detail about how Iran had an active nuclear weapons program called AMAD to build five nuclear weapons. Scott Horton (00:00:55): I have to refute virtually everything he just said, which is completely false. Mark Dubowitz (00:00:58): I mean really everything? There was not one thing I said that was true? Just one thing. Scott Horton (00:01:02): I mean Iran is a nation over there somewhere. You got that part right. Mark Dubowitz (00:01:05): 22 years of working on Iran and I got that right. Lex Fridman (00:01:07): But do you know the population of Iran? Mark Dubowitz (00:01:09): 92 million. Lex Fridman (00:01:10): Okay. Scott Horton (00:01:11): Give me a pound, dude. Lex Fridman (00:01:12): There we go, agreement. Lex Fridman (00:01:16): The following is a debate between Scott Horton and Mark Dubowitz on the topic of Iran and Israel. Scott Horton is author and editorial director of Ntwar.com, host of the Scott Horton Show and for the past three decades, a staunch critic of US foreign policy and military interventionism. Mark Dubowitz is a chief executive of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, host of the Iran Breakdown Podcast, and he has been a leading expert on Iran and its nuclear program for over 20 years. This is the Lex Fridman podcast. To support it, please check out our sponsors in the description and consider subscribing to this channel. If you do, I promise to work extremely hard to always bring you nuanced, long-form conversations with a very wide range of interesting people from all walks of life, and now, dear friends, here’s Scott Horton and Mark Dubowitz. Lex Fridman (00:02:18): Gentlemen. All right, it’s great to have you here. Let’s try to have a nuanced discussion/debate and maybe even steal man-opposing perspectives as much as possible. All right, as a stands now, there’s a barely stable ceasefire between Iran and Israel. Let’s maybe rewind a little bit. Can we first lay out the context for this Iran-Israel war and try to describe the key events that happened over the past two weeks, maybe even a bit of the deep roots of the conflict? Mark Dubowitz (00:02:50): Sure. First of all, thanks so much for having me on. Great to be on with Scott. I know he and I don’t agree on a lot, but I certainly admire the passion and the dedication to stopping wars. So that’s something we want to talk about. So let’s talk about how we got to this war. So President Trump comes into office and immediately lays out that his Iran strategy is maximum pressure on the regime and he will not allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon, and he makes that clear. Consistently, I think made it very clear during his first term, made a clear throughout his career and thus begins this process with the Iranians, which has kind of multiple tracks, but the one that Trump sees most interested in at the time is the diplomatic track, and he makes it very clear from the beginning and a sort of Oval Office remark. Scott Horton (00:06:21): Sure. Well, he started with January, right? Trump’s second term here and the maximum pressure campaign essentially as should be clear to everyone. Now, all these negotiations were just a pretext for war. Trump and his entire cabinet must have known that the Ayatollah is not going to give up all enrichment. That is their latent nuclear deterrent. Their posture has been heavily implied, “Don’t attack us and we won’t make a nuke.” While America’s position was if you make a nuke, if you start to we’ll attack you. So it was the perfect standoff, but what happened was, and you might remember a few weeks ago, there was some talk about, “Well, maybe we could find a way to compromise on some enrichment. Maybe they could do a consortium with the Saudis.” And then nope, the pressure came down. No enrichment, zero enrichment, but that’s a red line. Lex Fridman (00:11:00): Maybe a good question to ask here is what is the goal for the United States in Iran in relation to Iran’s nuclear program? What is the red line here? Does Iran have this need for latent nuclear deterrent and what is the thing that’s acceptable to the United States and to the rest of the world? What should be acceptable? Mark Dubowitz (00:11:24): Yeah, so there was a lot to unpack there. So let’s sort of just back up a little bit. Let’s talk about first of all, the regime itself. Islamic Republic of Iran came into power in 1979. It has been declared a leading state sponsor of terrorism by multiple administrations dating back to the Clinton administration, by Obama, by Biden, by Trump and it is a regime that has killed and maimed thousands of Americans, not to mention obviously hundreds of thousands of Middle Easterners. It is a regime that has lied about its nuclear program and never actually disclosed its nuclear sites. All these sites were discovered by Iranian opposition groups, by western intelligence agencies, and the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is the UN agency responsible for preventing proliferation has come out again and again over many years in very detailed reports describing Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Lex Fridman (00:18:35): Yeah, that is one of the fascinating questions, whether this Operation Midnight Hammer increase or decreased the chance that the Iran will develop a nuclear weapon. Scott Horton (00:18:44): Before you ask any more questions, I have to refute virtually everything he just said, which is completely false. Mark Dubowitz (00:18:49): I mean really everything, there was not one thing I said that was true. Just one thing. Scott Horton (00:18:52): I mean Iran is a nation over there somewhere. You got that part right. Mark Dubowitz (00:18:56): All right, 22 years of working on Iran and I got that right. Lex Fridman (00:18:59): But do you know the population of Iran? Mark Dubowitz (00:19:00): 92 million. Lex Fridman (00:19:01): Okay. Scott Horton (00:19:02): So first of all, they were trying to buy a light water reactor from the Europeans or the Chinese in the 1990s, and Bill Clinton wouldn’t let them and put tremendous pressure on China to prevent them from selling them a light water reactor, a turnkey reactor that produces waste that’s so polluted with impurities that you can’t make nuclear weapons fuel out of it. By the way, they never have to this day had a reprocessing facility for reprocessing plutonium. Even their current plutonium waste from their heavy water reactor at Boucher to make weapons fuel out of that. They have no plutonium route to the bomb under the JCPOA. Mark Dubowitz (00:19:37): At Iraq, not Boucher. There’s a difference. Scott Horton (00:19:40): Iraq is where they pour concrete into the reactor and shut it down. Mark Dubowitz (00:19:45): And the reason they pour concrete- Scott Horton (00:19:47): Under the JCPOA. Mark Dubowitz (00:19:48): Not they, but the Obama administration, he’s right, under the JCPOA poured concrete into the Kalindria in order to prevent them from using that reactor to reprocess plutonium. So there’s a distinction between Iraq and Boucher. Scott’s exactly right. Boucher is a heavy water reactor provided by the Russians as I described for the generation of electricity. Its proliferation proof. Iraq is the opposite. It’s a heavy water reactor that was built for a plutonium pathway to nuclear weapons, which is exactly why under the JCPOA, they literally had to pour concrete into the middle of it to prevent it from reprocessing plutonium. Scott Horton (00:20:25): I think we’re going to need a scientist to come in here and split the difference or maybe we need to go and look up some IAEA documents because I don’t believe that Iraq ever had a reprocessing facility for their plutonium waste and the deal under the JCPOA, the Russians would come and get all their plutonium waste, which the waste comes out all polluted and not useful. You need the reprocessing facility to get all of the impurities out. Mark Dubowitz (00:20:51): Just to clarify- Scott Horton (00:20:52): It could be that I’m wrong about that, but I don’t believe that they ever had a reprocessing facility at Iraq that they could use to remove all those impurities and then have weapons-grade plutonium fuel as the North Koreans do. Mark Dubowitz (00:21:05): So the Obama administration was very clear under the JCPOA, we are going to pour concrete into the Iraq facility as Scott acknowledged because we are concerned that Iraq can be used for reprocessing plutonium, for plutonium pathway to a nuclear weapon. Lex Fridman (00:21:21): Can be used, but we don’t know if it was used. Scott Horton (00:21:24): Oh, we know it never was. There never was any reprocessing of weapons fuel there. Lex Fridman (00:21:28): But there was concrete poured. Scott Horton (00:21:30): There’s no indication Mark Dubowitz (00:21:31): For your viewers who are interested and not to plug my own podcast, Lex so I apologize. Lex Fridman (00:21:35): It is a very good podcast. Mark Dubowitz (00:21:36): I just recently had David Albright on my podcast who is actually a physicist and a weapons inspector and goes into a lot of detail about the Iranian nuclear program. Please listen to the podcast. Lex Fridman (00:21:47): Iran Breakdown by the way is the name of the podcast. Mark Dubowitz (00:21:50): And David’s the president of the Institute for Science International Security and by the way, spent decades on this and to his credit, he was one of the deep skeptics of the Bush administration’s rush to war with Iraq. Scott Horton (00:22:00): That’s not true. He vouched for claims that there were chemical weapons in Iraq and later said he was sorry for it. Mark Dubowitz (00:22:06): Again, I mentioned the Bush administration’s rush to war based on their claims that Saddam was building nuclear weapons. Scott Horton (00:22:11): He did debunk the aluminum tubes though. Mark Dubowitz (00:22:14): He debunked it and it was a deep skeptic again of the rush to war in Iraq. The argument today, Lex, which I think is the more interesting argument, because there are very few people left today who don’t believe that the Iranians were building the nuclear weapons capability that gave them the option to build nuclear weapons. Scott Horton (00:22:33): I already said that. Mark Dubowitz (00:22:35): We can debate whether they had decided to, and I’m interested to hear Scott’s opinion on this, but the recent intelligence that has come out that the Iranian nuclear weapons scientists have begun preliminary work on building a warhead. Scott Horton (00:22:49): Came out from where? This intelligence that came out, who put that? Israeli claims. Not verified by the US and the Wall Street Journal anywhere, right? Let’s talk about all of my list of refutations of all your false claims from 10 years ago. Mark Dubowitz (00:23:04): The Wall Street Journal did verify. Scott Horton (00:23:06): That’s a lot of [inaudible 00:23:08] to refute. Lex Fridman (00:23:08): One at a time. Mark Dubowitz (00:23:09): Lawrence Norman actually wrote a piece and this was during the Biden administration because the Biden DNI had actually come out and for the first time in their annual threat assessment had removed a line that said Iran is not currently working on developing any capabilities that would put it in a position to actually deliver a nuclear warhead, and what became the Norman piece in the Wall Street Journal was that there actually was initial work done on metallurgy and on computer modeling, and so those actually were defined terms in Section T of the 2015 JCPOA, which defined weaponization in that section, and metallurgy and computer modeling were some of the initial steps so that the DNI was very concerned under Biden that these initial steps meant that either Khamenei had given the green lights or nuclear weapons scientists in order to get ahead of the boss so they could be in a position if he decided to move forward on this, were in a position and their timelines were therefore expedited. Scott Horton (00:24:29): Who’s the dog that didn’t bark there? The current director of National Intelligence who issued her threat assessment, Trump’s director of National Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard who issued her threat assessment in February that repeated the exact same language that from the National Intelligence estimate of 2007, and that the CIA and the NIE, the National Intelligence Council have reaffirmed repeatedly ever since then, which is that supreme leader has not decided to pursue nuclear weapons. He has not made the political decision to pursue nuclear weapons. She testified in fact under oath in front of the senate in March and then according to CNN and the New York Times, there was a brand new assessment that was put together the week before the attack was launched reaffirming the same thing and at least in history, if you read it in Haaretz, Massad agreed with the CIA. Mark Dubowitz (00:25:19): I’d like to just sort of quote CIA director John Radcliffe because Scott brought up the CIA and the intelligence committee. I think Radcliffe had a good way of looking at this and that he said is when you’re in the 99 yard line as a football team, you have the intention of score a goal, and what he was actually pointing to is let’s not talk about this debate about whether Khamenei had given the order or not given the order, because Khamenei knows that if he gives an order, the US and Israeli intelligence community will pick up on that order and that will be the trigger for strikes. What Radcliffe is saying is that Khamenei had built the nuclear weapons capability. He’s at the 99 yard line, and both the CIA and European leaders, the European Intelligence Committee has said for yours that if Iran has that capability and they’re on the 99 yard line, at that point, it’s going to be too late to stop them. Once that decision is made to assemble the final warhead, which by the way is the final piece of what you need for a deliverable nuclear weapon. Scott Horton (00:26:18): That’s not true at all, right? They have to resort to a crude analogy about football yard lines because they can’t say the truth, which is that they had zero weapons grade uranium, they were not producing it. They were trying to get the United States back in the deal that they are still officially within the JCPOA with the rest of the UN Security Council wherein they shipped all of their enriched uranium stockpile out of the country to France to be transferred to fuel rods. Their insistence was on their continued ability to enrich uranium, and so this goes to one of the things that he at least sort of brought up that deserves addressing. When Trump came into power in 2017, he decided on this Israeli influence maximum pressure campaign, and he said the JCPOA was the worst deal in the history of any time any two men ever shook hands and all these kinds of things in his hyperbolic way, which of course made it very difficult for him to figure out a way to stay in the thing or to compromise along its lines. Scott Horton (00:31:00): Claims credit he was first and said this is a facility. However, they were not in violation of their safeguards agreement with the IAEA. They were still six months away from introducing any nuclear material to that facility. When it was revealed, they weren’t in violation of anything. And then on com we had a huge fight about this at the time. The party line came down from all the government officials in the media that they had just exposed the facility there. Com is Fordo. Same thing. When in fact that wasn’t true. The Iranians had announced to the IAEA that we had built a new facility here, and we are going to introduce nuclear material into it within six months. Here’s your official notification. And then a few days later, they just pretended to expose it, when it was the Iranians themselves who had admitted to it in going along with their obligations under their safeguards agreement. Lex Fridman (00:36:39): Enough Already. Scott Horton (00:36:40): Thank you. I have a solid dozen sources including Michael Gordon’s own colleague, Alissa Rubin at the New York Times, and many others where they found these bomb factories in Shiite Iraq. They were being made by Shiite Arab Iraqis. When David Petraeus was going to have a big press conference, and they laid out all the components, all the reporters gathered around, and they started noticing that the components said “Made in UAE. Made in Haditha.” That is Iraq. In other words, there was no evidence whatsoever that these came from Iran. And then they called off the press conference. And Stephen Hadley, George Bush’s second national security advisor, admitted that we didn’t have the evidence that we needed to present that. And I also quote two, one Marine and one high-level Army intelligence officer in there, who were deeply involved in Iraq war reconfirming that there was never any evidence that these bombs were coming across from Iran or especially that then, even if they were, that that was at the direction of the Quds Force or the Ayatollah. Lex Fridman (00:39:21): First, let me say on the cover of Enough Already, “Devastating,” Daniel Ellsberg, “Outstanding,” Daniel L. Davis, “Essential,” Ron Paul. You are respected by a very large number of people. You have decades of experience. And the same thing with Mark. Extremely respected by a very large number of people. Experts. There’s a lot of disagreements here, and we’re going to unfortunately leave a lot of the disagreements on the table for the aforementioned nuclear scientist to deconstruct later. Let’s not try to … Every single claim does not have to be perfectly refuted. Let’s just leave it on the table, the statements as they stand, and let’s try to also find things we kind of agree on and try … I know this might be difficult, but to steelman the other side. That’s the thing I would love to ask you. Scott Horton (00:40:20): I think that, in my opening statement, quite frankly, I don’t carry any brief for the Ayatollah. I’m a Texan. I don’t give a damn about what some Shiite theocrat says about nothing, right? My interest is the people of this country and its future and what’s true. And so I don’t mind telling you. Even though the Iranians never said, “We’re building a latent nuclear weapons capability,” that’s clearly what they’re doing is showing that they can make a nuke, so don’t make me make a nuke. That has been their position. Their position has not been, “I’m making a nuke so I can wipe Israel off the map.” Their position has been, “Look, if you guys don’t attack us, we could just keep this civilian program the way it is.” And again, there’s always the implication that they’re just building up this uranium stockpile, but no, they’re not. Lex Fridman (00:41:52): Point made. Let’s try, if possible, to keep it to a minute and two of back and forth- Scott Horton (00:41:58): I said the problem is we’re talking about nuclear stuff, which is all very complicated, and most people don’t know much about it, which is what the war party is relying on, that people just hear nuclear, afraid, and mushroom cloud and give the benefit of the doubt to the hawks. And so we got to get into the details of this stuff. Lex Fridman (00:42:13): Details 100%, but I like the tension between two people with different perspectives exploring those details. And the more we can go back and forth, the better. And there’s a lot of disagreement on the table. I personally enjoy learning from the disagreement, I think, a lot- Scott Horton (00:42:28): That was a very long list of claims that he made, though, where I felt I had to go down the list as much as I could because there was a lot- Lex Fridman (00:42:34): I think you addressed maybe one or two claims, and it took 15 minutes. That’s why I’m just commenting on- Scott Horton (00:42:40): That’s fair. Lex Fridman (00:42:40): … let’s do one at a time. I like the tension of the debate of back and forth. That’s all. Mark, do you want to comment on stuff a little bit here? Pick whichever topic you want to go with here. Mark Dubowitz (00:42:51): There’s a lot there. Just couple of things, I think, that are worth your viewers knowing. Because Scott’s right. I mean, the nuclear physics is complicated, and it’s also important. The Iranians have assembled about … They say about 15 to 17 bombs worth of 60% enriched uranium. And I think it’s always important for your listeners to understand, what does this all mean? Enriched to 3.67%, to 20%, to 60%, and then to 90% weapons-grade uranium. What does this actual process mean? Lex Fridman (00:43:35): That’s fascinating. Yes. Mark Dubowitz (00:43:37): I think it’s, again, important just to understand the sort of basics before we jump into the allegations and claims and counterclaims. If you’re going to enrich to 3.67% enriched uranium, that’s for civilian nuclear power. But when you do that, you’re basically 70% of what you need to get to weapons grade. You’ve done all the steps, 70% of the steps, in order to get to weapons-grade uranium. Scott Horton (00:44:15): Medical isotopes. Mark Dubowitz (00:44:16): Correct. Iran has a Tehran research reactor for medical isotopes. By the way, you can buy those isotopes from abroad, or you can produce them at home. If you’re going to enrich to 60%, then you’ve done 99% of what you need to get to weapons-grade uranium. And then 90% is quote weapons-grade uranium. By the way, you can use 60% to actually deliver a crude nuclear device. That has been done in the past, but you want to get to quote 90%. That’s weapons-grade uranium, as Scott’s defining it. But just again, to clarify, these huge stockpiles of 60% that Iran has accumulated, this 16, 17 bombs worth of 60%, is 99% of what they need for weapons-grade. I just wanted to explain that. Scott Horton (00:45:03): But when you say … You’re saying if you include the mining, the refining of the ore into yellow cake, the transformation of that into uranium hexafluoride gas, the driving of it in a truck over to the centrifuge, and then spinning it, this is where we get this 90% number from, right? In place of 90% enriched uranium or 80% enriched uranium. It’s 90% of the way on some chart that includes picking up a shovel and beginning to mine. Right? Mark Dubowitz (00:45:34): Again, just to clarify, I just think it’s important to understand the definition of terms. Once you have 60% enriched uranium, you’ve done 99% of all the steps, including some of the steps that Scott’s talking about. You’ve done 99% of what you need to have weapons-grade- Scott Horton (00:45:48): That’s just meaningless. Lex Fridman (00:45:49): Why is that meaningless? Scott Horton (00:45:51): Well, as I’ve already established numerous times here, under the JCPOA, they shipped out every bit of their enriched uranium stockpile. The French turned it into fuel rods and then shipped it back. That’s the deal they’re trying to get the US back into and were obviously clearly willing to do. And again, the only reason they were enriching up to 60% was to put the pressure on the Americans to go ahead and get back into the deal. And bad bet. It gave them an excuse to bomb based on the idea that people are going to listen to him, pretend that somehow that’s 99% of the way to the bomb, when you’re including driving to the mine and mining it and converting it to yellow cake and all these other things. Mark Dubowitz (00:46:28): You’re going to have a deliverable nuclear weapon, so you need the weapons-grade uranium. And just to repeat, they have multiple bombs worth of the 60% enriched uranium, which, again, is 99% of the steps you need to take for weapons grade. They’re very close to weapons grade. It’s 1% more that they need to do to enrich to weapons grade. Scott Horton (00:48:35): If I can jump in here on this point, too, and I’ll turn it back over to you, but I actually have a bit of a correction to make. For anyone who’s seen me on Piers Morgan or a Saagar and Krystal, I actually oversimplified and made a mistake. I’ve been off of the Iran nuclear beat for a little while doing other things, and so I’d like to take this opportunity to clarify, and I’m going to try to clarify with them on their shows, too, was I have … An old friend of mine used to make nuclear bombs, Gordon Prather, and I only just found out that he died two years ago, unfortunately. He used to write for us at antiwar.com. He’s a brilliant nuclear physicist and H-bomb developer, and he had really taught me all about this stuff. Lex Fridman (00:50:11): They could drop it as a bomb? Scott Horton (00:50:13): They could test it in the desert and beat their chest, but essentially that’s all they could do. Mark Dubowitz (00:50:16): Or you could drop it from a plane like we did, as Scott said, in with Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Scott Horton (00:50:22): Well, very slim chance of Iranian heavy bombers getting through Israeli airspace, but anyway. Mark Dubowitz (00:50:49): The blueprints were given. Just to clarify, it’s just interesting just in the terms of the history of proliferation. Iran’s initial nuclear program, which is built on centrifuges, as Scott and I have been talking about … That was actually given to … The designs of that were given to them by AQ Khan who was really the father of the Pakistani nuclear program, and he actually stole those designs from the Dutch and handed it to the Iranians. He also handed it to the North Koreans and the Libyans and others. They were able to illicitly acquire this technology, or at least the blueprints for this technology, from the father of the Pakistani bomb. I think that’s an interesting point, but if you don’t mind- Scott Horton (00:51:31): As I said earlier, because Bill Clinton clamped down on the Chinese and wouldn’t let them sell or anyone else wouldn’t let them sell them light water reactors, so then they went to AQ Khan and bought the stuff on the black market. Mark Dubowitz (00:51:41): And they obviously bought heavy water reactors from the Russians, which they’ve been using for electricity. I want to just get to the second thing. I think it’s just important for listeners to know, and then I want to get to JCPOA- Scott Horton (00:51:52): I was in the middle of saying, though, when you’re trying to make a uranium implosion bomb or a plutonium implosion bomb, it’s a much more difficult task than putting together a gun-type nuke. Takes an extraordinary amount of testing. And that’s why he repeated, probably unknowingly, some false propaganda about Iran having this advanced testing facility. I think he was implying … Correct me if I’m wrong. I’m pretty sure you’re implying at Parchin that they were testing these implosion systems, but that’s completely debunked. It’s completely false. Mark Dubowitz (00:54:05): First of all, I’m glad Scott knows about what’s going on at Parchin because the IAEA doesn’t, and they’ve been asking the Iranians- Scott Horton (00:54:10): That’s not true. That’s not true. The Iranians told the IAEA, “You can inspect any five out of 10 facilities here carte blanche. Go ahead.” And they did and found nothing. Then they made up the lies about the implosion chamber later. And the IAEA … Again, Robert Kelly is the American IAEA guy. Debunked that in the Christian Science Monitor. Mark Dubowitz (00:54:27): All right. I want to just, again, just put it out there for your listeners. They should just Google AMAD, A-M-A-D, program, and they should learn about the AMAD program because it’s detailed in US government documents, experts in Iran’s nuclear program, including David Albright who actually saw the archive, went in there, wrote a whole book on it, and there’s a lot of detail about how Iran had an active nuclear weapons program called AMAD to build five nuclear weapons. Scott Horton (00:59:23): Somebody give me a screenshot of this. Give me a pound, dude. Mark Dubowitz (00:59:26): There we go. Lex Fridman (00:59:27): Agreement. Mark Dubowitz (00:59:28): There we go. Scott Horton (00:59:28): That’s fine. Lex Fridman (00:59:29): That makes my heart feel- Scott Horton (00:59:30): And I think the Ayatollah would’ve gone for it too. Mark Dubowitz (00:59:32): Well, I’m not sure if he would’ve, but let’s … Just a little bit of history. I think it’s just useful for the viewers to know, again, the context, especially when Scott and I agree. A process was begun- Lex Fridman (00:59:43): I’m loving this so much. Mark Dubowitz (00:59:44): … by the Trump administration. Trump appointed Brian Hook, or Secretary Pompeo actually appointed Brian Hook, who was the lead Iran envoy, and he began a process of talking to the Europeans. Now, the Europeans actually rejected this idea. And so at some point Trump said, “Look, if the Europeans aren’t prepared to get onside, then I’m out of the deal. I’m out of the deal.” And if you’re interested, I can talk about why I thought we should have stayed in the deal. Because I thought it gave us some important restrictions in the short term, certain leverage, but Trump decides to withdraw from that agreement because he recognizes that the fatal flaw of the agreement, the fatal flaws of the agreement are, one, giving them any enrichment capability, especially at an industrial size, within 15 years. Scott Horton (01:00:39): I’d like to go ahead and quickly accuse the FBI and the CIA of framing Trump for treason with Russia and pushing the Russiagate hoax. I’m trying to agree with my friend here. Because what it is is that that completely ruined Donald Trump’s ability to engage in real diplomacy with Russia for his entire first term. Certainly, for the first three years of it, he was completely handcuffed. It was terrible, as I’m sure you’re well aware, for the future, now our past, and current history of Ukraine, as well as for this deal too. Mark Dubowitz (01:01:39): Actually, can I just say one thing interesting? And again, I think it’s going to be a later topic, and so it’s going to be a provocative statement, but I think let’s put it on the table. I absolutely agree with Scott. I think it was a travesty of the accusations against Donald Trump as a Russian agent. I mean, completely debunked, but it did … I think it paralyzed. Mark Dubowitz (01:02:00): I mean, completely debunked. But it did, I think it paralyzed his presidency for two, two and a half years. I agree with Scott. The idea that you would accuse the President of the United States of being a foreign agent for Vladimir Putin, I think is unfounded. And I thought at the time, disgraceful, and I thought it was really important. I think Scott did really good work in debunking that. Scott Horton (01:02:54): Now, I was making a point. That’s hyperbole, making a point. But he did. In fact, could you Google this for me? Because I always forget exactly how many hundreds of millions of dollars that he took from Sheldon Adelson and Miriam Adelson. Mark Dubowitz (01:03:04): Who are Americans by the way. Scott Horton (01:03:06): Who are Americans. Who, Sheldon Adelson said his only regret in life is that he served in the American Army instead of the IDF, and said America should nuke Iran in order to get them to give up their nuclear weapons. He said, “I have one issue, one. Israel. And they gave Trump hundreds of millions of dollars over three campaigns.” That’s not just a, “Geez, I really hope you’ll think of me in the future.” Lex Fridman (01:03:27): Scott, first of all, a couple of things. So one, there’s a lot of people that are friends with Trump and try to gain influence. I believe that Trump, as an American, is making his own decisions. Let’s, for the purpose of this conversation, just focus on that and see what are the right decisions and what are the wrong decisions, and maybe- Scott Horton (01:03:45): I wonder what decisions I could get you to make if I gave you hundreds of millions of dollars. Lex Fridman (01:03:49): Well, me personally, you couldn’t give me… It doesn’t matter. Scott Horton (01:03:52): I couldn’t get you to drop in on a vert ramp or nothing for a hundred million bucks. Lex Fridman (01:03:56): Nothing. You cannot control my decisions with money. Scott Horton (01:03:59): It’s the American system, Lex. That’s how it works. It’s money. Lex Fridman (01:04:02): I appreciate that, yeah. Scott Horton (01:04:03): Right. Lex Fridman (01:04:03): We can go down that route. Scott Horton (01:04:04): It’s the same if we were talking about Archer Daniels Midland company throwing hundreds of millions of dollars around. They get policies based on their hundreds of millions of dollars. The squeaky wheel gets the grease, right? All that. Mark Dubowitz (01:04:14): So Lex, I think you’re right. I mean, I think Elon Musk spent what, $400 million helping Trump get elected. And obviously, there are a number of philanthropists. I think, clearly his son, Don Jr’s had a lot of influence in who gets selected in these positions in the Pentagon, NSC, and Tucker Carlson has had a lot of influence. So I think as you say, he surrounds himself with people who have certain ideas, ideologies, policies. The President makes his own decisions. Scott Horton (01:05:10): It’s a Mossad officer’s accusation. Mark Dubowitz (01:05:12): Yeah. Scott Horton (01:05:13): Victor Ostrovsky, is his name. Mark Dubowitz (01:05:15): Yeah. I know exactly who he is, and he has been widely discredited and having an ax to grind with Mossad. But anyway, not only ’83, but all through the 90s, the 2000s, 2010s, 2020s, there have been hundreds of attacks, of assassinations, of hostage taking. There are thousands Americans who have been killed and maimed by the regime. Scott Horton (01:05:41): Can you be specific what you’re talking about here? Mark Dubowitz (01:05:43): Yeah, I mean, I can give you a whole list. Scott Horton (01:05:44): Sure. Mark Dubowitz (01:05:45): Literally, I’m happy to pull it up. Lex, I shared it with you. It’s a long list of attacks all through the 80s and 90s. Lex Fridman (01:05:46): Yeah, yeah. You sent me a link. Mark Dubowitz (01:05:52): I mean, everything from the Khobar Towers. Scott Horton (01:05:57): The Khobar Towers was Al-Qaeda. Mark Dubowitz (01:05:57): Well, can I- Scott Horton (01:05:59): That was Osama bin Laden and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. Lex Fridman (01:06:01): Let him lay it out, please. Scott Horton (01:06:02): All right. Let’s hear them. Mark Dubowitz (01:06:03): Yeah. Scott Horton (01:06:04): I got my pen in my hand. Go ahead. Mark Dubowitz (01:06:05): Yeah, and again, according to US intelligence findings, it was actually Hezbollah that worked with Al-Qaeda, trained Al-Qaeda in that attack in the Khobar Towers. They were kidnapping our diplomats in Beirut. They launched attacks against our soldiers while in Iraq. The notion that somehow- Scott Horton (01:06:27): I already debunked that. Mark Dubowitz (01:06:27): No, I don’t think, well, you say you debunked it, you just made your claim. But those were Iran-backed militias, backed by Qasem Soleimani, who Scott referred to, who was the commander of the IRGC Quds Force, who supplied them with those IEDs or those EFPs, actually, those explosives. Scott Horton (01:06:49): [inaudible 01:06:49]. Mark Dubowitz (01:06:48): Well, again, this has been all confirmed. Scott Horton (01:06:52): Why don’t you search Alyssa Rubin, New York Times EFP factory? Or you can look in the Christian Science Monitor for Operation Eagle Claw where- Mark Dubowitz (01:06:52): Yeah. Scott Horton (01:06:59): … they found these things. Mark Dubowitz (01:07:01): Yeah. Scott Horton (01:07:02): It’s easy to find in my book. You can flip right to Soda Straws and EFPs. And you see where I have all my citations for the solid dozen American newspaper reporters who were embedded with American soldiers who found these factories in Iraqi Shiaistan with Iraqi Arabs working the machines, not Iran. Mark Dubowitz (01:07:23): So I’d like your viewers to Google not just a couple of sources, but actually Google the US government reports that did a whole after-action report on the Iraq War. All the mistakes were made in the Iraq war, and there were legion of mistakes made. But it was very clear that Iran had actually provided the technology, the training, the funding for these Iran-backed militias to kill Americans. I mean, I could see, Scott- Scott Horton (01:07:48): In fact they learned a method from Lebanese, Hezbollah that got it from the IRA. Mark Dubowitz (01:07:52): Well- Scott Horton (01:07:52): They didn’t even get the technique from the Iranians at all. Mark Dubowitz (01:07:55): Yeah. So Lebanese, Hezbollah, as I’m sure all your listeners know, has been trained, financed- Scott Horton (01:08:00): It’s true- Mark Dubowitz (01:08:01): … and supported by- Scott Horton (01:08:01): … but they got it from the IRA. Mark Dubowitz (01:08:01): … Iran for many years. Scott Horton (01:08:02): The copper core bombs- Mark Dubowitz (01:08:02): Yeah. Scott Horton (01:08:03): … and that design did not come from Persia. Mark Dubowitz (01:08:05): Yeah. So again, I think we all admit, Scott admits as well that Hezbollah was trained, financed, and supported by Iran. Hezbollah’s been responsible for many of these terrorist attacks. Scott Horton (01:08:15): Where does Hezbollah come from? It’s a reaction to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon where they went after the PLO and horribly mistreated the poor local Iraqi Shiites until they rose up and created these militias to fight in self-defense. Mark Dubowitz (01:08:26): Again- Scott Horton (01:08:26): That’s where Hezbollah comes from. Mark Dubowitz (01:08:27): Hezbollah was actually created by the IROGC before the Israeli invasion. Why- Scott Horton (01:08:30): This was the CIA’s Bin Laden unit. Mike Scheuer says it was Osama bin Laden and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed that did the Khobar Towers attack. And who did they kill? They killed 19 American airmen who were stationed there to bomb Iraq from bases in Saudi Arabia under the Israeli insisted upon Dual Containment Policy- Mark Dubowitz (01:08:49): What’s amazing- Scott Horton (01:08:49): … of Bill Clinton. Mark Dubowitz (01:08:49): What’s amazing, Scott- Scott Horton (01:08:50): That came from Yitzhak Shamir who had sent his man Martin Indyk to work for Bill Clinton and push the Dual Containment Policy, is where that comes from in the first place. The main reason Al-Qaeda turned against the United States, and the Khobar Towers attack was Bin Laden, and he bragged about it himself to Abdel Bari Atwan, the reporter from Al-Quds, Al-Arabi in London, and spent days with him and bragged all about it and blessed the martyrs and the rest of that and has widely discredited the claim that it was Iranian-backed Shiite Hezbollah that did the Khobar Towers attack. Mark Dubowitz (01:09:51): So what we know now from Scott, because he’s given certainly a lot of context to how he actually sees things, is here’s who lies to you and here’s who doesn’t. US government lies to you. Israeli government lies to you. The Israelis clearly lie to you. Mendacious bunch. Saudis lie to you. But you know who doesn’t lie to you, actually? Hezbollah doesn’t lie to you. AL-Qaeda doesn’t lie to you. Scott Horton (01:10:16): I didn’t cite Al-Qaeda or- Mark Dubowitz (01:10:17): The Ayatollah- Scott Horton (01:10:17): … or Hezbollah. I cited Osama himself. Mark Dubowitz (01:10:18): And the Ayatollah of Iran won’t lie to you. Scott Horton (01:10:20): I cited Michael Scheuer, the chief of the CIA’s bin Laden unit. Right? Mark Dubowitz (01:10:24): So make it clear here. The Iranians- Scott Horton (01:10:25): [inaudible 01:10:25] Hezbollah- Mark Dubowitz (01:10:27): The Iranians- Scott Horton (01:10:28): Did you get that? Lex Fridman (01:10:28): Scott, straight up, I hear you, but you’re interrupting and please, just honestly, it’s not about the content, but honestly. Scott Horton (01:10:34): How come you’re not saying to him, isn’t that weird that you just said he trusts Hezbollah even though he didn’t say anything about trusting Hezbollah? Lex Fridman (01:10:39): I’m not calling out the content. I’m calling out the interruptions. He hasn’t interrupted you. It’s great. I’m loving the back and forth. Scott Horton (01:10:45): Yeah. Lex Fridman (01:10:46): It is great. But just a little less talking over each other. That’s all. Mark Dubowitz (01:10:49): Yeah. So I mean, again, the sort of view of the regime in Iran, and I think Scott wisely said at the beginning of this discussion, what did you say? “I don’t have any love for the Ayatollah. I’m a Texan. I don’t have any love for the Ayatollah in Iran.” And yet, despite the fact, Scott, doesn’t have love for the Ayatollah, I agree with him and I think he’s being sincere, in every discussion that we’ve had on every topic, it’s always about everyone’s lying except the Ayatollah in Iran. He’s not lying about having a nuclear weapons program. Lex Fridman (01:14:59): Actually, that’s a good cue. Mark Dubowitz (01:15:01): Take a bathroom break. Lex Fridman (01:15:01): Let’s take a bath and break. Mark Dubowitz (01:15:02): All right. Lex Fridman (01:15:04): Okay. We took a quick break and now, Scott. Scott Horton (01:15:07): Yeah. Okay. So a few things there. First of all, on Ahmad, the pre-2003 nuclear weapons research, the CIA estimate in 2007 concluded that all research had stopped in 2003, and Seymour Hersh reported that the reasoning behind that was mainly that America had gotten rid of Saddam Hussein for them. Now, in Gareth Porter’s book Manufactured Crisis, he shows that the major conclusion that the DIA had made, that the Iranians were researching nuclear weapons, was based on some invoices that they had intercepted for some dual use materials, some specialty magnets and things that they thought, “Boy, this looks like this could be part of a weaponization program, a secret program here.” Mark Dubowitz (01:17:24): Scott, can I ask you a question? Not a comment by me, but a question. Scott Horton (01:17:24): Sure. Mark Dubowitz (01:17:25): Just your perspective. So just so I understand this, so the nuclear archive, this massive archive that the Israelis were able to take out of Tehran, bring to the United States, bring to the IAEA, which is very detailed blueprints. Scott Horton (01:17:39): It’s just the alleged studies documents again, it’s the same stuff from the smoking laptop. Mark Dubowitz (01:17:43): Yeah. So let me just ask you, because it’s huge, and it’s very detailed, and it shows clearly that Iran had an active nuclear weapons program, certainly until 2003. And then we can have a discussion about what happened after that. Are you suggesting that that’s all been forged by Israel? Scott Horton (01:18:01): Yes. Nothing in this smoking laptop held up. Mark Dubowitz (01:18:03): All four? Not the laptop, but this entire archive that they pulled out with the stats- Scott Horton (01:18:08): You’re thinking of- Mark Dubowitz (01:18:09): … and blueprints? Scott Horton (01:18:09): … the big photo op with all the folders of documents- Mark Dubowitz (01:18:12): No, no- Scott Horton (01:18:13): … behind them and all. Mark Dubowitz (01:18:13): … I’ve seen it. I’ve seen it. I’ve seen many- Scott Horton (01:18:15): How many pages were? Mark Dubowitz (01:18:15): … many of the documents. There’s thousands of pages. I’m asking, this is not what I’m claiming. Is that all forged by Israel? Scott Horton (01:18:21): Is that not all about the uranium tetra fluoride and the warhead that David Albright debunked and all the same claims that were in the smoking laptop from the Bush years? Mark Dubowitz (01:18:31): David Albright actually wrote an entire book. It’s a very detailed book your listeners should Google. It’s David Albright in the archive where he goes in, he went in detail and he confirms the information in that archive that Iran had an active program under something called Ahmad to develop five atomic weapons. So again, you and I can debate this all day. Scott Horton (01:18:53): Now, this would’ve been before Natanz was even dug and before a single centrifuge was spinning right? Mark Dubowitz (01:18:53): And again, forget all that. Scott Horton (01:18:58): I’m just making sure everybody understands, assuming that was true, we were talking about a piece of paper? Mark Dubowitz (01:19:01): It’s not a piece of paper. It’s a massive archive. I’m just asking the question. You believe Mossad fabricated all of this as a lie to deceive the United States, the IAEA, and the international community? That’s just my question. Scott Horton (01:19:13): My understanding is that there’s nothing significant in the 2018 archive that was not already in the debunked claims from the laptop. Mark Dubowitz (01:19:22): But my question is not that it’s debunked because we can argue about whether it’s debunked or not, but are you saying that Mossad fabricated it? That’s what you’re claiming? Scott Horton (01:19:32): Yeah. Yeah. Yeah, because the CIA admitted that there was no laptop and Oli Heinonen admitted- Mark Dubowitz (01:19:33): Not the laptop. Scott Horton (01:19:37): … that he got it from the MEK. Mark Dubowitz (01:19:37): I’m not asking about laptop. I’m not asking for- Scott Horton (01:19:37): He got it from the MEK. Where did the MEK get it? The MEK got it from the Israelis. Mark Dubowitz (01:19:43): Scott, I’m not asking about the laptop. I’m asking about this huge archive that was sitting in a warehouse in Tehran full of- Scott Horton (01:19:49): I don’t know the truth behind those documents. I don’t believe Israeli claims of what they were and where they came from without, for example, reading Albright’s book and seeing what he has to say about all of that. I don’t take Netanyahu’s claims. Okay, so what’s so significant in there? You say that there’s a document that has a plan to make five bombs, but isn’t the rest of the proof the same green salt experiments and the warhead for the missile that David Albright showed was obviously fake, because the warhead was purportedly being designed for a missile that was now going to have an entirely different nose cone on it? Mark Dubowitz (01:20:26): No. So David Albright, again, we should bring David Albright here. Lex Fridman (01:20:29): David Albright is a prominent physicist nuclear proliferation expert known for his detailed research and publication on nuclear weapons. Mark Dubowitz (01:20:35): Yeah. Lex Fridman (01:20:35): He has a bunch of books Peddling Peril, Iran’s Perilous Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium, 1996 and so on. Mark Dubowitz (01:20:43): Yeah, so folks should read the book on the archive because David had full access to the archive, all the detailed documents and blueprints, and he writes a book that, again, the conclusion of which is Iran had an active nuclear weapons program. Scott Horton (01:21:00): No, no, no. The conclusion of which was they were researching it right before 2003. They had no nuclear material to introduce into a single machine, right? Mark Dubowitz (01:21:08): Well, they actually- Scott Horton (01:21:09): Active program, meaning they had- a piece of- Mark Dubowitz (01:21:10): No, they had already built a covert enrichment facility, which was only- Scott Horton (01:21:13): No they hadn’t. Mark Dubowitz (01:21:13): It was closed. Scott Horton (01:21:14): Natanz was empty until the end of 2006, right? They didn’t even start spinning centrifuges in there until ’06. Mark Dubowitz (01:21:21): They had gotten centrifuges for AQ-Khan. They’d built a deeply buried underground facility at Natanz. They were putting in place the component parts for a nuclear weapons capability. And Ahmad showed, conclusively, unless you believe Mossad fabricated all- Scott Horton (01:21:21): We’ll see. Mark Dubowitz (01:21:39): … that they actually had the plan to build nuclear warheads. Scott Horton (01:21:42): Again, Seymour Hersh says that it was when- Mark Dubowitz (01:21:43): Well, Seymour Hersh is not a nuclear weapons expert. David Albright has, he saw the archive. Scott Horton (01:21:48): Hersh’s sources said- Mark Dubowitz (01:21:50): You’re claiming that America fabricated- Scott Horton (01:21:51): … that when America invaded Iraq and overthrew Saddam Hussein for them, that was when they gave up, even considering the need for it. Remember, the Iranians held a million-man vigil for the Americans on September 11th. The Iranians hated the Taliban. In fact, the Americans thought Iran might invade Afghanistan earlier in 2001, and they hated Saddam Hussein. Mark Dubowitz (01:22:10): Yeah. Scott Horton (01:22:10): So they had every reason in the world to want to work with the United States- Mark Dubowitz (01:22:13): No, that’s a distraction. Scott Horton (01:22:14): … after September 11th. And the American- Mark Dubowitz (01:22:15): My questions to you. It’s a distraction. My question- Scott Horton (01:22:17): It is- Mark Dubowitz (01:22:18): … let’s not go to al-Qaeda, the Taliban and 9/11 and the Iranians, and the Million People Vigil. Let’s just stay on the topic. Scott Horton (01:22:23): You’re asking me what I already answered. Mark Dubowitz (01:22:25): Do you believe Mossad fabricated that entire- Scott Horton (01:22:28): I already told you- Mark Dubowitz (01:22:28): … archive? Scott Horton (01:22:29): … I don’t take their word for anything. And as far as I understand, the accusations in there are the same ones from the laptop that are already discredited. And I haven’t read David Albright’s book. You’re distracting from me refuting this giant list of false claims that you made previously that I haven’t got a chance- Mark Dubowitz (01:22:44): Okay. Let’s all agree. Let’s all agree, you’re going to read the book? Maybe Lex, you’re going to read the book. Viewers, you should read the book. I think David Albright has done a meticulous job. By the way, just warning, it’s a big book, very detailed, hundreds of pages. And he goes through it in meticulous detail in analyzing this archive, and showed again that Iran had an active nuclear weapons program designed to build five atomic warheads. Now we can talk about what happened after 2003, and did they make the decision to totally stop it? Scott Horton (01:23:10): Yeah, God changed his mind after the Neoconservatives lied America into war with Iraq for Ariel Sharon. Lex Fridman (01:23:16): So just to clarify, you, Mark, and David Albright believed that Iran was developing a nuclear weapon. And you, Scott are saying they were not before 2003? Scott Horton (01:23:28): I’m saying- Lex Fridman (01:23:28): That’s just to summarize what we were just talking about. Scott Horton (01:23:31): Well, I could tell you that, so Gareth’s book came out in 2014, which is before this archive was supposedly revealed in Tehran. But in Gareth’s book, he shows that the CIA and National Intelligence estimate of 2007 that said that there was a program before 2003, and was halted after America invaded Iraq was based on one, the DIA’s mistaken, but sincere interpretation of these invoices for these dual use technologies. And then the smoking laptop, which was completely fake and funneled into the stream by the Mujahideen e-cult, communist terrorist cult. The same people who’ve come off with 10 major hoaxes. The NCRI, the National Council for Resistance in Iran, that’s the MEK. They just put out a fake story, what, three, four weeks ago about a big secret nuclear weapons site in Iran. Don’t you remember? And then nothing happened with that because it was another lie by the MEK. It happens all the time. Mark Dubowitz (01:24:28): So Lex, maybe we should talk about what happened after 2003. What about this 2007 NIE? What does it mean? Did it mean Iran had now abandoned its nuclear weapons program or did something else happen? Scott Horton (01:24:38): They never had a nuclear weapons program. Mark Dubowitz (01:24:40): All right, but let’s talk about that. They had- Scott Horton (01:24:42): [inaudible 01:24:42]- Mark Dubowitz (01:24:42): … interesting history. Scott Horton (01:24:43): According to NIE, They had a nuclear weapons research program that never made anything at all. So you can try to conflate that if you want. Mark Dubowitz (01:24:51): No. That’s not- Scott Horton (01:24:51): But I think everybody can see what you’re doing there. Mark Dubowitz (01:24:53): … what the 2007 NIE says. But the 2007 NIE says is that, and you are correct, according to the 2007 NIE is Iran made the decision after the invasion of Iraq not to pursue an active nuclear weapons program anymore. Scott Horton (01:25:09): Because we were putting their best friends in power in Baghdad for them. Mark Dubowitz (01:25:13): Well, because the United States had gone in- Scott Horton (01:25:14): So they didn’t need to worry no more. Mark Dubowitz (01:25:15): And in a matter of 100 days, had taken down the Iraqi army. Scott Horton (01:25:19): And put in Abdul Aziz al-Hakim’s faction- Mark Dubowitz (01:25:21): That’s fine. Scott Horton (01:25:22): … the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq who’d been living in Iran for 20 years. Mark Dubowitz (01:25:26): That’s why you and I did not publicly support the Iraq War, did we? Scott Horton (01:25:30): I publicly opposed it. Mark Dubowitz (01:25:31): Good for you. Scott Horton (01:25:31): As far as I possibly could. Thank you. Mark Dubowitz (01:25:32): I should have publicly opposed it rather than just working on Iran in 2003. But you’re right, it redounded to the benefit of Iran, that invasion. But that’s not actually what I’m talking about. What I’m talking about is 100 days the Iranian Sea that the US military has taken down the Iraqi army, that they had fought an eight-year war with where almost a million people, Scott, as you know, had been killed. So they were afraid that the United States was going to march from Baghdad to Tehran. So they make a decision to end their active Ahmad program. They make a decision to build up the key capabilities they need to retain an Iranian nuclear weapons option, specifically the enrichment capabilities at Natanz, and then Fordow, and at Iraq given them the plutonium route. And then what they do is they take the members of the Ahmad program, the nuclear weapons scientists that have worked on this, and they disperse them. So they’re now no longer in a formal weapons program. They’re put in a number of different research centers and universities. Scott Horton (01:27:57): But- Mark Dubowitz (01:27:58): But, sorry, just to finish. So just understand the brilliance of Iranian nuclear deception, right? I think it’s really interesting to get in the minds of the Ayatollah and understand this, because he doesn’t want to provoke the United States. He doesn’t want to see another Iraq-style invasion, this time of his country. He’s building this capability on the enrichment side and on the reprocessing side. He is framing this as I’m only building a civilian nuclear program. He’s taken the weapons scientists who are building part of an active nuclear weapons program, and he’s dispersing them, putting them under the guidance and direction of Fakhrizadeh and starting to build out these capabilities. Lex Fridman (01:29:45): Two things. One, can you go and respond to certain things that you heard? And two, can we generally move in the direction of the modern day and trying to see what is the right thing now, our analysis of the situation now, we’ve been kind of staying in the context of history, which is really important, but sort of moving it forward? But yeah, go ahead please. Scott Horton (01:30:08): I’m not sure how much time we have. I kind of hoped- Lex Fridman (01:30:10): unlimited. Scott Horton (01:30:11): … you’d let me talk about Israel’s role in Iraq War, too, and for that matter in Barack Obama’s dirty war in Syria that led to the rise of the bin Ladenites there. It’s all part of America’s Israel policy. So I don’t want to, I’d rather go back before we go forward. But I also do, I need to go back over so many claims that he’s made here that I’d like to address. Lex Fridman (01:30:31): So I strongly prefer we go, because there’s so much history, we’re going to lose ourselves in it. There’s not enough hours. We should take certain moments in history that instruct the modern day, but let’s not get lost there if it’s okay. Scott Horton (01:30:45): Sure. Lex Fridman (01:30:45): This is such a fascinating conversation, Iraqi- Scott Horton (01:30:47): We talked about the JCPOA and the time between then and now quite a bit already too. Lex Fridman (01:30:52): Yes. Scott Horton (01:30:52): So we’ll be going back over some of that. Lex Fridman (01:30:54): Well, no, I mean modern day, I don’t mean- Scott Horton (01:30:56): You’re talking about this week. Lex Fridman (01:30:57): … I mean this week. Scott Horton (01:30:58): Okay. Lex Fridman (01:30:58): A lot of stuff happened this week and a lot of stuff will happen tomorrow and the next week. And everyone wants to know what is going to happen. What is the worst case, what is the best case? Should we be freaking out? What do we need to understand about today? That’s all. Scott Horton (01:31:13): All right, so there’s a lot of things to address here. So first of all, something that me and Mr. Dubowitz agree about. Mark Dubowitz (01:31:19): Please call me Mark. Scott Horton (01:31:19): Mark. Something that Mark and I agree about is that there actually is not a threat of an aggressive first strike by Iran. I’m a little surprised to hear him say that, but I’m grateful to hear him say that. It is honest. I would advise you, you may be unfamiliar with this, but I can tell you anyone in America who drives for a living and listens to AM radio have heard claims that Iran was making nuclear weapons probably 50,000 times in the last 25 years. Over and over and over again, we hear this propaganda. Mark Dubowitz (01:33:02): No, they never said that. Scott Horton (01:33:03): He didn’t say- Scott Horton (01:33:00): … out for a nuke. I’ll nuke them if I have to. Mark Dubowitz (01:33:02): No, they never said that. Scott Horton (01:33:03): He didn’t say that, but the implication was- Mark Dubowitz (01:33:05): By the way, no US president ever said they’re going to obliterate Iran. US president said- Scott Horton (01:33:08): Hillary Clinton did. Mark Dubowitz (01:33:09): … all options are on the table. Scott Horton (01:33:11): Anyone can Google her word. Mark Dubowitz (01:33:12): She was never our president. Scott Horton (01:33:13): No, I said she was running for president. Mark Dubowitz (01:33:15): But she was never our president. But no US president ever said they’re to obliterate Iran. Nobody ever said they could drop a nuke on Iran. Scott Horton (01:33:20): The implication was clear under W. Bush, Barack Obama, Trump, Biden, and Trump again- Mark Dubowitz (01:33:25): That they would strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Scott Horton (01:33:27): If they broke out toward a nuclear weapon, America would do whatever it took to prevent that from happening. Mark Dubowitz (01:33:34): Strike their nuclear facilities. Scott Horton (01:33:36): That was always the case there. Mark Dubowitz (01:33:38): But please clarify, just to be accurate, I was talking about nuking Iran. Scott Horton (01:33:38): I’m almost certain no one’s- Mark Dubowitz (01:33:42): No one’s talking about bombing Iran to smithereens or obliterating or any of that. Scott Horton (01:33:46): That’s really not true. I mean. Mark Dubowitz (01:33:46): US presidents- Scott Horton (01:33:48): Barack Obama changed America’s nuclear posture to say, because it used to say we reserve the right to use a nuclear first strike against any country. He changed that to say, “No, we promise not to use a nuclear first strike against any non-nuclear weapon state except maybe Iran.” That’s true. In fact, that was the threat. Mark Dubowitz (01:34:48): I think it’s really important. I agree with that. Scott Horton (01:34:49): I’m just agreeing with you so you don’t have to stop me. Mark Dubowitz (01:34:51): But I’m agreeing with you. Scott Horton (01:34:52): I know, but I’m agreeing with you so it’s all right. Netanyahu told Jeffrey Goldberg that he was not concerned about a first strike, that his only concern was that talented young Israelis would move to Miami, that there would be a brain drain. That was his words, a brain drain from Israel. That also then Hezbollah, as this is what he put it, and I agree with this, that conventional forces would have a bit more freedom of action in the region if Iran was sitting on an A-bomb. Neither of them said that there was a threat of an offensive first strike against Israel. I would point out, and I’m skipping ahead to Trump, but I’m skipping back here again in a second because I got more things to refute. But Trump just said the other day when he announced American airstrikes there that this has neutralized a threat to Israel. He did not even pretend that it was a threat to the United States that he had ended in doing so. Mark Dubowitz (01:35:43): Actually, he said exactly that. Scott Horton (01:35:44): Well, actually you can Google the state [inaudible 01:35:47]. Mark Dubowitz (01:35:47): He actually said, president Trump has said that an Iranian nuclear weapon is a threat to the United States. [inaudible 01:35:53]. He said that over and over again. Scott Horton (01:35:53): Not in the state [inaudible 01:35:53]. He announced his great victory in bombing, which is what I just said, right? Mark Dubowitz (01:35:57): President Trump sends out 20 Truth posts a day. Let’s look at the many, many, many things that he said. Scott Horton (01:36:03): Then we have this whole thing about how I always believe Hezbollah, and I always believe the Ayatollah, when in fact, I did not quote the Ayatollah and I did not quote Hezbollah on anything. I did quote Osama bin Laden taking responsibility for the Khobar Towers attack, which he shared that with Abdul Bari Atwan. Anyone can read it. He agrees with Michael Scheuer, the former chief of the CIA’s Bin Laden unit, who also said that it was a hoax, that it was Iranian-backed Saudi Hezbollah that did that attack. Again, who did they attack? They killed 19 American airmen, which was the number one complaint of al-Qaeda against the United States that we had air forces and Army stationed in Saudi Arabia in order to bomb and blockade Iraq, which again, and this was the thing that you had asked about before, was part of the dual containment policy in the 1990s. Mark Dubowitz (01:36:54): Scott, you’re saying- Scott Horton (01:36:54): Goddamn, man. Lex Fridman (01:36:55): No, wait a second. Mark Dubowitz (01:36:56): All right. Lex Fridman (01:36:56): Let Scott talk. Scott Horton (01:36:57): The fact is you’re sitting here saying that I trust them all so much. Well, what do you think, Lex, what do you think Ronald Reagan meant by trust but verify? He meant don’t trust but be polite. That’s what he meant. Verify means we know with sensors and cameras and inspections what’s going on. No one can find a quote that I said here about how we can trust the Ayatollah because he promised this or that or the other thing. I didn’t say that. What I’m talking about is the process. They sign agreements and then we have inspectors to verify their claims. As anyone can search at IAEA.org, they have continued to verify the non-diversion of nuclear material in Iran to any military or other special purpose. Mark Dubowitz (01:37:39): The IAEA has now said that they actually can no longer do this before this war started. Scott Horton (01:37:43): Because America withdrew from the- Mark Dubowitz (01:37:46): I mean, at the end of the day, let’s just be factually accurate. The fact of the matter is anybody who knows anything about nuclear weapons program knows that we do not have 100% certainty on anything. I mean, Scott is making claims here that Mossad is fabricating the CIA is fabricating, everybody’s fabricating, but he’s also assuming that we have 100% certainty about what Iran is doing inside a country more than two and a half times the size of Texas. Scott Horton (01:38:23): [inaudible 01:38:23] refuted that an hour ago. You can rewind it. Mark Dubowitz (01:38:24): Anyone can refute it, but the fact of matter is they did it. It’s there. Scott Horton (01:38:26): We know the facilities are there. By the way, you keep saying that I just say lies, lies, lies. But I have explained exactly what I meant. I’ve cited my sources and I haven’t just sat here and said, “Uh huh, that’s a lie,” because I don’t like it. I sat here and explained to you exactly how I know who was building those EFP bombs in Iraq, exactly how I know what the IAEA said about the state of inspections here, or what Robert Kelly told the Christian Science Monitor about Parchin and the rest and on and on and on. I don’t sit here like I’m just saying, “Well, that’s not true because I like it,” when in fact I’m explaining exactly why your claims are not true, which they’re not. Just like saying that I said I trust Hezbollah when anyone can rewind that and break their finger trying to find the part where I said that because I never did. Mark Dubowitz (01:40:57): But Scott, this is the constant theme in your analysis. Again, want to look at it, maybe steel man it, maybe challenge it, but the constant theme is the United States and Israel and the West, we constantly aggress against North Korea, against Iran, against Russia, against these countries, and they respond to us. They respond to us in ways that they build nuclear weapons programs that are peaceful, but we force them to develop nuclear weapons. They don’t actually mean to kill us. Scott Horton (01:41:34): Look, it’s not right that I’m saying everything anyone does- Mark Dubowitz (01:41:34): Can I finish? Scott Horton (01:41:34): No. Mark Dubowitz (01:41:38): [inaudible 01:41:38]. Scott Horton (01:41:38): You’re saying that everything I say is that everyone anyone else does is the reaction, but that’s not true. The subject here is what has America done to make things worse rather than better? Mark Dubowitz (01:41:48): That’s not the topic here. Scott Horton (01:41:49): I’m citing provocations. That doesn’t mean I’m saying that everything that happens in the world is only an equal and opposite reaction to an American provocation, and you can’t find me saying that. You can only somehow try to paraphrase me claiming that somehow or something like that. But that’s what’s at issue is as I said, for example, there’s the Reuters story that says that after Israel did the sabotage, which they bragged about at Natanz in April of ’21, that was when they started enriching up to 60%. now I’m saying that, and I’m just denying the agency of the Iranians or anything except that, no, I’m not. I’m just citing the Reuters news agency saying that this proactive action by Israel caused a negative reaction by your own lights, a very negative reaction in their beginning to again enrich up to 60% uranium. Mark Dubowitz (01:42:56): He did try. Scott Horton (01:42:57): The US government has made numerous mistakes in many of these countries. Mark Dubowitz (01:43:01): If this podcast was all about the American government and the mistakes that’s made, then we’d spend four hours on it. Scott Horton (01:43:06): It’s a huge [inaudible 01:43:06]. Lex Fridman (01:43:06): Can we please- Mark Dubowitz (01:43:08): Get to today. Lex Fridman (01:43:10): … use everything we just talked about and talk about today, what is maybe Mark, can you lay out what is the best case and the worst case in Scotland? Lay out the best case and the worst case that can happen now. Mark Dubowitz (01:43:22): Lex, I think the best case, and something I’ve advocated for, I’ve been working on this for 22 years, is that the Iranians return to negotiations at Oman, sit down with the United States and conclude an agreement that peacefully and permanently and fully dismantles their nuclear program. They agree to that, which means they shut down any remaining facilities. They give up all the remaining centrifuges and enriched material that they could use to develop nuclear weapons. They let the IAEA in in order to supervise this. They actually commit to not rebuilding this nuclear program. We commit, as we’ve done with 23 other countries, to helping them provide civilian nuclear energy. Because it seems to me a little fanciful that Khamenei would build a civilian nuclear program under 80 meters of concrete surrounded by rock and take all the risks he’s taken. By the way, he faces a risk to his regime, spent a half a trillion dollars to do this when it makes no commercial sense. Lex Fridman (01:44:56): What can Trump do to help make that happen? Mark Dubowitz (01:44:59): I think what he can do is he can say to the Iranians, “Look, I made you that offer last time. You rejected it. Now that offer’s no longer on the table because that offer gave you enrichment. Now temporarily, but I now see the game that you would’ve played when I left office, to turn that enrichment capability into nuclear weapons. That deal’s off the table, but here’s the deal that’s on the table. It’s a one-page deal. You give up your nuclear capabilities, we help you build civilian nuclear energy.” I think that’s best case. Lex Fridman (01:47:41): Can I just even dig in further on the worst case? Do you think it’s possible to have where US gets pulled into a feet on the ground full-on war with Iran? Mark Dubowitz (01:47:54): I think one must never dismiss possibilities because as I said, you’ve got to plan against worst case options, and I think- Scott Horton (01:48:00): That’s what the Israel lobby has in store for you guys. American lives mean nothing to the Israel-firsters. They don’t care that Israel motivated September 11th and killed 3,000 of our guys. I was at the airport yesterday, had a big American flag with all the red and white stripes made out of the names of the dead of September 11th who were killed by people motivated by Israel’s crimes in Palestine and in Lebanon and enforcing Bill Clinton’s dual containment policy from Saudi Arabia. They don’t care about that. They don’t care about the 4,500 Americans who died in Iraq War Two or the million something people who died in Iraq War Two, the half a million in Syria as long as the Shiite Crescent is somehow is limited. They’ll even celebrate openly. Mark Dubowitz (01:49:44): I wish you’d listened and not put words in my mouth. Lex Fridman (01:49:47): I heard what he said. I forced him kind of to say what the worst case possibility of a full-on invasion as a thought experiment, and you can let him finish that as opposed to making the accusations. Let’s just minimize both ways accusations, please. Just talk about the ideas. That’s the most charitable interpretation of those ideas. Scott Horton (01:50:06): I’m from the United States of America, unlike him, and I care about the future of this country, unlike him, who’s here to serve a foreign power and make their case at our expense. Lex Fridman (01:50:16): Scott, and next you’re going to say that I’m un-American. Mark Dubowitz (01:50:21): Because an immigrant too. Scott Horton (01:50:21): You’re just hosting the show. I don’t know. It seems like you’re trying to be fair. Lex Fridman (01:50:25): No, it’s not about fair. Scott Horton (01:50:27): He has an agenda. Lex Fridman (01:50:28): Stop. Stop. Scott Horton (01:50:28): He’s from the FDD. Lex Fridman (01:50:29): Stop. It’s not about being fair. The implication here is somebody who’s un-American because where they’re from. Scott Horton (01:50:36): I didn’t say anyone who’s not from here. I’m talking about him. Lex Fridman (01:50:41): I think that’s a really deeply disrespectful accusation. Scott Horton (01:50:45): Can I ask you, does it bother you that when Naftali Bennett bombed a UN shelter full of 106 women and children in Qana, Lebanon in 1996, that that’s what motivated Mohamed Atta and Ramzi bin al-Shibh to join Al-Qaeda and attack our towers? Mark Dubowitz (01:51:00): Scott, you know what bothers me? I came to this country 22 years ago. I became a proud US citizen 10 years ago. I’m proud to be an American and accusing me or Lex or any immigrants to this country of not being un-American is deeply offensive. Let me answer Lex’s question. Lex, let’s get back to your question because I think it’s an important question. What are the chain of events that could lead 500,000 mechanized US troops to have to invade Iran, which would be a disaster? That’s something we never want to see again. That’s one of the lessons of Iraq. Scott Horton (01:52:14): Can’t the IDF handle it? Mark Dubowitz (01:52:16): Can I just finish just who can handle it, who cannot handle it? I think that it’s a potential scenario, which is why I don’t think anybody should be advocating for a US decapitation of the regime in Iran. I have long been on record of supporting the Iranian people, providing support to the Iranian people, to at one point take back their country and take back their flag. It’s very much sort of Reagan’s strategy that Reagan ran in the Cold War of maximum pressure on the regime, maximum support for anti-Soviet dissidents. While by the way, he was negotiating arms control agreements for the Soviet Union in order to try to reduce the number of nuclear tipped ICBMs that both countries had pointed at each other. I think the Reagan strategy of providing support to the people is a far better strategy for trying to get transition, leadership transition, government transition inside Iran. But I think the scenario of decapitation strikes, killing Khamenei, taking out the entire government could potentially lead to that scenario. I think we have to be conscious of that. We have to guard against that. I think that’s important. Lex Fridman (01:54:17): Scott, what do you think is the best case and the worst case here? Scott Horton (01:54:20): Well, the best case scenario is that we quit right now and that Trump figures out a way to reorder some paragraphs and get back in something like the JCPOA, which was also signed with the rest of the UN security council power. Lex Fridman (01:54:34): Can I ask you like JCPOA is a pretty good approximation of what would be a good deal? Scott Horton (01:54:39): Pretty good. It could have been better, as I said at the beginning. Trump could have gone in there and tried to negotiate a better result with the sunset provisions on some of those things. But the concept that America is just going to insist on zero enrichment, zero nuclear program whatsoever when they have the unalienable “in the nonproliferation treaty to civilian nuclear material and a civilian program”, it’s a poison pill. It’s meant to fail just like it was a poison pill meant to destroy the tox here, good enough to start a war. Again, as I quoted from earlier, he said on TV last week, “Well, America has to take out Fordo now because now they’re more likely to break out towards a nuke.” I think that’s exactly right. There still is, or there’s strong reason to be skeptical, including Israeli and American officials told the New York Times that they thought that the damage was quite incomplete. Mark Dubowitz (01:55:34): The IAEA just came out recently just point of fact, sort of interesting. We’ll see on the battle damage assessment, but they actually think the facility was destroyed and that the sensitive centrifuges were destroyed. Just interesting for the viewers. It may be premature. Scott Horton (01:55:50): All the uranium mines, and all the aluminum smelters so that they can’t make any more centrifuges. Mark Dubowitz (01:55:55): Interesting assessment. Scott Horton (01:55:57): They know how to make centrifuges. At this point, this is why government doesn’t work. They make matters worse and create more work for themselves and make things worse and worse and worse. We can make the same criticism about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine making matters worse for themselves and causing them to have to escalate even further. Lex Fridman (01:57:05): Can you go into the analysis of best case and worst case? You laid out the best case. What’s the worst case would be feet on the ground? Scott Horton (01:57:06): Worst case is this. Mark Dubowitz (01:57:12): What was the best case? I missed it. The best case is a deal? Scott Horton (01:57:15): Yeah, that we quit now. Mark Dubowitz (01:57:16): The deal. Lex Fridman (01:57:17): Basically, you guys agree on the best case. Scott Horton (01:57:19): We respect their right to a civilian nuclear program and try to negotiate, as I said, back into something like the JCPOA, which again had them exporting their entire stockpile of uranium out of the country. Lex Fridman (01:57:31): [inaudible 01:57:31]. Scott Horton (01:57:31): He wants no nuclear program whatsoever. Mark Dubowitz (01:57:33): No, no, that’s not what I said. That’s not what I said. Be careful what I said. Scott Horton (01:57:36): Well, no enrichment capabilities [inaudible 01:57:38]. Mark Dubowitz (01:57:38): [inaudible 01:57:38]. Scott Horton (01:57:38): [inaudible 01:57:38] entire dependence on other countries to supply their fuel needs. Lex Fridman (01:57:41): Can you teach me the difference when we [inaudible 01:57:43]? Mark Dubowitz (01:57:42): Let me just step back from this because we agree on some and we disagree on a major issue. Then if we both agree Iran deserves a civilian nuclear program- Scott Horton (01:57:52): The point is the Ayatollah is never going to give in on enrichment. Mark Dubowitz (01:57:55): Can I just- Scott Horton (01:57:55): We know that. That’s a premise for our whole discussion here. Therefore, what he’s saying is we’re going to have to keep escalating the war until the mission is accomplished. Mark Dubowitz (01:58:03): Not sure I said that. Scott, I think it’s, again, important that the distinction here. We both agree that Iran deserves a civilian nuclear program. 23 countries have civilian nuclear programs and they don’t have enrichment and they don’t have reprocessing. Where we differ is, I don’t think Iran should have the Iran standard. I think that Iran should agree to the gold standard that 23 US allies have agreed to. Have civilian nuclear program, but you don’t get to keep the key enrichment and reprocessing capabilities that you need to develop nuclear weapons. Scott Horton (01:58:34): Do you think that Bill Clinton should have just let the Chinese sell them the light water reactor that they wanted to back in the ’90s? Mark Dubowitz (01:58:40): America, of course, allowed Russia to sell them a heavy water reactor for the same purpose. But I agree with Scott that I think one of the ways out of this is, yes, whether it’s the Chinese or preferably as an American, I prefer the Americans actually sell reactors to the Iranians, a great nuclear industry in this country. Let’s do that. But if they can’t, the South Koreans can, the Russians can, the Chinese can. I wouldn’t want to have significant Russian and Chinese influence in Iran, so better that it’d be a western country that does it. Nevertheless, provide those reactors. They’re proliferation proof. There’s no enrichment and no reprocessing. You buy your fuel rods from abroad, you put them in the reactors, you power the Iranian electrical grid, which is in terrible shape because the Ayatollah has spent a half a trillion dollars trying to build nuclear weapons. They’re not trying to provide electricity for these people. Scott Horton (02:00:23): Can I ask you, you were saying you supported the JCPOA, you were opposed to it. Mark Dubowitz (02:00:23): No, no, I was opposed to JCPOA. Scott Horton (02:00:28): That’s right. You were opposed to withdrawing from it? Mark Dubowitz (02:00:30): Yeah. Scott Horton (02:00:30): Don’t you think that Trump could have gone over there and negotiate to make it better? Would you agree that it was a huge mistake to withdraw that because they were, as we agreed, shipping out all of their enriched uranium to only be brought back in a form that they could not use to make nukes. The scientists had decided that if they kicked all the inspectors out and beat their chests and started making a nuke, it would take them a full year to have enough weapons grade uranium for a single gun type nuke under the JCPOA. Mark Dubowitz (02:00:58): Let me ask you a question. Scott Horton (02:00:59): Yeah. Mark Dubowitz (02:00:59): Because you’re right. I mean, I’m glad you’ve pointed out because I tried to take a nuanced position during the JCPOA debate, and I got hammered by the left and I got hammered by the right. The left hammered me because I criticized the JCPOA because it’s fundamental flaw was twofold. One, it gave Iran enrichment capability that would expand over time as the restrictions sunset it. Number two, the sunsets were going to kick in and Iran would emerge with this industrial size program, which we would not be able to stop. Now, the nuanced position, which I got hammered on by the right, was I said, “Go negotiate with the Europeans. Agree on a common transatlantic position to approach the Iranians and say, ‘Look, that deal that we did back in 2015, we think it’s flawed. We want to extend that deal. We want to get rid of the sunsets and we are going to negotiate a deal.'” Now, does that mean we have to give you more sanctions relief? Yeah, probably. The Iranians are not going to just agree without sanctions relief. Scott Horton (02:02:20): But what I’m asking you is if say you were the national security advisor under the JCPOA where they’re still shipping all their enriched uranium out of the country and all that, which you would be advising him to not leave, in the negotiations to improve the deal, would you have been willing to accept some level of enrichment then as long as we have the restriction part where they’re shipping it all out of the country, or to you, enrichment at all is always a red line, essentially equivalent to them being 99% of the way to a nuclear weapon? Mark Dubowitz (02:02:53): Look, enrichment capability is a red line. It has to be a red line. Scott Horton (02:02:58): Even though you know it’s protected by the NPT, the right to peace nuclear technology? They call it a loophole, but they have the right to enrich uranium. Mark Dubowitz (02:03:05): There’s different interpretations of everything, including agreements. There is a raging debate about whether the NPT actually gives you a right to enrich. In fact, the Obama administration, even with the JCPOA, was not willing to recognize Iran’s right to enrich, but they were willing to recognize its de facto reality that they were enriching. Lex Fridman (02:03:26): Can you explain NPT? Mark Dubowitz (02:03:27): It’s the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Iran is a member of it. It’s supposed to promote peaceful civilian nuclear energy, and it’s supposed to prevent countries from developing nuclear weapons. I think that’s a basic summary of it. Scott Horton (02:03:41): It mandates that non-nuclear weapons states have a safeguards agreement with the IAEA and full of additional protocols and whatever, where they have the right to inspect. Mark Dubowitz (02:03:42): Which Iran refused to sign, by the way. Scott Horton (02:03:52): Well, no, they had an additional protocol that they were abiding, not even enriching at all while they were negotiating with the E-III. Then what the JCPOA really did was add a bunch of additional protocols and subsidiary arrangements and agreements. Mark Dubowitz (02:03:52): Iran refused … Scott Horton (02:04:00): Had a bunch of additional protocols and subsidiary arrangements and agreements [inaudible 02:04:04]. Mark Dubowitz (02:04:04): Ironically refused to ratify the additional protocol. I just wanted just be clear on the facts. I mean, it’s really important. Scott Horton (02:04:07): Well, at which point in time did they refuse to ratify? Because they did ratify the JCPOA, which was full of additional protocols and subsidiary arrangements and agreements they’re called. Mark Dubowitz (02:04:17): There’s an important additional protocol that Iran refused. Scott Horton (02:04:19): Which one was that? The one where they promised not to enrich at all, which they actually did abide by while they were negotiating with the E3 in the W. Bush years before they even started spinning centric engines in response. Mark Dubowitz (02:04:30): The important point is that you asked me what I would advise the National Security Advisor of the United States, or if I was the National Security Advisor of the United States, which I guess I can’t be because I’m a foreigner, but the fact of the matter is- Scott Horton (02:04:39): I think you could still be National Security Advisor. Zbigniew Brzezinski sure was. Lex Fridman (02:04:43): I think he was taking a shot back at the fact that you took a shot. Scott Horton (02:04:46): You know what, Lex? I think that you probably would recognize that there are many people who lobby for Israel’s interests in the United States who clearly don’t care that much about what happens to the United States of America in it as a consequence because they care about Israel, which is a different country than America, right? It’s not part of the 50 states. Lex Fridman (02:05:05): I think an American citizen cares primarily about America. That is a fundamental belief for me. To make an accusation that they don’t requires a very large amount of proof for each individual. I don’t care. Scott Horton (02:05:19): Pretend that American and Israel’s interests are the same, requires a tremendous amount of cognitive dissonance by those who support Israel’s interests. Mark Dubowitz (02:05:28): He’s right. They’re not all the same. Scott Horton (02:05:29): State sponsor of terror as though Iran has anything to do with anti-American terrorists. Lex Fridman (02:05:35): I don’t know who is the they that we’re talking about, but I believe American citizens care about America first. They may discuss how their nations and the interests in the Middle East or in Europe and those interests might align with their own worldview, whatever. But when it comes, at the end of the day, if everybody starts a war with everybody else, they’re America first. I am America first. If there’s a war that breaks out and we have to pick up guns, I’m fighting for America. Scott Horton (02:06:05): I’ll take them on a case by case basis. Lex Fridman (02:06:07): Case is great. Scott Horton (02:06:07): I know immigrants. I know immigrants who are absolutely super patriots who know American history and love and care about America more than their next door neighbors who are from here, but that ain’t universal. Okay? Lex Fridman (02:06:19): Sure. Let’s talk about case by case then. That’s fine. Mark Dubowitz (02:06:21): Well, I think he’s clearly accusing me. Scott Horton (02:06:24): I think a worse war with Iran. He was entertaining the possibility of putting ground troops in there, [inaudible 02:06:29] catastrophe for this country. Lex Fridman (02:06:29): Don’t take personal shots. Don’t take personal shots. Either of you. You’ve taken personal shots. Let’s not do it. You guys are just having fun and I’m having fun. Scott Horton (02:06:36): Just on the idea here. Mark Dubowitz (02:06:37): Let me respond. Scott Horton (02:06:37): He said that there, there’s a threat from the missiles. There’s a threat from Iranian missiles to America’s bases in the Middle East. Yeah. Because of Israel and because of this war, the first time Iran ever fired missiles at an American base over there was in response to Trump bombing them. Mark Dubowitz (02:06:53): Never Iran’s fault. It’s never Iran’s fault. Scott Horton (02:06:55): Is that what everybody thinks? Mark Dubowitz (02:06:56): Never his [inaudible 02:06:57] fault. Scott Horton (02:06:56): It was Iran who started this? Mark Dubowitz (02:06:58): Never Iran’s fault. Let’s bring it back, Scott. What a joke. Lex Fridman (02:06:58): Hold on a second. Mark Dubowitz (02:07:01): Scott. It’s a remarkable management. I want to reiterate this- Scott Horton (02:07:03): Trump bombed Ordo and then Iran shot missiles at Qatar and Iraq. Mark Dubowitz (02:07:08): Scott, you’re a patriotic American. God bless you. God bless the United States. Thank you for allowing me to come to this country and become an American. It’s a great country and as a patriotic American, I assume that the United States government and the United States intelligence community and the United States military has America’s best interest at heart. However, we have learned from the history, and Scott’s done a very good job of detailing this during the Iraq war, that the United States gets it wrong. I don’t think the United States lied us into war, but the United States got it wrong. So I think Scott’s right. We must make sure that we learn the lessons of Iraq, but not overlearn the lessons of Iraq. I would also say this. There are many lobby organizations in the United States. There’s the China lobby, there’s the oil lobby, there’s the pharmaceutical lobby, there’s the Qatar lobby. Scott Horton (02:10:52): They don’t have any 90% enriched uranium. He just means hypothetically, if they did have some, to be clear. Mark Dubowitz (02:10:58): You know the 60%, that’s 99% of the way to 90% enriched uranium. By the way, you can make a crude nuclear device with 60% enriched uranium. I just want to put that on the record, but he lost that key conversion facility that turns 90% enriched uranium or even 60% enriched uranium into uranium metal. You need uranium metal to fashion a crude nuclear device or a warhead. That’s been destroyed. And when I was coming in this morning, I just checked, I thought it was interesting and a whole lot of discussion about the fact that about 12 or 16 trucks showed up at Fordo in the days before the U.S strikes and moved something out of Fordo. Well, according to reports, just this morning, we’ll see if they’re verified. I don’t trust single sourcing. I don’t trust what some reporter just says in their stories because reporters got it wrong over and over again, especially all the ones who accuse President Trump have been a Russian agent. Scott Horton (02:14:14): Who thinks that if they break out and try to start making nukes now that any hawks supporting this war will take responsibility for driving them to it. Lex Fridman (02:14:22): So the suggestion you’re making is we’re actually driving as opposed to doing the opposite, we’re actually driving them to develop nuclear weapons. Scott Horton (02:14:31): Of course. That’s right. Lex Fridman (02:14:31): Can you make the case of that? Scott Horton (02:14:32): Yeah. Previously he said, “Let’s take the Ayatollah at his word that he only wants a civilian electricity program.” Well, let’s not take him at his word. Again, I never said in this conversation, “Trust the Ayatollah.” He did. Now he’s kind of-, Mark Dubowitz (02:14:47): Yeah, but you said that the Ayatollah doesn’t want nuclear a weapons programs. Scott, you were very clear about that. Scott Horton (02:14:51): What I said- Mark Dubowitz (02:14:53): Ayatollah never wanted a nuclear weapons program. Are you going back on that now? Scott Horton (02:14:55): Jesus Christ. What I was very clear about from my very first statement when we sat down was that the Ayatollah was building himself a latent nuclear deterrent, putting Iran as what they call a threshold nuclear weapons state just like Brazil and Germany and Japan, so that everyone knows they have mastered the fuel cycle, they could enrich uranium up to 90%, don’t make me do it. That was his position. Mark Dubowitz (02:14:55): None of those countries have a nuclear weapons program. None of them. Scott Horton (02:15:18): Did you ever hear me say anything about believing the Ayatollah saying he only wanted an electricity program? This is why enrichment is a red line. It’s because if all the enrichment is done overseas somewhere, then it’s not a latent nuclear deterrent at all. Mark Dubowitz (02:15:37): So it’s a red line for you, as well as for me, we agree, Scott. Scott Horton (02:15:40): I’m saying it’s a red line for the Ayatollah that he’s clearly not going to give in on, and it’s a poison pill by the Israelis in the west. They know he’s never going to give up enrichment a hundred percent because that’s the whole point of it. So it’s just disingenuous to say, “Oh, let’s believe him that he wants an electricity program.” He’s not saying that. I don’t even think that’s his official position. Or if it is, it’s with a strong implication as everyone understands that it’s a latent nuclear weapons capability and a potential actual nuclear weapons capability. Lex Fridman (02:16:13): To you, a deal will have to include enrichment. Scott Horton (02:16:15): Yes. Lex Fridman (02:16:16): That is a red line. He will move off. Scott Horton (02:16:17): Yes. And then the thing is too, just like I was saying before, if Trump had come in 2017 and said, “Screw this, I hate this deal.” And then got on a plane and flown straight to Tehran and said, or sent his guys and said, “Now listen here Ayatollah, I want to fix this deal up better.” I think that he really could have, and I already said, I don’t know the details, but I believe Mark when he says that the Europeans were being intransigent on that. And again, I criticized the CIA and FBI for framing Trump for treason, for preventing him from being able to work with the Russians to see if maybe they could put pressure on the Ayatollah to deal with him. Mark Dubowitz (02:17:39): Can I just say technically, just I think, again, important for your listeners trying understand, under the JCPOA, Iran is allowed to keep a stockpile of a maximum of 300 kilograms, as I remember, of 3.67% enriched material. They’re allowed to continue to enrich as long as if they go over the 300 kilogram, they have to continue to send that out to Russian, to Russia to blend down. And so they kept the enrichment capability, the ability to enrich. They did keep a stockpile. Scott’s right. They’re not allowed in those early years to go under 3.67%. They would be allowed to go to 20% and 60% and 90% as the restrictions sunsetted, but they were able to keep all of those key capabilities. So I just want to clarify just technically what the JCPOA actually said and what it didn’t say. Lex Fridman (02:18:30): Yeah. Can you comment on the so-called Operation Midnight Hammer? Now that we can look back at it, what parts were successful, what parts were a mistake? Was the whole operation a mistake that accelerates the Iran nuclear program or the incentives for it? Or is there some components that actually is a disincentive for Iran to develop the program? And then maybe you can comment on the same. It’d be nice just to get comments on each. Scott Horton (02:18:56): Well, I think we really don’t know, right? There’s some initial battle assessments and arguments and all that about just how much was destroyed, and we don’t know exactly what their reaction is going to be. There were reports of them saying, “Hey, we’re already starting up a new facility somewhere else.” There were reports where they said, “Hey, a lot of our centrifuges survived and we’re going to start spinning them up right now,” and this kind of thing. The potential is there. I don’t know what the Ayatollah is going to do. And I think this goes to the larger argument about the apocalyptic threat of the Ayatollah, which Mark has not made, but which Israel hawks often do that these guys just can’t wait to get into a war and all this. In fact, if you look at Iran- Mark Dubowitz (02:19:35): Well, they’re in a war, but the argument I make is they’re not going to use a nuclear weapon. Scott Horton (02:19:39): Jesus, man, you stop me, you interrupt me every time I try to say anything. Mark Dubowitz (02:19:41): But Scott, just You’re mischaracterizing what I’m saying. I need to clarify when you mischaracterize. Lex Fridman (02:19:45): He’s not interrupting every time, but sometimes interrupting. Yes. So try not to interrupt as much. Go ahead, Scott. Don’t take it personally. Come on, let’s go. Scott Horton (02:19:54): It seems like a deliberate attempt to obfuscate and prevent me- Lex Fridman (02:19:58): It’s not. Scott Horton (02:19:58): From just being able to complete a point. He does it virtually every time. Lex Fridman (02:20:02): No, it’s not. As a listener, I’m enjoying this. Scott Horton (02:20:05): Well, look, on the face of it, they blew up a lot of stuff and they made them very angry. So are they going to now give in or they’re now going to double down or they’re now going to hold still? We don’t really know. As I was trying to explain, from the Ayatollah’s position that he’s in, what are you going to do with a problem like the United States of America, right? They can chant great Satan, this and that all they want. They have no ability to really threaten this country in any way. And they know that America absolutely does have the ability to, in fact, even without nuclear weapons, essentially wipe their civilization off the face of the earth just with B52s if we wanted to carpet bomb their major cities. So they know, the Ayatollah knows, he’s in a very difficult position. Lex Fridman (02:21:39): Zero casualties so far? Scott Horton (02:21:40): Zero casualties so far. So what is going on there essentially is he’s got to do something. He’s doing these symbolic strikes essentially to say like, “Hey, you can’t do that to me.” But then he’s also telegraphing that, “Hey, I can’t do anything about you and I don’t really want to fight.” And so in a way, he’s kind of backing down. He’s doing, and then what did Donald Trump say? Donald Trump again, let him have the last word and in fact, bragged and mocked and said, “Hey, thanks Ayatollah for giving us a warning that you were about to shoot missiles at our base so we could be ready to shoot them all down,” and this kind of thing. And he said, “Now is the time for peace.” In other words, Trump again, letting the Ayatollah get the last word. Why? Because the Ayatollah, he might be a horrible leader if you live in Iran, but he is not perfectly, but essentially cautious in foreign policy because what’s he going to do? Lex Fridman (02:23:45): That is one of the fundamental disagreements in the room that you’re saying they really don’t have interest to develop a nuclear weapon. And they’re not quite- Scott Horton (02:23:55): Well, not exactly. I mean, what I said- Lex Fridman (02:23:57): More towards that direction, then Mark is saying- Scott Horton (02:23:59): More toward, but they’re saying, “Look at us. We’re a threshold state. Don’t push your luck and force us to make the bad decision.” Now, that’s an implication. They have not said that outright, but clearly the implication is that if we force them, then they will go ahead and make a nuclear weapon. Lex Fridman (02:24:16): What I mean is if left on their own devices, they would not develop. That’s the case you’re making, the case- Scott Horton (02:24:22): Well, not just on their own devices, but if we were to try to negotiate with them in good faith and try to have normal relations with them, that would disincentivize a nuclear weapon even further. Lex Fridman (02:24:32): Okay. Can you comment on the mission on operation and in general? Mark Dubowitz (02:24:34): Sure. A couple of things I think were interesting, what Scott said, and I agree certainly with some of it. I mean, the first thing is I do believe President Trump has negotiated in good faith. I mean, he sent Steve Witkoff, he’s chief negotiator for five rounds of negotiations since he came in office. The second is, I mean, we can keep going around in circles, but the fact of the matter is I do believe that Iran and Iran-backed terrorist organizations have for since 1979 killed and tried to kill and maim Americans and taken them hostage. I think it’s important for me again to put that on the record, but where I agree with with Scott is, and it’s interesting, and I don’t know if Khamenei has changed. He’s 86 years old. He’s been in power since 1989. And there’s a little bit of history that I think is really interesting. Scott Horton (02:28:55): Do you think that that might have anything to do with the fact that America attacked Iraq and Libya when they did not have weapons of mass destruction programs? Mark Dubowitz (02:29:04): Can I tell you the Libya example? I think Scott is the most interesting one for me, right? Because the Libya example- Scott Horton (02:29:09): When they lynched the guy? Mark Dubowitz (02:29:09): It was a big mistake. By the way, Ukraine is another good example of this. We went to the Libyans and we said, “You must fully dismantle your program.” And Gaddafi said, reluctantly under huge American pressure, “Okay, I’ll do it.” And the Brits and the Americans went in there and literally hauled out his entire nuclear- Scott Horton (02:29:26): It wasn’t really a program, it was just a bunch of AQ cons junk sitting in crates in a warehouse. They did not have the capability to make a nuclear program at all in Libya. They didn’t have the engineers, the scientists or anyone. So Gaddafi had bought that junk just to trade it away. Just to be clear, there never was a nuclear weapons program or a nuclear program of any kind in Libya, unlike what you just heard. Mark Dubowitz (02:29:48): That wasn’t my point. Okay? My point is you had a nuclear program- Scott Horton (02:29:51): Patents are important. Mark Dubowitz (02:29:52): We can debate about, again, how we were debating about whether- Scott Horton (02:29:52): He had warehouses full of crates. Mark Dubowitz (02:29:56): Again, it’s always Gaddafi and Khamenei and all these people, they don’t really want nuclear weapons. We just misunderstand them. But that’s not the point. The point is, we did a deal with Gaddafi. We pulled out his nuclear program and then I don’t know how many years later, but it wasn’t too many years late. Scott Horton (02:29:56): Seven. Mark Dubowitz (02:30:10): Seven years later, thank you, Scott. We actually took Gaddafi out and he didn’t have a nuclear program, so we took him out in the Libya operation. Now, Ukraine is another great example. The Ukrainians after the fall of the Soviet Union, you know this, they had the Soviet nuclear arsenal or good parts of it on their soil. So we went to them and we said, “All right, well here’s the deal for you. Give up the nuclear arsenal off your territory, and we and the Russians and the French guarantee your territorial integrity and your sovereignty as a country.” So the Ukrainians said, “Fair deal to me,” gave up all the nuclear weapons, and then Putin has now invaded Ukraine twice. Scott Horton (02:30:49): That’s not what the Bucharest Declaration says, that we promised their security, we promised to respect it, and the Russians promised to, and both sides broke that promise. But there is nothing like a guarantee. Mark Dubowitz (02:30:59): That’s not my point. Scott Horton (02:31:00): That America would protect Ukraine’s sovereignty. They gave up those nukes and they had no ability to use those nukes anyway, because they were Soviet nukes with Soviet codes and they belonged to the Soviet military, and the Ukrainians would’ve had no ability to use them or deliver. They were married to missiles that were made to fly around the world, not to Russian next door. Mark Dubowitz (02:31:18): But Scott, my point is, and I think you’ll agree with this, my point is if you’re Khamenei, and you’ve seen those two examples of Libya, you gave up your nuclear program, Gaddafi gets taken down. You’re Ukraine, you gave up your nuclear weapons, and the Russians invaded twice. If you’re Khamenei thinking to yourself, “The only thing that matters more to me than my nuclear weapons program is my regime survival. And in 12 days of war, the Israelis specifically, because we hit Fordo and Isfahan and the Khans, we the United States hit those sites. We the United States hit those sites. Lex Fridman (02:31:53): The gleeful nation, Scott, stop. Take that out. There’s no place here in this room with me, the un-American bullshit, don’t do that. The implication here, man, is that I, me, am un-American. I’ve been attacked just like the Russian hoax for being a Putin shill. I’m an American. Scott Horton (02:32:14): Well, when you talk about Ukraine’s war with Russia, do you say we or do you say they? Mark Dubowitz (02:32:19): I said we the United States, we actually- Scott Horton (02:32:21): Well, you added the United States, but you just described Israel’s strikes. Mark Dubowitz (02:32:24): Israel didn’t strike Fordo, Scott. Lex Fridman (02:32:25): He talked about the US attack. You’re speaking to this other people that you’ve heard that somehow. They do say we, and they talk about, I would say ridiculously as if, I’ve even heard some people basically put Israel above US, and they’re American citizens. Yeah, that’s fucking ridiculous. But none of those people are in this room. There are demons under the bed. I’m sure those people exist. There’s ridiculous people on the internet. There’s ridiculous people in Congress who can criticize them, make fun of them, say they’re fucking crazy. Scott Horton (02:33:02): The foundation for a defense of democracy has been the vanguard of the war party in this country for 25 years. Lex Fridman (02:33:07): Well, that’s a different criticism, but I was- Scott Horton (02:33:09): It’s an important one. Lex Fridman (02:33:10): Yes, that, but no, you just switched. You just switched. No, no, no. You just switched from the un-American discussion to criticizing policies that that particular institute, fine, criticize the policies, do that. What is the un-American bullshit? Not here. Scott Horton (02:33:27): Lex, the neoconservative movement is the vanguard of the Israel lobby. That’s who they are. That’s what Neoconservatism is about. Mark Dubowitz (02:33:34): Lex, I’m not a NeoCon. Scott Horton (02:33:34): That’s who the war- Mark Dubowitz (02:33:35): I’m not a neoconservative, so I don’t know who he’s talking about, but I’m not a neoconservative. Lex Fridman (02:33:39): Let’s not mix stuff up. Scott Horton (02:33:40): There is a massive Israel lobby in America, in Washington that is inseparable from the American War party. Lex Fridman (02:33:47): Yeah, yeah. I’ve talked to John Mersham. I respect him deeply. He’s one of the most brilliant people speaking on that topic. Great, great. Let’s just talk about today and the nuclear proliferation. You guys have been brilliant on this. I’m learning a lot. Let’s continue [inaudible 02:34:01]. Mark Dubowitz (02:34:01): Yeah. Sorry. Let’s go back to where Khamenei may be. I mean, in a bunker, 86 years old thinking he’s going to drink the poison chalice and agree to a deal with Donald Trump and Oman, or is he going to do all of the things that Scott and I are concerned about? And one of those, and Scott has pointed this out rightly so, is he may decide now to break out for the nuke or creep out for the nuke. He may decide not to do it now, he may decide to do it in three and a half years when President Trump is gone. And I think that the important thing is he’s seen, we, the United States, we took out Fordo and Natanz and Isfahan in one operation with B-II bombers and 12 30,000 pound massive orange penatrators and Tomahawk missile. So if he didn’t think if that the United States had serious military power before, he now knows we do. Lex Fridman (02:34:56): So to you, that operation was geopolitically a success. It sends a message of strength that if you try to build, you’re going to be punished. Lex Fridman (02:35:00): It sends a message of strength that if you try to build, you’re going to be punished for it. Mark Dubowitz (02:35:04): So I’ve said online in the past 12 days, and even before that, “Curb your enthusiasm. Curb your enthusiasm.” So all the people- Lex Fridman (02:35:12): Related to which topic? Mark Dubowitz (02:35:13): … Yeah, just this idea that this has been this unbelievable success and everything’s great. And everything’s going to be amazing. And we stopped the nuclear weapons program and this has been a resounding success. Scott Horton (02:35:37): You demanded unconditional surrender on Twitter again last night, right? After Trump said there’s a ceasefire? Mark Dubowitz (02:35:42): Yes. Lex Fridman (02:35:42): What does unconditional surrender mean? Mark Dubowitz (02:35:44): It means no enrichment, full dismantlement. Lex Fridman (02:35:45): Okay. Mark Dubowitz (02:35:46): Yes, exactly right. It’s exactly what President Trump … Well, I can’t- Scott Horton (02:35:49): Not a regime change? Unconditional surrender in World War II meant the end of the Nazi regime and the imperialist Japanese regime entirely. Right? Lex Fridman (02:35:55): Does President Trump know what that means? Mark Dubowitz (02:35:56): He made it very clear. President Trump made it very clear. Lex Fridman (02:35:58): Unconditional? Mark Dubowitz (02:35:58): He made it clear, ” I don’t support regime change.” Lex Fridman (02:36:01): Well, except for that one post. Scott Horton (02:36:04): A few hours earlier? Right. Mark Dubowitz (02:36:06): Actually, I’ll explain that one because I thought it was really interesting. Lex Fridman (02:36:10): He’s re-analyzing it like it’s Shakespeare. What does that? Mark Dubowitz (02:36:11): Yeah, yeah. Lex Fridman (02:36:11): And what did he also mean? We have two countries that have been fighting so long and so hard that they don’t know what the fuck they’re doing. What’s that about? Scott Horton (02:36:18): He was angry that Israel was still attacking after he promised they weren’t. He demanded they turn their planes around. He felt that they were doing it in defiance of their agreement. Lex Fridman (02:36:27): But he didn’t say Israel. He says that both countries [inaudible 02:36:30]. Scott Horton (02:36:29): Different quote. He did say, I believe it was a tweet from Truth Social, “I demand that Israel turn those planes around right now.” Was how upset he was about it. Mark Dubowitz (02:36:39): Well, I guess Donald Trump doesn’t listen to Bibi all the time, does he? Scott Horton (02:36:41): Yeah, I guess he’s finding out they respect him about as much as they respect the Palestinian. He’s just the help. Lex Fridman (02:36:47): Well, that’s how world leaders …. World leaders are interested in their own nation. Mark Dubowitz (02:36:49): That’s right. Lex Fridman (02:36:50): They fuck you over. Scott Horton (02:36:51): Good important lesson there everyone. What does Israel care about? Israel. Mark Dubowitz (02:36:55): Every country then defends its national interests. That’s not unusual for Israel or any other country. But I think to understand- Scott Horton (02:37:02): We’re supposed to pretend that, “Hey, whatever Israel needs, we’re here to serve their interests.” Lex Fridman (02:37:06): If those people exist, they aren’t American. If people put Israel’s interest first- Scott Horton (02:37:15): He just said we fight terrorism together. Mark Dubowitz (02:37:15): … Well, we do. Scott Horton (02:37:15): Well, we generate terrorism together. What are you talking about? Lex Fridman (02:37:15): But that doesn’t mean you put Israel’s interest above America’s. If you do, you’re unAmerican. Mark Dubowitz (02:37:20): You know how many American lives- Scott Horton (02:37:21): That’s all I’m saying. Mark Dubowitz (02:37:22): … Israeli intelligence community has saved? And ask people in the FBI and CIA who work counter-terrorism, how many American lives the Israelis have saved because of their intelligence capabilities. Scott Horton (02:37:34): How about when Naftali Bennett, again, bombed that shelter full of women and children and caused the September 11th attack. That’s what happened. In fact, I don’t know if you know the story, but you could Google this. You like Googling things. It’s on Google Books. Mark Dubowitz (02:38:46): Of course, that’s ignores the history of Al-Qaeda- Scott Horton (02:38:48): Which for years before that was for the United States, Britain, and Saudi Arabia. Mark Dubowitz (02:38:52): … operations against the United States, but executing them. Lex Fridman (02:38:55): You guys love pulling each other into history. Scott Horton (02:38:57): No, no, no. History is, America’s problem with Al-Qaeda- Mark Dubowitz (02:39:01): Just one second. Mark Dubowitz (02:39:01): America’s problems with Al-Qaeda is Israel. America and Israel are terrorist states. Scott- Scott Horton (02:39:06): They were America’s mercenaries that we used in Afghanistan, in Bosnia, in Kosovo, in Chechnya. Mark Dubowitz (02:39:11): It’s all us. It’s all us. Scott Horton (02:39:11): But they turned against us. Mark Dubowitz (02:39:12): And when I mean us, Scott? I mean, America. Scott Horton (02:39:14): They turned against us. Mark Dubowitz (02:39:14): It’s all us, Scott. It’s all us. Scott Horton (02:39:15): Anyone can read Michael Shearer’s book, the former chief of the CIA’s Bin Laden where he wrote his great book. Mark Dubowitz (02:39:21): We’re responsible for our enemies attacking us. Scott Horton (02:39:23): It’s called Imperial Hubris. Mark Dubowitz (02:39:38): That’s the most articulate justification I’ve ever heard for Al-Qaeda in my life. But let’s- Scott Horton (02:39:42): It’s not a justification. I’m not saying that makes what they did right? I’m saying that was how Bin Laden recruited his foot soldiers to attack this country was by citing American foreign policies that were directly to the detriment of the people of the Middle East. And specifically, our support for Israel. Mark Dubowitz (02:41:27): I think Al-Qaeda hates America, Scott. Scott Horton (02:41:28): Why? You know what? I’ll tell you what, Ali Soufan … You know, Ali Soufan, the former FBI agent, counter-terrorism agent? He wrote in his book, The Black Banners, that the Bin Ladenites said to Bin Laden, “We don’t understand why you’re so angry at America. They’ve been so good to us in Afghanistan, in Bosnia, in Kosovo, and now here in Chechnya. Why do you want to attack them?” Mark Dubowitz (02:41:50): And Bin Laden attacked America. Scott Horton (02:41:50): Bin Laden said, “I have a larger agenda that you don’t understand.” Lex Fridman (02:41:54): The disagreement between you is clear. I’ve talked to Noam Chomsky twice. Scott, you focus on the criticism. Scott Horton (02:41:59): You should interview Michael Scheuer. Well, although he’s gone pretty crazy lately. I don’t know. Maybe not. Lex Fridman (02:42:04): Anyway, we’re going into history. We’re learning a lot. The perspectives differ strongly. Can we look into the, maybe a ridiculous question, but a nuclear proliferation? You already started to speak to, both of you. Mark Dubowitz (02:42:41): So look, I think it’s a great question. Will there be more nuclear weapons powers in the future or less as a result of this decision by President Trump? Lex Fridman (02:45:07): What if they don’t? What if they’re prevented? Doesn’t that still send the same message to everybody that they should build? Mark Dubowitz (02:45:15): Oh, I think it sends the opposite message, Lex. I think if they see what has happened and that it’s successful, and it stopped Iran from developing nuclear weapons. And in addition, if Trump is able to negotiate an agreement for zero enrichment and full dismantlement, then the message to all these other countries is, number one, you don’t need it. And number two, if you try to get it, then the United States is going to use American power. Lex Fridman (02:47:42): My favorite thing is when you guys point out, when you agree with the other person. Anyway, Scott, what do you think? Everything that’s just happened over the past two weeks does to nuclear proliferation over the next 5, 10, 20 years? Scott Horton (02:47:56): I really don’t know for sure. But I would think that there’s a very great danger that it’s going to reinforce the lessons of North Korea, Iraq, and Libya, which is, “You better get a nuke to keep America out. And you better hurry before it’s too late.” Lex Fridman (02:49:33): And good translator. Scott Horton (02:49:34): And Peele goes off like an angry Black guy kind of character. Right? Lex Fridman (02:49:37): He’s been going nuts on Twitter. Scott Horton (02:49:38): Yeah, he goes way out, above and beyond, but I think he’s probably acting on instructions to talk that way. And it is a real risk that the NPT could just fall apart when it’s treated so callously by the United States who invented it. And insisted that the rest of the world adopt the thing to such a great degree. Lex Fridman (02:49:59): Trump did say, ” Don’t use the N word.” He talked down to Medvedev. Scott Horton (02:50:02): That’s right. Yeah, he did. Lex Fridman (02:50:04): Don’t throw around the nuclear word. Scott Horton (02:50:05): Yeah. Well, and I appreciate that. Lex Fridman (02:50:07): That’s good. He’s right. He’s right in that. It’s a serious thing. Scott Horton (02:50:12): And look, Pakistanis could give a nuke to Iran who are their friends, I think not the tightest of allies. I’m not saying I predict that, but there’s a danger of that. Lex Fridman (02:52:53): Is that your Bill Clinton impression? Scott Horton (02:52:54): No. I’ll spare you. Lex Fridman (02:52:55): Okay. Scott Horton (02:52:55): That was pretty good. After the show, when we’re not recording much. Mark Dubowitz (02:53:00): Can I respond to a couple of things here? Just really quickly. I’ll try to do it quickly. Scott Horton (02:54:21): I didn’t say that. Mark Dubowitz (02:54:21): … Well, you said, quote unquote, “Iran is not attacking Israel.” So I mean, it’s just not true. Scott Horton (02:54:25): Yeah, they were not in a state of war until Israel launched a state of war. That’s the fact. Mark Dubowitz (02:54:29): Yeah, they were at war. Scott Horton (02:54:30): Oh, well, they backed a group that did a thing. Yeah, okay. Mark Dubowitz (02:54:33): They killed thousands of Israelis, maimed thousands of Israelis. Scott Horton (02:54:36): But that attack was not- Mark Dubowitz (02:54:37): Suicide bomb ordered in Tehran. Scott Horton (02:54:39): The Wall Street Journal says that US intelligence does not believe that Tehran ordered that attack. But they found out about- Mark Dubowitz (02:54:43): What the Wall Street Journal says and what the US intelligence says, and we can dispute whether they directed it on October 7th. Everybody knows indisputably, that Iran financed Hamas, provided Hamas with weapons. Scott Horton (02:54:44): So did Israel. Mark Dubowitz (02:54:58): Well, just a second, provided Hamas with weapons. That the IRGC and the Quds force were training Hamas. Hezbollah backed by Iran was training Hamas. There were three meetings before October 7th, one in Beirut, one in Damascus, and one in Tehran where the IRGC, Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad were together. There was a meeting in Tehran that was attended by Khamenei the Supreme leader. Lex Fridman (02:55:43): Critics of Israel will say that Benjamin Netanyahu has also been indirectly financing Hamas by allowing the funds going into- Scott Horton (02:55:51): I’ll say that America backs Israel, so anything Israel does is America’s responsibility too under that same logic, right? Lex Fridman (02:55:58): … I think you started to make a point disagreeing with Scott about that they’re not a good member of the NPT. Scott Horton (02:56:04): That’s all tiny technical violations. None of that has anything to do with weaponization. It’s always so, “Yeah, how do you explain this isotope?” And they go, “Well, it must’ve came with the Pakistani junk that we bought from [inaudible 02:56:14].” Mark Dubowitz (02:56:21): Yeah, that’s just not the case. Scott Horton (02:56:22): That’s the entire history of the IAEA’s objections to Iran. Mark Dubowitz (02:56:27): So your listeners, I know they’re not going to do it, because it’s a lot of technical reading. Scott Horton (02:56:31): Nothing to do with weaponization. A diversion of nuclear material. Mark Dubowitz (02:56:31): But just go out, go out and read IAEA reports dating back at least 20 years. And you’ll see the IAEA meticulously, methodically, dispassionately outlining all of the violations that Iran has embarked on of the NPT. Scott Horton (02:56:50): Virtually all those are resolved later. They won’t answer this, and then later they do. Well, they won’t answer that, and then later they do. Mark Dubowitz (02:56:56): And many open files are still there. Again, I just want your viewers to walk away from this conversation thinking, “Okay, that’s interesting. I didn’t know that.” And that, “I’m going to go fact check Mark and fact check Scott, and just see what this is all about.” Right? Because otherwise, it’s just he says, she says, or he says, he says. Scott Horton (02:57:34): They abided by the additional protocol without having ratified it. They abided by it for three years and did not proceed with any enrichment at all as long as they were dealing in good faith with the EU until W. Bush ruined those negotiations and closed them down. Only then did they begin to install the centrifuges at Natanz. Mark Dubowitz (02:57:51): It’s always the Americans who screw things up. Scott Horton (02:57:52): You complain they didn’t ratify the thing, but they abided by it for years. Mark Dubowitz (02:57:56): So that’s an interesting- Lex Fridman (02:57:57): They were in violation of it. But I think a more pragmatic and important disagreement that we already spoke to is how do we decrease the incentive for Iran to build nuclear programs? Not just the next couple of years, but the next 10, 20 years. Scott Horton (02:57:57): Attack it more. Lex Fridman (02:58:12): You’re mocking that. There’s a lot of people that will … There’s neocons that say basically, “Invade everything. Let’s make money off of war.” Scott Horton (02:58:33): If we’re really lucky. Lex Fridman (02:58:35): So it’s a big risk is your case. Mark Dubowitz (02:58:36): So here’s some practical recommendations that I think the United States should follow. I think the first is get the Iranians back to Oman, negotiate with them and do a deal. Lex Fridman (03:03:02): So Scott, as many people know, here in Austin, Texas, you’re the director of the Libertarian Institute. Let’s zoom out a bit. What are the key pillars of libertarianism and how that informs how you see the world? Scott Horton (03:03:17): Well, the very basis of libertarianism is the non-aggression principle, which essentially is the same thing as our social rules for dealing with each other in private life. No force, no theft, no fraud, and keep your hands to yourself. And we apply that same moral law to government. Scott Horton (03:06:00): For the United States of America, what we want is independence, non-interventionism and peace. Lex Fridman (03:06:05): So to you, isolationism is a kind of dirty word- Scott Horton (03:06:08): That’s right. It’s a smear term- Lex Fridman (03:06:08): It’s a smear term. Scott Horton (03:06:10): Invented by interventionists and internationalists to attack anyone who didn’t want to go along with their agenda. The term itself is used essentially as a smear against anyone who doesn’t want to go to war. Lex Fridman (03:06:22): So can you actually just deeper describe what non-interventionism means? So how much display of military strength should be there, do you think? Scott Horton (03:06:32): Dr. Paul said, we could defend this country with a couple of good submarines, which by the way, for people who don’t know, one American Trident sub could essentially kill every city and military base in Russia, just one. So he’s absolutely right about that. A couple of good submarines are enough to defend our coast and deter anyone from messing with the United States of America. And then I admit, I’m a little bit idealistic about this, that I think of that old William Jennings Bryan speech, ” Behold the Republic,” where unlike the empires of Europe burdened under the weight of militarism. Here we have a free country and where you know what we could do? We could be the host of peace conferences everywhere. There are frozen conflicts in the Donbass, in Kaliningrad, in Transnistria, in Taiwan, in Korea, virtually all the borders of Africa and Eurasia were drawn by European powers to either divide and conquer their enemies or artificially group their enemies together in order to keep them internally divided and conquered in those ways. Lex Fridman (03:08:54): Yeah, I’ve criticized Trump a lot, but I think maybe he’s just rhetoric, but I think he talks about peace a lot. Even just recently, the number of times the word peace is mentioned and with seriousness, not you get a genuine desire for peace from him. And that’s just beautiful to see for the leader of this country. Scott Horton (03:09:15): And look, man, there used to be a time when a third of the planet was dominated by the communists, right? So I’m not going to sit here and argue the first Cold War with you. My book’s about the second one, and I’m not as good on the first. But since the end of the first Cold War, we have let the neoconservative policy of the defense planning guidance of ’92 and rebuilding America’s defenses and the rest of this American dominance-centered policy control our entire direction in the world. It’s led to the war on terrorism in the Middle East, seven countries we’ve attacked. It’s led to the disaster in Eastern Europe, and it’s leading toward disaster in Eastern Asia when there’s just no reason in the world that it has to be this way with the commies dead and gone. Lex Fridman (03:10:22): Just one more thing. You mentioned the two submarines. What’s the role of nuclear weapons? Scott Horton (03:10:28): Well, I would like for America to have an extremely minimal nuclear deterrent and work toward a world free of nuclear weapons. And I know that that sounds utopian. However, I would remind your audience that Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev came within a hair of achieving a deal just like that at Reykjavik Iceland in 1986, and they were both of them dead serious about it, complete and total nuclear disarmament. Then Reagan was essentially bullied by Richard Pearl and others on his staff saying, “You promised the American people that you would build them a defensive anti-missile system, the Star Wars system,” which was total pie in the sky, technological fantasy of the 1980s. And if you’re getting rid of all the ICBMs, then why the hell do you need a missile shield anyway? Is the world’s probably greatest tragedy that ever took place that Ronald Reagan walked away from those negotiations. Lex Fridman (03:12:40): We should also just say one more thing, not to be ageist, but most of the major leaders with nukes and those with power in the world are in their 70s and 80s. I don’t know if that contributes to it, but they kind of are grounded in a different time. I have a hope for the fresher, younger leaders to have a more optimistic view towards peace and to be able to reach towards peace. Scott Horton (03:13:06): And underlying so much of what we’re talking about here is all this enmity, but if America could just work, remember when China cut that pseudo sort of peace deal between Saudi and Iran a couple of years ago or last year was it? We could try to double up on that. We could try to come up with ways for Saudi and Iran to exchange as much as possible. I know you don’t like all the going back too far in history, but it’s important. It’s in my book that in 1993, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who the revolution had happened on his watch Operation Eagle Claw, the disaster of the rescue mission in ’79 after the hostage crisis and everything, all that egg was on ZB’s face. But in ’93 he said, “We should normalize relations. We should build an oil pipeline across Iran so they can make money. We can make money and we can start to normalize.” Mark Dubowitz (03:15:46): But to just have Scott and I fighting- Lex Fridman (03:15:47): That’s a fund kind of fight. Mark Dubowitz (03:15:50): Fun and peaceful. Lex Fridman (03:15:51): Mark, you’re the CEO of FDD, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, it’s a DC-based organization that focuses on national security and foreign policy. What has been your approach to solving some of these problems of the world? Mark Dubowitz (03:16:09): So look, I love the vision that Scott painted, and I agree with some of the libertarian instincts that he has, but my view is that America is the indispensable power. Scott mentioned earlier in the conversation about the rules-based order that is so important and the NPT and all these rules-based agreements that are important to maintain. Well, the rules-based order has been maintained by the United States since World War II. There is no American prosperity to the degree that we have. There’s no recovery of Europe, there’s no recovery of Asia after the devastation of World War II without American power and the rules-based order that America has led and back stopped. Scott Horton (03:21:04): Have I been pronouncing it wrong this whole time? Mark Dubowitz (03:21:06): Reza Pahlavi? Scott Horton (03:21:06): You know the guy? Mark Dubowitz (03:21:08): I met him, yeah. Scott Horton (03:21:09): Pahlavi. Mark Dubowitz (03:21:10): Pahlavi. Lex Fridman (03:21:10): What were you saying? Scott Horton (03:21:11): I thought it was Pahlavi. Lex Fridman (03:21:13): Oh wow. Mark Dubowitz (03:21:14): No, it’s okay. It’s okay. Lex Fridman (03:21:14): Heartbreaking. Scott Horton (03:21:14): Seriously, who knew? Mark Dubowitz (03:21:18): The only thing you’ve ever gotten wrong for pronouncing [inaudible 03:21:21] that’s not bad. That’s Lex Fridman (03:21:22): Pronouncing so many things correctly, I think people will give you a pass. Scott Horton (03:21:25): Can I ask you though? I mean all this militarization has led to a state of permanent war. We’ve been bombing Iraq for 34 years. We put a war against the Taliban who didn’t attack us instead of Al-Qaeda who did fought for 20 years, and the Taliban won anyway. We overthrew or launched an aggressive war against Saddam Hussein put the Ayatollah’s best friends in power, launched an aggressive war against Libya on this ridiculous hoax that Gaddafi was about to murder every last man, woman, and child in Benghazi. Imagine Charlotte, North Carolina being wiped off the map, Barack Obama lied in order to start that war and completely destroyed Libya. It’s now three pieces in a state of semi-permanent civil war including, and this wasn’t just back then, this is to this day the re-legalization and re-institutionalization of chattel slavery of sub-Saharan Black Africans in Libya to this day, as a result. Lex Fridman (03:22:42): Point well made. He’s speaking to the double-edged sword of a strong military that what you mentioned that Trump did, seems like a very difficult thing to do, which is keep it hit hard and keep it short. Scott Horton (03:22:57): We don’t know how this ended yet. Lex Fridman (03:22:59): But even the beginning part is not trivial to do. Just hitting one mission and vocalizing except for one post, no regime change, really pushing peace, make a deal, ceasefire like that’s an uncommon way to operate. So I guess you said that we should resist the military industrial complex. That’s not easy to do. That’s the double-edged sword of a strong military. Scott Horton (03:23:29): Oh, I forgot Yemen. Let me say real quick, and I promise… Look, I’m going to say one thing then and then I’ll stop. Mark Dubowitz (03:23:32): You’ve made your point. Scott Horton (03:23:33): I just want to add that this is a really important point, okay. Is grassroots efforts. There is no Houthi lobby in America. It was grassroots efforts by libertarians, Quakers, and leftists to get War Powers resolutions introduced in Trump’s first term to stop war in Yemen, which was launched not for Israel, for Saudi Arabia and UAE by Barack Obama in 2015. Mark Dubowitz (03:23:33): Well, that’s a first. Scott Horton (03:23:56): It’s not a first. The Afghan war wasn’t about Israel either. Okay, but this Yemen war was- Mark Dubowitz (03:24:01): I thought 9/11 was about Israel. Scott Horton (03:24:03): Well, it was in great part, but the decision to sack Cobble and do a regime change and all that had nothing to do with the Likud whatsoever other than, well, we got to keep the war going long enough to go to Baghdad. Mark Dubowitz (03:24:16): Oh, okay. So it was Israel’s fault. Scott Horton (03:24:17): I was in the middle of saying about the war in Yemen that we got the war powers resolution through twice, and Trump vetoed it twice. And his man, Pete Navarro, explained to the New York Times that this was just welfare for American industry. A lot of industrialists were angry about the tariffs disrupting trade with China, and somehow they substituted Raytheon for all American industry somehow and said, industry will be happy if we funnel a lot of money to Raytheon. That’s Pete Navarro talking to the New York Times about why they continued the war in Yemen throughout Trump’s entire first term. He had no interest in it at all. The whole thing was it was Obama’s fault. The whole thing was essentially on autopilot. And what was he doing? He’s flying Al-Qaeda’s Air Force against the Houthis, who originally, if you go back to January of 2015, America was passing intelligence to the Houthis to use to kill Al-Qaeda. You know AQAP, the guys that tried to blow up the plane over Detroit with the underpants bomb on Christmas Day 2009 that did all those horrific massacres in Europe, real As Bin Ladinist terrorists. Lex Fridman (03:25:38): Right, military, industrial complex. The point was made. Mark Dubowitz (03:25:40): Yeah, maybe I could respond to that, because I mean, again, it’s always America’s fault according Scott. Lex Fridman (03:25:46): Just take jab at each other. Mark Dubowitz (03:25:46): No, no but it’s just- Scott Horton (03:25:46): Saudi and UAE asked Barack Obama for permission to start that war and for American help in prosecuting it, and he said yes, and helped them do it. Mark Dubowitz (03:25:53): I’m going to segue into an answer, because I think it deserves an answer. Military industrial complex is a serious concern because I think you’re right. The bigger it gets, and the more weapons you have, you think the more the greater the temptation to use it, right? I think that’s sort of the argument. And then there’s also self enrichment and how much money can be made, and all of that I think is of serious concern to people. Look, I think Trump is somebody who, it’s hard pressed to say that Donald Trump is a great advocate of the military industrial complex, or that he is in their pocket the same way that he’s in the pocket of the Israelis and in the pocket of the Saudis and in the pocket of everybody. I mean, I think the one thing with Trump is that Trump, he has learned the lessons of American engagement over the past few decades, and I think Scott’s done a good job of laying out the mistakes that have been made, even though we can discuss about causal connections and who’s responsible. And I lean on- Scott Horton (03:26:52): Can we? I want to. Mark Dubowitz (03:26:53): Well, Scott, can I finish? Because your causal connection is always, it’s America aggressing, Israel aggressing, and all these poor people responding to us. But nonetheless, I think Trump has, he’s learned the lessons, but he hasn’t over-learned the lessons. He’s not paralyzed by Iraq or Afghanistan or the mistakes made by his predecessors. He understands that at the end of the day, we need serious American power. We need lethal power. We need four deterrence. And he’s been very careful and very selective about how he uses American power. I mean, we’ve talked about it throughout this whole conversation. Trump used American power to kill Qasem Soleimani, one of the world’s most dangerous terrorists. He killed Baghdadi, the head of ISIS, one of the world’s most dangerous terrorists. Scott Horton (03:27:57): That’s not true. Those are North Korean missiles completely debunked by Janes’ Defense Weekly. Nice try. Mark Dubowitz (03:28:02): Yeah, nice try. Anyway, everybody knows that the Iranians have been financing the Houthis. Hezbollah has been training the Houthis, and Iran has given capabilities to the Houthis to develop their own indigenous missile capability. The fact of the matter is he did in a way go after the Houthis much more intensively than Biden did in order to prevent them from continuing to shut down Red Sea shipping on which both America and our allies depend as a trade route. He actually did it quite successfully because after a few days of pretty intensive bombing, the Houthis got the message and they cut a deal with Donald Trump, they’re not going to interfere with our ships anymore. Scott Horton (03:28:41): He got a deal with them. They kept bombing Israel, which is what got him involved in the first place. He completely backed out. Sounds to me like they won, and he backed down. Mark Dubowitz (03:28:48): Well, it sounds like in terms of promoting American national security interests, it sounds like he did a pretty good job of sending a message to the Houthis and the Iranians don’t mess with the United States, and that gets us to the contemporary reality. He took a decision one day on one day to send our B2s and our subs in order to severe damage to three nuclear facilities. It was a one day campaign. It was selective. It was narrow, it was overwhelming. And I think it sends a message to Khamenei. I think it sends a message to regimes around the world, anti-American regimes around the world, that Donald Trump has not over-learned the lessons of the past 20 years, but that in fact, he is not going to dismantle the U.S military and dismantle our nuclear program and fly around through all these cities and call peace conferences and hope that these dictators will just sit down with America and say, “You know what? All is forgiven the United States of America. It’s all your fault. You did this all. We admit our responsibility,” and then we have peace and paradise on earth. Lex Fridman (03:31:26): So you made a case for, if it’s okay, you made a case for strength here. Just practically speaking, why do you think Trump has talked about peace a lot, why do you think he hasn’t been able to get to a ceasefire with Ukraine and Russia, for example? If we just move away from Iran without getting into the history of the whole thing, why he’s been talking peace, peace, peace, peace, peace. He’s been pushing it and pushing it. What can we learn about that so far failure, that’s also instructed for Iran? Mark Dubowitz (03:31:57): Look, I’m not a Russia expert. I’m not a Ukraine expert. I’m sitting in front of two people who know a lot more about that conflict than I do. Lex Fridman (03:32:03): You are, we should say, banned by Putin. Mark Dubowitz (03:32:06): I am. I have been sanctioned by Russia and by Iran. Lex Fridman (03:32:10): Sanctioned. Yes. Mark Dubowitz (03:32:11): Yes. Banned, sanctioned, threatened. Lex Fridman (03:32:14): Congratulations. Mark Dubowitz (03:32:15): Thank you. Thank you. Well, it causes some difficulties. But anyway, I think the answer to that is that for Putin, he needs to understand that like Khamenei, he has two options here. Option one, which President Trump has signaled over and over and over again is come sit down and negotiate a ceasefire with the Ukrainians. I don’t want to get into the details and the back and forth about who’s responsible for the fact there’s no ceasefire, Putin or Zelensky. I mean, that’s a whole other debate, and I’m sure you guys have a lot of opinions on that. But path one is sit down and let’s negotiate a ceasefire. Path two is the United States will use American power in order to build our leverage so that Vladimir Putin understands that he has to do a ceasefire. Now, I’m not suggesting US troops, absolutely not. What I am suggesting is, there’s a package right now of sanctions that have ADA co-sponsors in the Senate across party lines. Lex Fridman (03:35:10): Increasing military aid to Ukraine, in the case that you described, also has to be coupled with extreme pressure to make peace. Mark Dubowitz (03:35:17): Correct. Extreme pressure to make peace, Lex Fridman (03:35:19): Which Trump hopefully appears to be doing now in Iran. Mark Dubowitz (03:35:23): I think Trump is early… I mean, it’s interesting you said that because he’s early indicators. Again, who knows where the ceasefire goes. But I think it was important he slapped Khamenei, but he also said to Bibi, “Enough, enough.” And it’s like, okay, now we’re going back to Oman. There’s going to be a temporary ceasefire. Now let’s negotiate. And I think that’s important. And I think it shows that Donald Trump is leading, not following. It shows that Donald Trump is his own man, not on the payroll of the Russians or the Iranians or the Israelis or all these other crazy accusations that have been made about this guy for many, many years. And he’s going to give, as they say, peace a chance, and he’s going to give a ceasefire a chance. He’s going to give negotiations a chance. But I’ll think he’s sending the message to the Iranians and he needs to send it to Putin is, if you don’t take me up on my offer, I’ve already demonstrated that I am serious and I will use American power carefully and selectively in the way that I’ve done in the past. Lex Fridman (03:36:23): At the risk of doing the thing I shouldn’t do. But just to test the ideas of libertarianism and the things we’ve been talking about. Can we, for a brief time unrelated to everything we’ve been talking about, talk about World War II, what was the right thing to do in 1938, 1939? What would you do? Okay. To be clear, World War II has nothing to do with current events. In fact, many of the horrible policies of the United States, in my opinion, have to do with projecting World War II onto every single conflict in the world. Okay. Scott Horton (03:37:00): Agree. Lex Fridman (03:37:01): But- Mark Dubowitz (03:37:01): Overlearning. Overlearning. Scott Horton (03:37:00): Agree. Mark Dubowitz (03:37:01): But overlearning. Lex Fridman (03:37:02): Overlearning. But it is an interesting extreme case. Just to clarify, I’m just philosophically talking about at which point do you hit, do you do military intervention, and that’s a nice case. Maybe you have a better case study, but that’s such an extreme one that it’s interesting. Scott Horton (03:37:22): We’re talking about Germany or Japan? Lex Fridman (03:37:23): Germany side. Yeah. Scott Horton (03:37:24): So Japan attacked us and Germany declared war on us. Tough for them. And that’s what happens when you declare war on the United States, you get hit. Lex Fridman (03:37:33): That was idiotic on the part of Hitler to declare war on the United States. Scott Horton (03:37:36): I never understood why he ever did that. They always said it was just because he was crazy. But what it was is he was trying to get the Japanese to invade the Soviet Union from the East and in order to divide Stalin’s forces, which failed and it didn’t work. And it was a huge blunder from his point of view, I guess. Lex Fridman (03:37:50): Philosophically from an interventionism perspective, you’re saying United States should have stayed out from that war as long as possible, until they’re attacked? Scott Horton (03:37:59): Yes. I mean, look at how powerful they ended up being and the amount of damage that they were able to inflict on the Soviets, better them than us. Lex Fridman (03:38:07): What do you think? Mark Dubowitz (03:38:08): So, look- Lex Fridman (03:38:09): Is this a useful discussion? Mark Dubowitz (03:38:10): It’s interesting. I mean, I think it’s interesting- Lex Fridman (03:38:12): Philosophically. Mark Dubowitz (03:38:13): … of sort of libertarianism or isolationism in practice. I mean, I think the ’30s are more interesting to me than what happened between ’39 and ’45. I think the debate in America was very interesting in the ’30s where there was really a strong isolationist movement with Charles Lindbergh and Henry Ford and Father Coughlin and many. Lex Fridman (03:38:34): And Joe Kennedy. Mark Dubowitz (03:38:35): Yeah, and Joe Kennedy. I mean they defined themselves as sort of America-firsters, but it was very much an isolationist strain. And I think we can talk about that history and- Lex Fridman (03:38:44): Coughlin was a New-Dealer, not a right-winger. Mark Dubowitz (03:38:46): Anyway, very much an isolationist talking about America having to stay out of these entangling alliances. This is not our war. Emotionally understandable. Right? Because you can also overlearn the lessons of World War I. and I think they over-learned the lessons of World War I, which was a brutal war and a devastating war mostly for Europe, but obviously for the United States. We lost thousands of American men and women. So the ’30s was this big debate between those who saw the gathering storm of what was happening with Nazi Germany and those who wanted to keep America out. Lex Fridman (03:41:14): To make clear, you mentioned there’s a parallel, but mostly there’s no parallel. It’s a fundamentally different… Mark Dubowitz (03:41:20): Absolutely. Lex Fridman (03:41:20): There will never be a war like that. Scott Horton (03:41:22): It’s a real problem, too, because they always say everybody’s Hitler, all enemies are Hitler. And to compromise with them at all is to appease Hitler and you can never do that. Mark Dubowitz (03:41:30): Agreed. Scott Horton (03:41:31): And they do that to Manuel Noriega, to David Koresh, to Saddam Hussein, to whoever they feel like demonizing and saying is- Mark Dubowitz (03:41:37): Hitler was unique evil. Scott Horton (03:41:38): … too crazy to negotiate with, when let’s get real, and I think we’re agreed about this probably, that in 2002, W. Bush could have just sent Colin Powell, the four-star general former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of State, to read the Riot Act to Saddam Hussein and tell him, “Look, man, you help keep Al-Qaeda down and we’ll let you live.” And everything would’ve been fine. And in fact, just like Saddam Hussein, there’s a great article by James Risen- Mark Dubowitz (03:42:05): For the record, I don’t agree. Scott Horton (03:42:06): Hang on, hang on now. There’s an article by James- Mark Dubowitz (03:42:07): Not surprisingly. Scott Horton (03:42:08): There’s an article by James Risen in the New York Times, and there’s another one by Seymour Hirsch as well about how Saddam Hussein offered to give in on everything. He said, “You want to search for weapons of mass destruction, you can send your Army and FBI everywhere you want. You want us to switch sides in the Israel-Palestine conflict, we’ll stop backing Hamas. You want us to hold elections, we’ll hold elections. Just give us a couple years. If this is about the oil, we’ll sign over mineral rights.” This is James Risen, New York Times. Mark Dubowitz (03:43:54): And they were giving refuge to Al-Qaeda. And the CIA said, “This is a key facilitation pipeline between Iran and Al-Qaeda.” Quote unquote. Scott Horton (03:44:01): They were willing to negotiate a trade- Mark Dubowitz (03:44:03): Key facilitation pipeline. Scott Horton (03:44:04): … between these dangerous Bin Ladenites and the MEK and America refused to negotiate that. And it was years later when the Bin Ladenites abducted some Iranian diplomats in Pakistan that they then traded them away to get their diplomats back. And Atef, I think Bin Laden’s son ended up being killed not long after that, Hamza, and Atef too. But both of those dangerous terrorists were released and were involved in terrorism between then and the time that they were later killed, I think within a couple of years of that. So the hawks always like to say, “Oh yeah, Iran gives such aid and comfort to Al-Qaeda,” and all that. There’s a great document at the Counterterrorism Center at West Point where they debunk all of that. Mark Dubowitz (03:44:44): Yeah, there’s a 9/11 report by the 9/11 Commission. There’s a 9/11 commission report, people can Google it, which talks about the cooperation between Iran and Al-Qaeda. Scott Horton (03:44:53): Only in Bosnia when they were doing a favor for Bill Clinton. Mark Dubowitz (03:44:56): Beyond that, and the CIA released thousands of pages of classified material that they declassified showing the relationship between Iran and Al-Qaeda. The US Treasury Department under Obama and under Trump actually designated a number of Iranian individuals for facilitating Al-Qaeda. So anyway, I mean, these are important facts, but I actually want to- Scott Horton (03:45:19): You mentioned Baghdadi and Soleimani in the same breath a minute ago, and they’re deadly enemies. And it was Soleimani’s Shiite forces in a Iraq war three that helped destroy [inaudible 03:45:27]- Mark Dubowitz (03:45:27): The enemy of my enemy is my friend. Scott Horton (03:45:28): … with America flying air power for them. Mark Dubowitz (03:45:30): The greatest error that we’ve made in the Middle East is this notion, not the greatest, but one of the greatest, is this sort of conceptual error that somehow Sunnis and Shiites don’t work together and Iran doesn’t work with Al-Qaeda- Scott Horton (03:45:30): Well, I didn’t say that. Mark Dubowitz (03:45:43): I’m not saying you say that, but many people think that, and of course they do work, they hate each other, but of course they work together because they hate us more. But can I just say something, Lex, because I actually think just stepping back from all of this detail- Lex Fridman (03:45:54): The more we start to zoom out now, the better. Mark Dubowitz (03:45:56): Yeah. I’d like to zoom out a little bit. Look, I think the lessons for me over 22 years on working on these issues is one must learn about the mistakes that we’ve made in Iraq and in Afghanistan, in Libya. One must learn about the mistakes that we made in Vietnam, mistakes that we made in World War II- Scott Horton (03:46:13): So we can make them all over again in Iran this time. Mark Dubowitz (03:46:15): Can I finish? Or… Scott Horton (03:46:16): Go ahead. Mark Dubowitz (03:46:16): Are you good? Scott Horton (03:46:17): Yeah, I’m ready. Mark Dubowitz (03:46:18): All right. So I think that what President Trump is trying to do is learn but not overlearn. I think he understands the mistakes that have been made. I think he’s trying to rectify those mistakes and he also understands that American power is important. It is a force for good in the world, even though we have made major mistakes. I think there is a great danger amongst certain people to believe that no power should ever be exercised, that all American power is a bad thing and a destructive thing. And sometimes to confuse major tactical decisions that have been made, whether it’s been made by the Brits in World War II or the Americans or us or whoever it is in whatever war, with the fact that there is a strategic reality that we always have to be conscious about and that we have enemies. This is not the Garden of Eden, yet. Scott Horton (03:48:12): They don’t have a nuclear weapons program. Mark Dubowitz (03:48:16): Again, we’ve had a four-hour debate on this, so I’m sure if you want to rewind, you can listen to all our arguments once again. But the fact of the matter is that our unwillingness to use power, if we’re never going to use power, all that’s going to do is send a signal to our enemies that they can do whatever they want. They can violate whatever agreements they want, they can use aggression against anyone they want. And I think that puts American lives in danger. Lex Fridman (03:49:23): On that topic, question for both of you, Scott. If human civilization destroys itself in the next 75 years, it probably most likely will be a World War III type of scenario, maybe a nuclear war. How do we avoid that? We’ve been talking about Iran, but there’ll be new conflicts. There’s Ukraine, China… Scott Horton (03:49:41): Kashmir. Lex Fridman (03:49:42): Kashmir. Mark Dubowitz (03:49:44): North Korea. Lex Fridman (03:49:46): Yeah. Mark Dubowitz (03:49:47): Don’t forget North Korea. Lex Fridman (03:49:48): Yeah, I mean, there was time when North Korea was the biggest threat to human civilization, according to… Scott Horton (03:49:53): We could have had a deal except John Bolton ruined it. Lex Fridman (03:49:56): So that’s the bigger question, not so much in the specifics. Scott Horton (03:50:00): Oh, I mean the second time. He ruined the Clinton deal of ’94, then he ruined the Trump deal of 2018. Mark Dubowitz (03:50:06): Or maybe the North Korean dictator ruined it. But again, one doesn’t want to blame our enemies for their mistakes. Scott Horton (03:50:12): Well, at the second meeting, Trump sent John Bolton to Outer Mongolia so that he couldn’t sit at the table and ruin the deal. But what happened then? The Democrats had his lawyer testify against him while he was at the meeting and they had this huge propaganda campaign that Kim Jong Un is going to walk all over Trump and take such advantage of him, and they made it virtually impossible for him to walk away claiming a victory. Mark Dubowitz (03:50:33): Scott, do you ever blame the enemy ever? Do you ever blame the enemy? Scott Horton (03:50:37): North Korea is not my enemy. Mark Dubowitz (03:50:38): North Korea is not your enemy? Scott Horton (03:50:40): No. Mark Dubowitz (03:50:40): Really? They build nuclear weapons, ICBMs that targeted America. Scott Horton (03:50:45): That’s George Bush and John Bolton’s fault. I already said that. Mark Dubowitz (03:50:47): Well, whatever fault it is, the fact of the matter is do you ever, ever blame an American adversary or is it always our fault? Scott Horton (03:50:55): In fact, what happened was- Mark Dubowitz (03:50:57): Is it always our fault? Scott Horton (03:50:58): See, all you can do is characterize, but you don’t want to talk about the details. The details are that Stephen Biegun, who worked for Donald Trump gave a speech and said, “you know what? We can put normalization first and denuclearization later.” Mark Dubowitz (03:51:11): I know him very well. Scott Horton (03:51:12): And then Donald Trump brought John Bolton to the meeting and he prevented that from being the message of the meeting and ruined the deal. Mark Dubowitz (03:51:24): So it’s always John Bolton’s fault. Always the neocon’s fault. Scott Horton (03:51:25): Yes. That’s right. It’s all John Bolton’s fault, because how reasonable does this sound to you, Lex- Mark Dubowitz (03:51:26): It’s lobby fault. Scott Horton (03:51:29): Give up all your nuclear weapons first, then we’ll talk about every other issue. Does that sound like a poison pill or that sounds like a reasonable negotiation? Give me a break. Mark Dubowitz (03:51:37): Sounds like a beginning of a negotiation. Scott Horton (03:51:39): Yeah. Well, they got nowhere because Trump brought John Bolton with him and helped to ruin it. Mark Dubowitz (03:51:44): And maybe they went nowhere because the North Korean dictator at the end of the day, is a dictator who wants threaten the United States with ICBMs and nuclear. Listen, you’re criticizing the sequential decisions made in a negotiation. Scott Horton (03:51:59): I am. Mark Dubowitz (03:51:59): I’m just asking you a serious question out of hours of talking. Scott Horton (03:52:02): Okay. Mark Dubowitz (03:52:03): Which I must say I’ve really enjoyed. I’ve learned a lot. Lex Fridman (03:52:06): I enjoyed it. Mark Dubowitz (03:52:07): I think there’s been areas of agreement, obviously real disagreement. But here’s the question to you, really. I mean, do you ever, ever hold our adversaries responsible or do you just don’t think we have any adversaries? Scott Horton (03:52:19): This is ridiculous. The topic has been- Mark Dubowitz (03:52:23): Tell me. Scott Horton (03:52:23): … from your point of view, it’s all the adversaries and all American and Israel are trying to do is survive and fix the situation the best they can. Mark Dubowitz (03:52:31): I think I’ve acknowledged America’s has made mistakes the whole time. Scott Horton (03:52:33): I’m refuting that by bringing up all the things that America and Israel have done to make matters worse. I didn’t ever say that the Ayatollah’s some great guy or that Kim Jong Un is some hero or any kind of- Mark Dubowitz (03:52:42): But do you think they’re threats to America? Scott Horton (03:52:42): … thing to spin for their side. Mark Dubowitz (03:52:44): Are there a threat to America? Scott Horton (03:52:45): No, of course not. As Zbigniew Brozinsky said in 1993- Mark Dubowitz (03:52:48): They’re not a threat to America? Wow. Scott Horton (03:52:50): … we could have perfectly normalized relations then. You talk about Iranian support for Al-Qaeda, Iran supported Al-Qaeda in Bosnia- Mark Dubowitz (03:52:57): That’s the bottom line. Scott Horton (03:52:57): … in 1995 as a favor to Bill Clinton because they were trying to suck up to the United States- Mark Dubowitz (03:53:02): I understand. Scott Horton (03:53:02): … is why they supported Al-Qaeda in Bosnia. Mark Dubowitz (03:53:04): I understand it, your position, your position- Scott Horton (03:53:05): Yes. My position is whatever you say it is, not what I say. Mark Dubowitz (03:53:08): No, no. I’m just, I’m trying to summarize. Scott Horton (03:53:10): You know who’s the last person who told me I need to be ware about over-learning the lessons of Iraq? It was Charlie Savage from the New York Times when on the subject was his absolute ridiculous hoax, that Russia was paying the Taliban to murder American soldiers in Afghanistan in 2020, which ruined Trump’s potential, which he was floating trial balloons about withdrawing in the summer of 2020, which would’ve absolutely prevented- Mark Dubowitz (03:53:34): Scott, you said it. Scott Horton (03:53:34): … the Joe Biden era catastrophe. Mark Dubowitz (03:53:36): You said it. Scott Horton (03:53:36): And Charlie Savage who published these ridiculous lies- Mark Dubowitz (03:53:40): Scott. Scott Horton (03:53:41): … that were later refuted by the general in charge of the Afghan war, the head of CENTCOM, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the director of Intelligence- Mark Dubowitz (03:53:47): You flood the zone with as much detail as possible. Scott Horton (03:53:48): He told me, “You know what your problem is, Horton, is you have over-learned the lessons of Iraq War II.” But it turned out those lessons were perfectly apt for Charlie Savage’s hoax. It wasn’t true what Charlie Savage said, you know what he resorted to? He said, “Well, it’s true that there was a rumor I was reporting on.” Mark Dubowitz (03:54:05): Scott. You made it very clear, America has no adversaries. Scott Horton (03:54:08): That’s called learning the lessons of Iraq, not over-learning them. Lex Fridman (03:54:12): All right, so I guess the answer to the question I asked about avoiding World War III is the two of you becoming friends. That’s my goal. If we can try to find the light at the end of the tunnel. One last question. What gives you hope to the degree of hope about the future? What gives you hope about this great country of ours and humanity too? Scott Horton (03:54:33): Yeah, I mean, look, there are a million wonderful things about this country. The land, the people, our culture and our resources and everything, and the kind of society that we could build in, not with a controlled system, but with just a pure free market capitalist system in this country where people are allowed to own their property, improve its value, and exchange it on the market and build this country up. We would be living in, comparatively, a paradise compared to what we have now. And if you look at the opportunity costs just since the end of the Cold War on all that has been wasted on militarism in the Middle East especially, but also in Eastern Europe and in East Asia, all of that wealth put here could have gone much more to something like perfecting our society. Lex Fridman (03:56:14): What gives you hope? Mark Dubowitz (03:56:15): What gives me hope? I think first of all, I have a lot of hope and confidence in the wisdom of the American people. I think Americans understand at the end of the day that they need leaders who are about making America great again. I think they elected Donald Trump who is flawed in many, many ways. But I think Trump is wrestling with some of the questions that we have been wrestling with for the past five hours. I think most Americans know that we have adversaries and it’s just overwhelming numbers of Americans understand that. They may disagree on exactly who is an adversary and how you rank them, but they know we have adversaries. I think the third thing is Americans greatly admire the men and women in uniform. I mean, I think the institution with the greatest popularity in America still remains the US military. Scott Horton (03:58:39): The Iranians. Mark Dubowitz (03:58:41): Well, and we start focusing on our adversaries, which are not the Iranians, because the 80% of Iranians despise this regime. And Lex, I feel really bad that in five hours we actually haven’t even talked about that in any detail. Lex Fridman (03:58:52): Many of my friends are Iranian. They’re beautiful people. And it’s one of the great cultures on earth, yeah. Mark Dubowitz (03:58:57): And you know the only place they don’t succeed in the world is inside the Islamic Republic. When they come to America and Canada and Europe, they’re incredibly successful people. And 80% of Iranians despise this regime and they long for a free and prosperous Iran. And so it’s a big question that they’re ever going to get there. And who knows the right way to get them there. But at the end of the day, I am convinced that the vast majority of Iranians are our friends. But there is a regime that has been trying to build nuclear weapons, has been engaged in terrorism for decades, has killed and maimed thousands of Americans and our allies. And it’s a regime that has to be stopped. Lex Fridman (04:00:36): I am deeply grateful that you guys will come here. This is really mind-blowing, also that you have, it’s silly maybe to say, but the courage to sit down and talk through this, through the tension. I’ve learned a lot. I think a lot of people are going to learn a lot. I’m a fan of both of your work and it means a lot that you’ll come here today and talk to a silly kid like me. So Scott, thank you so much, brother. Scott Horton (04:01:04): Thank you. Lex Fridman (04:01:04): Thank you, Mark. Mark Dubowitz (04:01:05): Thanks Lex, appreciate it. Lex Fridman (04:01:06): Bam. Mark Dubowitz (04:01:06): Thanks Scott. Lex Fridman (04:01:09): Thanks for listening to this debate between Scott Horton and Mark Dubowitz. To support this podcast, please check out our sponsors in the description and consider subscribing to this channel. And now let me leave you with some sobering words on the cost of war from Dwight D. Eisenhower. For some context, Eisenhower was the 34th President of the United States. But before that, during World War II, he was the supreme commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, orchestrating some of the most significant military operations at the war with leadership marked by strategic and tactical brilliance. It is in this context that the following words carry even more power and wisdom, spoken in 1953.